Credit Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Management. by Park, Kunsu
  
CREDIT RATINGS CONSERVATISM AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
AUGUST 2017 
 
 
By 
Kunsu Park 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
Jian Zhou, Chairperson 
S. Ghon Rhee 
John Wendell 
Liming Guan 
Inessa Love 
 
Keywords: Credit Ratings Conservatism, Earnings Management 
 ii 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to my family. A very special dedication goes to my 
parents, Jongoh Park and Jeongkeun Oh, who always encourage me to pursue this study 
and to continue my education in the fields of economics, management and administrative 
science (MAS), finance and accounting. My parents always give me unconditional love 
and support. I would like to dedicate this work to my first younger sister Kyeongok Park, 
brother-in-law Kitae Hong, and two nephews Hayoon Hong and Haram Hong, for their 
unwavering love and support. I would also like to dedicate this work to my second 
younger sister Kyungja Park, brother-in-law Wooseong Jin, and two nephews Jonghwa 
Jin and Jonghyun Jin, for their constant love and support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank all my committee members, Dr. Jian Zhou, Dr. S. Ghon 
Rhee, Dr. John Wendell, Dr. Liming Guan, and Dr. Inessa Love, for their valuable 
comments and inspiring discussions, and continued guidance. In particular, my 
dissertation advisor Dr. Jian Zhou has always given me plenty of advice, support, and 
encouragement during my Ph.D. studies. I would also like to express my deepest 
gratitude and special thanks to Dr. S. Ghon Rhee for his continued support, inspiration, 
guidance, and encouragement throughout the journey of this dissertation. He has been an 
exceptional academic mentor to me. Without their support and guidance, I would not 
have been able to complete this dissertation.  
I would also like to thank Dr. Boochun Jung, Dr. Shirley Daniel, Dr. Hamid 
Pourjalali, Dr. David Yang, Dr. Tom Pearson, Dr. Roger Debreceny, Dr. Wei Huang, Dr. 
Qianqiu Liu, Dr. Sang-Hyop Lee, Dr. Song K. Choi, and Dr. Kentaro Hayashi for their 
support, encouragement, and kind assistance during my Ph.D. studies. In particular, Dr. 
Song K. Choi has given me invaluable advice and support through all stages of my work. 
Dr. Boochun Jung always gives me valuable comments and suggestions regarding my 
work. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Mark Anderson, who encouraged me to pursue 
my Ph.D. studies in the field of accounting.  
I would like to express my appreciation to my Ph.D. colleagues for their 
continued support and motivation. Among those who deserve special recognition are 
 iv 
James Youn, Cheol-Rin Park, Jaeseong Lim, Jaisang Kim, Youngbin Kim, and Jin Suk 
Park. I also want to express my thanks to my friends for their encouragement and 
unconditional love. Those who deserve special thanks are Kyung Sung Jung, Young 
Kwark, Jongmin Kim, Tong Hyouk Kang, Soonchul Hyun, Joo Hyung Lee, Jangho Gil, 
Jong-Min Oh, Seong K. Byun, Sung Hoon Woo, YoungJae Kim, Hojin Jung, Minwoo 
Lee, Sang Baum Solomon Kang, Sung Bok Lee, Jason Shin, Hyunsuk Jang, Chris Choi, 
Dong Wook Huh, Kwondo Song, and Soonsup Hong.  
I would also like to acknowledge Nicole Kurashige and Avree Ito-fujita for their 
assistance and guidance in helping me to improve English writing skills during my Ph.D. 
studies. I would like to thank Rosemarie Woodruff and Adam Pang for your continued 
encouragement and assistance. I would also like to thank Bumhwan Jeon, Kara 
Youngshim Bang, and Dawna Kim for unconditionally supporting me throughout my 
studies. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank Dr. Young Mok Choi and Dr. Se Hun Lim 
for their motivation, support, and assistance during my studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
I examine whether ratings conservatism influences a firm’s earnings management. 
First, total earnings management, calculated as the sum of real and accrual-based 
earnings management measures, increases in response to ratings conservatism. Ratings 
conservatism leads to a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings 
management, indicating that the increase in real earnings management is greater than the 
decrease in accrual-based earnings management. Next, the negative relation between 
ratings conservatism and accrual-based earnings management is more pronounced for 
firms with low credit quality than for those with high credit quality. However, the 
positive relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings management does not 
apply to both investment- and speculative-grade firms. The results are robust to sample 
selection bias, alternative measures of accrual-based earnings management, alternative 
industry classifications, alternative cut-off years employed when measuring ratings 
conservatism, the effect of external events, omitted variable bias, and different 
specifications for ratings models. In addition, there is no evidence of earnings smoothing 
and asymmetric timeliness loss recognition relating to ratings conservatism. Overall, this 
study finds that ratings conservatism affects a firm’s incentive to manage its reported 
earnings. This study also represents the first step towards understanding how ratings 
conservatism influences the earnings management behaviors of managers. 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iii 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... xiii 
 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1
 RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENTCHAPTER 2
............................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Credit Ratings and Earnings Management .............................................................. 13 
2.2 Stringent Trends in Rating Standards (“Ratings Conservatism”) ........................... 16 
2.3 Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Management .................................................. 18 
 RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................ 28 CHAPTER 3
3.1 Measuring Credit Ratings Conservatism ................................................................. 28 
3.2 Measures of Earnings Management ........................................................................ 31 
3.2.1 Accrual-Based Earnings Management (AEM) ............................................. 31 
3.2.2 Real Earnings Management (REM) .............................................................. 32 
3.2.3 Total Earnings Management (TEM) ............................................................. 35 
3.3 Baseline Regression Model ..................................................................................... 35 
 vii 
 SAMPLE SELECTION AND ESTIMATION OF RATINGS CHAPTER 4
MODELS ............................................................................................................. 41 
4.1 Data Selection ......................................................................................................... 41 
4.2 Ratings Models ........................................................................................................ 42 
4.2.1 Data Description ............................................................................................ 42 
4.2.2 Estimating Ratings Models ........................................................................... 42 
 RESULTS ................................................................................................. 44 CHAPTER 5
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations ................................................................... 44 
5.2 Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Accrual-Based Earnings Management: 
Testing H1 ......................................................................................................................... 46 
5.3 Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Real Earnings Management: Testing 
H1 50 
5.4 Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Total Earnings Management ........... 53 
5.5 Investment- and Speculative-Grade Firms (Accrual-Based Earnings Management): 
Testing H2 ......................................................................................................................... 54 
5.6 Investment- and Speculative-Grade Firms (Real earnings management): Testing H2
 58 
 POTENTIAL SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS ....................................... 61 CHAPTER 6
 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES ................................................................... 63 CHAPTER 7
7.1 Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Smoothing (EM_SMOOTH) ......................... 63 
7.2 Ratings Conservatism and Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition ........................ 67 
 viii 
 ROBUSTNESS TESTS ........................................................................... 73 CHAPTER 8
8.1 Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management ............................ 73 
8.2 Using Alternative Industry Classifications When Calculating Ratings Conservatism 
and Earnings Management Proxies ................................................................................... 77 
8.3 Alternative Cut-Off Years Employed When Measuring Ratings Conservatism ..... 79 
8.4 Controlling for the Effect of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 ................. 80 
8.5 Possibility of Omitted Variable Bias ....................................................................... 81 
8.6 Re-estimation of the Regression Equation (8) ........................................................ 82 
8.7 Validity of the Ratings Model ................................................................................. 83 
8.8 Role of Accounting Quality in the Assignment of Credit Ratings .......................... 84 
 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 86 CHAPTER 9
 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ................................... 88 CHAPTER 10
APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: RATINGS MODEL ............................ 90 
APPENDIX B VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: BASELINE REGRESSION MODEL91 
APPENDIX C MEASURE OF ASYMMETRIC TIMELY LOSS RECOGNITION: 
Khan and Watts’ C_Score (2009, p. 136) .......................................................... 96 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 158 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1     Number of Firms by S&P Credit Ratings Categories and Year, 1985-2014 
(CHAPTER 4) ........................................................................................................... 97 
Table 2     Summary Statistics for Relevant Variables used in Ratings Models 
(CHAPTER 4) ........................................................................................................... 98 
Table 3     Ratings Models (CHAPTER 4) ....................................................................... 99 
Table 4     Descriptive Statistics (CHAPTER 5) ............................................................. 102 
Table 5     Pearson Correlation Coefficients (CHAPTER 5) .......................................... 103 
Table 6     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management (Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) 
(CHAPTER 5) ......................................................................................................... 104 
Table 7     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management (Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) 
(CHAPTER 5) ......................................................................................................... 106 
Table 8     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Real Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 5)
 ................................................................................................................................. 108 
Table 9     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Real Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) (CHAPTER 5)
 ................................................................................................................................. 110 
 x 
Table 10     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Total Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using TEM1) (CHAPTER 5) ............................................................... 112 
Table 11     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Total Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using TEM2) (CHAPTER 5) ............................................................... 114 
Table 12     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 5)
 ................................................................................................................................. 116 
Table 13     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) (CHAPTER 5)
 ................................................................................................................................. 118 
Table 14     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using REM1) (CHAPTER 5) ............................................................... 120 
Table 15     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using REM2) (CHAPTER 5) ............................................................... 122 
Table 16     Potential Sample Selection Bias                                                                                                                     
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 6)
 ................................................................................................................................. 124 
Table 17     Additional Analysis                                                                                                                                         
Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Smoothing (CHAPTER 7) 127 
 xi 
Table 18     Additional Analysis                                                                                                                                         
Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition 
(CHAPTER 7) ......................................................................................................... 129 
Table 19                                                                                                                                                                               
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 1: Testing H1 
(CHAPTER 8) ......................................................................................................... 130 
Table 20                                                                                                                                                                              
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 2: Testing H1 
(CHAPTER 8) ......................................................................................................... 133 
Table 21                                                                                                                                                                              
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 3: Testing H1 
(CHAPTER 8) ......................................................................................................... 136 
Table 22                                                                                                                                                                               
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 4: Testing H1 
(CHAPTER 8) ......................................................................................................... 139 
Table 23                                                                                                                                                                                   
Using a Three-Digit SIC Industry: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) ............................... 142 
Table 24                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1997): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) ..................... 145 
Table 25                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1998): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) ..................... 148 
 xii 
Table 26                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controlling for the Effect of Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Testing H1 
(CHAPTER 8) ......................................................................................................... 151 
Table 27                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controlling for the Controlling for Additional Variables: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8)
 ................................................................................................................................. 154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1     Plot of Coefficient on Year Dummies in Ratings Models (CHAPTER 4) ... 157 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, credit ratings of U.S. firms, on average, have declined. Prior 
research documents that the downward trend in credit ratings is attributed to more stringent credit 
standards by credit ratings agencies (Blume et al., 1998; Alp, 2013; Baghai et al., 2014; Afik et al., 
2016).
1
 The term “ratings conservatism” refers to the tendency for credit ratings agencies 
to tighten their credit standards over time. Several studies focus on a firm’s earnings 
management in relation to credit ratings and to credit ratings changes (Ali and Zhang, 2008; Alissa 
et al., 2013; Jung et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013; Shen and Huang, 2013). However, the relation 
between ratings conservatism and earnings management has yet to be investigated. My study 
begins with the following research questions: Does ratings conservatism affect a firm’s earnings 
management behavior? If so, does ratings conservatism influence the choice between real and 
accrual-based earnings management? In addition to real and accrual-based earnings management, 
does ratings conservatism affect other types of earnings management, such as earnings smoothing 
and asymmetric timeliness loss recognition? To answer these questions, I examine how ratings 
conservatism influences a firm’s incentive to manage its reported earnings through earnings 
                                                 
1
 An exception is Jorion et al. (2009), who argue that the downward trend in corporate credit ratings is 
due to the decline in accounting quality over time. On the other hand, my study is based on the argument by 
previous studies that the decline in credit ratings is primarily caused by the tightening rating standards 
applied by ratings agencies (Blume et al., 1998; Alp, 2013; Baghai et al., 2014; Afik et al., 2016). I focus 
on the impact of stringent rating standards over time (“ratings conservatism”) on a firm’s earnings 
management. I do not, however, explore why bond ratings of U.S. firms have declined over time. To do 
this, I first replicate Baghai et al.’s (2014) findings. I then extend the sample period to 2014 and calculate 
ratings conservatism proxies proposed by Baghai et al. (2014). Finally, I investigate whether ratings 
conservatism influences a firm’s incentive to manage earnings via earnings management. 
 2 
 
management. 
Issues concerning a firm’s earnings management have attracted much interest from 
academics and practitioners over several decades.
2
 Prior literature investigates potential motives for 
a firm’s earnings management from different perspectives, such as management compensation 
contracts (Healy, 1985; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Gaver et al., 1995; Hothausen et al., 1995; 
Balsam, 1998; Guidry et al., 1999), lending contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994), regulatory motives (Moyer, 1990; Collins et al., 1995), political costs (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Jones, 1991), capital market motives (Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b), and so on. In 
addition to these motives, three recent studies (Ali and Zhang, 2008; Alissa et al., 2013; Kim et al., 
2013) provide an additional incentive for managers to manage their firms’ earnings in the context of 
credit ratings and credit ratings changes. Managers are more likely to behave opportunistically. 
Specifically, earnings management behaviors in response to credit ratings and credit ratings changes 
can affect a firm’s cost of capital and further its stock price. Therefore, credit ratings are one of the 
important characteristics that explain a firm’s earnings management behaviors. 
Prior research also shows that credit ratings agencies have become more conservative with 
their credit standards and provides the testable implications of ratings conservatism for researchers 
and managers (Blume et al., 1998; Alp, 2013; Baghai et al., 2014; Afik et al., 2016). One may take 
into account ratings conservatism in examining a potential motive for a firm’s earnings 
                                                 
2
 Schipper (1989) states earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the 
neutral operation of the process)” (p. 92). In a similar way, as described by  Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (p. 368). 
 3 
 
management in the framework of credit ratings. This is indeed what I explore in this paper. 
Corporate credit ratings are determined by not only a firm’s financial conditions and operating 
performance at a current point in time, but also by ratings agencies’ evaluation criteria or standards. 
If the tightening of credit standards by ratings agencies remains persistent over time, such stringent 
standards influence the opportunistic earnings management behaviors of managers. 
I propose two hypotheses to examine the relation between ratings conservatism and 
earnings management. The first hypothesis is: Credit ratings conservatism leads to a substitution 
between real and accrual-based earnings management. My hypothesis of the substitution between 
real and accrual-based earnings management is based on theoretical, empirical, and anecdotal 
evidence.
3
 Managers use real and accrual-based earnings management either individually or jointly 
to achieve one or more objectives (Kothari et al., 2016). I infer that firms pursue alternate means to 
manage their reported earnings in response to ratings conservatism. Mangers have incentives to 
manage their firms’ reported earnings via real earnings management to meet earnings targets 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Managers in firms more affected by stringent rating standards engage in 
real earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks in an attempt to enhance their 
credibility with capital markets and to achieve desired credit ratings. For example, survey evidence 
provided by Graham et al. (2005) shows that the chief financial officers (CFOs) responded that their 
firms try to meet earnings benchmarks in an effort to “achieve or preserve a desired credit rating.” 
(p. 25). Firms affected by ratings conservatism engage in more real earnings management and gain 
                                                 
3
 Blume et al. (1998), Graham and Harvey (2001), Bartov et al. (2002), Graham et al. (2005), 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Kisgen (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Jorion et al. (2009), Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), Gunny (2010), Caton et al. (2011), Zang (2012), Shen and Huang (2013), Baghai et al. (2014), Ge 
and Kim (2014), and Standard & Poor's (2008, 2015) contribute to the study of this topic. Please see 
subsection 2.3 for more details. 
 4 
 
better credit ratings by meeting earnings benchmarks, which consequently access debt markets at a 
more favorable rate.
4
 Thus, firms that suffer more from ratings conservatism engage in more real 
earnings management. On the other hand, I predict that ratings conservatism restrains managers 
from engaging in accrual-based earnings management because high accounting accruals are 
observable to sophisticated credit rating agencies as well as regulators, auditors and even 
institutional investors (Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2010; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015). 
Firms with high accounting accruals are subject to closer scrutiny from regulators (the SEC), 
auditors, and even credit rating agencies. High accounting accruals are more likely to be related to 
accrual-based earnings management, which results in a decrease in financial reporting quality and 
thus an increase in uncertainty among capital market participants, including credit rating agencies 
(Akins, 2017).  The high accounting accruals can impede credit ratings agencies from timely and 
accurately assigning credit ratings to firms and have a negative influence on a firm’s future credit 
ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Jorion et al., 2009; Caton et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2013; Shen 
and Huang, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2015).5 Accordingly, high accounting accruals are negatively 
associated with the assignment of credit ratings by ratings agencies, which likely result in tighter 
rating standards. Thus, firms more affected by ratings conservatism have incentives to engage in 
less accrual-based earnings management. Collectively, as ratings conservatism increases, real 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Bartov et al. (2002) and Gunny (2010).  
5
 Based on these prior studies, I infer that credit rating agencies are able to (fully) comprehend a firm’s 
accounting accruals process and penalize earnings management behaviors of managers. For example, 
Standard & Poor’s (2015) states that accounting quality is considered to be a factor in the process of 
assigning bond ratings.  
 5 
 
earnings management increases while accrual-based earnings management decreases.
6
 Another 
possible explanation for the substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management in 
response to ratings conservatism is as follows: Ratings conservatism implies that ratings agencies 
apply more stringent requirements (or criteria) on qualitative information (accounting quality) as 
well as on quantitative information (past audited financial statements) in their assignment of credit 
ratings. Ratings conservatism also implies that, given that financial conditions or operating 
performance are comparable with the previous year, firms affected more by ratings conservatism 
receive relatively worse ratings than before. Accordingly, due to their ratings disadvantages, firms 
experience difficulty in obtaining debt financing, which could lead to lower levels of debt.
7
 
Consequently, firms would deviate from their target debt (or target leverage) ratios. To make up for 
the deviation, the firms attempt to revert back to their target debt ratios. These firms have a desire to 
improve their credit ratings because improved ratings can signal a lower likelihood of credit risk (or 
default risk) to market participants, including investors and creditors, which likely results in lower 
debt financing costs. Therefore, in response to ratings conservatism, managers have incentives to 
improve their accounting quality (or earnings quality) by engaging in less accrual-based earnings 
management in an attempt to achieve desirable or better credit ratings. In other words, these firms 
engage in less accrual-based earnings management to improve accounting quality for a better credit 
rating to access debt markets at a favorable rate. On the other hand, ratings conservatism can lead 
managers to resort real earnings management, which possibly benefits from an increase in earnings 
                                                 
6
 Of course, it is possible that firms use the combination of real and accrual-based earnings 
management. 
7
 If capital markets completely take into account the effect of ratings conservatism, firms would not 
need to consider it in their debt financing decisions.  
 6 
 
and thus positively affects debt ratings in spite of its costs.
8
 In a circumstance that rating agencies 
have become more conservative in their assignment of credit ratings, the costs of real earnings 
management (e.g., lower subsequent operating performance (Gunny, 2005)) are be less than its 
benefits (e.g., the benefits from beating or meeting earnings targets/benchmarks (Graham et al., 
2005; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012)) as discussed earlier.
9
 Taken together, in response to ratings 
conservatism, mangers prefer real earnings management to accrual-based earnings management. 
The second hypothesis is: The positive (negative) relation between ratings conservatism and real 
earnings management (accrual-based earnings management) is more pronounced for firms with 
low credit quality than for those with high credit quality. Given that credit ratings agencies consider 
accounting quality as an important item for their assignment of credit ratings, I infer that to obtain 
better credit ratings and thus access debt markets at a more favorable rate, firms with low credit 
quality, i.e., speculative-grade firms, have more (less) incentive to manage their reported earnings 
via real earnings management (accrual-based earnings management) than those with high credit 
quality, i.e., investment-grade firms.  
Using a sample of publicly traded and rated U.S. firms between 1985 and 2014, I 
investigate the relation between ratings conservatism and earnings management. I use the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) as well as positive and negative 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for a firm’s accrual-based earnings management. To 
calculate discretionary accruals, I follow Dechow et al. (1995) and use the cross-sectional 
                                                 
8
 See, for example, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005).  
9
 Graham et al. (2005) provide survey evidence on why chief financial officers (CFOs) have a desire to 
meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Please see Graham et al. (2005, p. 21-43) for more details.  
 7 
 
modified Jones (1991) model. Next, following Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate the 
abnormal levels of operating cash flows, production costs and discretionary expenditures 
to capture a firm’s real earnings management. To capture total real earnings management, 
I follow Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), and generate 
two alternative measures, REM1 (calculated as the sum of the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one and the abnormal level of production 
costs) and REM2 (computed as the sum of the abnormal level of discretionary expenses 
and the abnormal level of operating cash flows, both multiplied by negative one). 
Furthermore, to examine the effect of ratings conservatism on overall earnings 
management, I follow Chan et al. (2015) and generate two measures, TEM1 (calculated 
as the sum of the signed discretionary accruals (DA) and the aggregate real earnings 
management (REM1)) and TEM2 (computed as the sum of the signed discretionary 
accruals (DA) and the aggregate real earnings management (REM2)).
10
 On the other hand, 
I employ two measures of credit ratings conservatism developed by Baghai et al. (2014). 
The procedures for measuring ratings conservatism are similar to those in Baghai et al. 
(2014). Specifically, in the first step, I estimate ratings models between 1985 and 1996 to 
predict ratings between 1997 and 2014. In the second step, I obtain two ratings 
conservatism proxies, measured as the difference between a firm’s actual and predicted 
ratings. 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, I find that ratings conservatism is negatively 
                                                 
10
 Furthermore, for additional analyses, I use earnings smoothing measures and asymmetric timely loss 
recognition measures. See subsections 6.1 and 6.2 for more details.  
 8 
 
related to accrual-based earnings management, measured through the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and positive discretionary actuals. These findings suggest that 
firms affected more by ratings conservatism engage in less accrual-based earnings 
management and income-increasing earnings management.
11
 Furthermore, with respect to 
negative discretionary accruals, I find a positive relation between ratings conservatism 
and accrual-based earnings management. This finding indicates that firms affected more 
by ratings conservatism engage in less income-decreasing earnings management. Taken 
together, my evidence suggests that accrual-based earnings management decreases with 
ratings conservatism. In contrast, I find that firms affected more by ratings conservatism 
engage in more real earnings management, measured as the abnormal levels of production costs, 
discretionary expenses, and cash flow from operations as well as aggregate measures of real 
earnings management, REM1 and REM2. These findings support my first hypothesis. To 
summarize, ratings conservatism leads to a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings 
management. Furthermore, given the two opposite effects, I find that ratings conservatism increases 
total earnings management. This finding implies that the increase in real earnings management is 
greater than the decrease in accrual-based earnings management. Next, consistent with my 
second hypothesis, I find that the negative relation between ratings conservatism and 
accrual-based earnings management (measured as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals) is stronger for speculative-grade firms than for investment-grade firms. 
However, I find that the positive relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings 
                                                 
11
 When using the ratings conservatism measure based on firm fixed effects, I find no evidence of 
income-increasing earnings management.  
 9 
 
management does not apply to both investment- and speculative-grade firms. This finding is 
inconsistent with my hypothesis that the positive relation is more pronounced for speculative-grade 
firms than for speculative-grade firms. With respect to a series of robustness checks, my main 
results are robust to sample selection bias, alternative measures of accrual-based earnings 
management, alternative industry classifications, alternative cut-off years employed when 
measuring ratings conservatism, the effect of external events, omitted variable bias, and 
different specifications for ratings models. Finally, regarding additional analyses, I find no 
evidence that firms more affected by ratings conservatism tend to engage in more or less earnings 
smoothing. I also find inconsistent results regarding the relation between ratings conservatism and 
each measure of asymmetric timeliness loss recognition. 
My study provides the following several contributions: First, this study contributes to the 
literature on ratings conservatism by providing evidence that the tightening of rating standards 
affects a firm’s earnings management. Until now, there is little literature on the downward trend in 
corporate credit ratings of U.S. firms over time (Blume et al., 1998; Jorion et al., 2009; Alp, 2013; 
Baghai et al., 2014; Afik et al., 2016). These studies document that rating standards have become 
more stringent over the past decades, except for Jorion et al. (2009). Specifically, Blume et al. (1998) 
argue that corporate credit ratings have become more stringent for the period of 1978 to 1995. Their 
argument is supported by subsequent studies, including Alp (2013), Baghai et al. (2014), and Afik 
et al. (2016). In contrast, Jorion et al. (2009) claim that the tightening of rating standards only 
applies to investment-grade firms, suggesting that the downward trend in credit ratings is mainly 
due to the change in accounting quality over time, not stringent rating standards by ratings agencies . 
 10 
 
Unlike Jorion et al. (2009) and Alp (2013), Baghai et al. (2014) develop a measure of ratings 
conservatism and further examine whether ratings conservatism affects corporate behaviors, such as 
a firm’s capital structure decisions, cash holdings, and debt spreads. I further extend prior studies, 
especially Baghai et al.’s (2014), by considering whether ratings conservatism can affect a firm’s 
earnings management. This study provides evidence that firms take on different earnings 
management strategies in response to ratings conservatism. 
Second, this study extends prior literature on the relation between credit ratings (changes) 
and earnings management by examining the effect of ratings conservatism on a firm’s earnings 
management. Among prior studies (Ali and Zhang, 2008; Alissa et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013), 
Alissa et al. (2013) examine how a manager’s discretion of earnings management affects credit 
ratings. They document that when a firm’s current ratings are below (above) expected ratings, the 
firm has an incentive to manage its reported earnings upward (downward). My study is, however, 
different from theirs in several ways. First, unlike Alissa et al., I examine how ratings conservatism 
affects earnings management using a novel measure of ratings conservatism developed by Baghai 
et al. (2014). Second, my study takes into account the behaviors of credit ratings agencies using a 
measure of ratings conservatism. This study provides evidence that ratings conservatism can be one 
of the potential characteristics that affect a firm’s earnings management. Although there are prior 
studies on earnings management from the perspectives of credit ratings (change), there is no 
evidence of whether the tightening of rating standards by credit ratings agencies influences a firm’s 
earnings management. With my study, I hope to fill this gap by providing the impact of ratings 
conservatism on earnings management. My study is different from prior literature on the relation 
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between credit ratings (changes) and earnings management in that I take into account both the 
opportunistic behaviors of managers and the behavioral changes of credit ratings agencies.  
Third, this study complements recent studies on the relation between real and accrual-based 
earnings management by providing evidence that ratings conservatism can be one of the potential 
factors in explaining the alternation of a firm’s earnings management. I find evidence of a 
substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management in my study. Graham et al. (2005) 
and Roychowdhury (2006) document a firm’s preference of real earnings management over 
accrual-based earnings management. On the other hand, some studies show that firms alternate their 
decision to use each earnings management strategies (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015).
12
  
Finally, this study provides meaningful implications for corporate decision makers, 
researchers, and regulators. For corporate decision makers, ratings conservatism by rating agencies 
is an important issue because it affects or distorts a firm’s debt financing decisions. For researchers, 
ratings conservatism is an interesting topic and worthy of investigation because it broadens their 
perspectives and can be applied to other areas. For example, my study represents the first step 
towards understanding the role of ratings conservatism in a firm’s earnings management. For 
regulators, this study provides evidence that ratings conservatism can positively influence a firm’s 
accounting quality (or earnings quality), represented as accrual-based earnings management. This 
                                                 
12
 For example, Cohen et al. (2008) document a trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings 
management. They show that accrual-based earnings management declines while real earnings 
management increases after the passage of SOX. In a recent study, Chan et al. (2015) argue that the passage 
of clawback provisions leads a substitution between accrual-based and real earnings management. 
Consistent with the argument, they find that after the passage of clawback provisions, accrual-based 
earnings management decreases, but real earnings management increases. 
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study also implies that earnings management behaviors of managers are influenced by the extent of 
ratings conservatism.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: CHAPTER 2 reviews relevant prior 
literature and develops the hypotheses, CHAPTER 3 discusses research methodologies, 
CHAPTER 4 describes the sample selection procedures and data, CHAPTER 5 presents the results, 
CHAPTER 6 discusses potential sample selection bias, CHAPTER 7 provides further analyses, 
CHAPTER 8 presents robustness checks, CHAPTER 9 concludes the paper by summarizing the 
results, and finally CHAPTER 10 discusses limitations and future research. 
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 CHAPTER 2
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Credit Ratings and Earnings Management 
Empirical findings presented by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) imply that there is a relation 
between credit ratings and earnings management. They consider the quality of working capital 
accruals and the timeliness of earnings as proxies for a firm’s financial transparency. Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. find that credit ratings are positively related to accrual quality and earnings timeliness. 
Their results suggest that there is a negative link between credit ratings and earnings management. 
This is because a firm’s earnings management leads to lower accrual quality.  
In subsequent years, a stream of literature examines the relation between credit ratings 
(changes) and earnings management (Ali and Zhang, 2008; Alissa et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2013; 
Jung et al., 2013; Shen and Huang, 2013). Using ratings data from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
between 1987 and 2005, Ali and Zhang (2008) study whether upgrades (or downgrades) in broad 
ratings categories are related to a firm’s earnings management. According to Kisgen’s (2006) article, 
they define a broad rating category as the level of ratings without the addition of plus, middle, and 
minus specifications. For example, a broad rating category A includes A+, A, and A−. They find 
that firms located in the borders of a broad rating category (A+ and A−) are more likely to inflate 
their reported earnings and have less conservative accounting compared to their counterparts. 
In another study, Alissa et al. (2013) examine whether firms manage their reported earnings 
through real and accrual-based earnings management to meet or return to their expected credit 
ratings. Based on the literature concerning target leverage, Alissa et al. construct a rating model. 
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They then run an ordered probit regression to estimate expected credit ratings, and measure the 
deviation from current credit ratings (i.e., a difference between a firm’s actual and expected credit 
ratings). Alissa et al. find evidence that when a firm’s current ratings are below expected ratings, the 
firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management. They also show that 
when a firm’s current ratings are above expected ratings, the firms are more likely to be involved in 
income-decreasing earnings management. Furthermore, Alissa et al. argue that when there are 
deviations from a firm’s expected ratings, managers attempt to revert back to their expected credit 
ratings. To test this argument, Alissa et al. further investigate whether income-increasing (-
decreasing) earnings management by firms whose current ratings are below (above) expectations 
can influence future rating changes. Consistent with their hypothesis, Alissa et al. document that 
income-increasing (-decreasing) earnings management is related to positive (negative) changes in 
future credit ratings. Their findings imply that credit ratings agencies do not perceive a firm’s 
earnings management, which likely leads to improper assignment of credit ratings to debt issuers.   
Furthermore, based on the target ratings hypothesis (Hovakimian et al., 2009), Kim et al. 
(2013) study whether a firm’s real or accrual-based earnings management influences changes in 
future credit ratings. Using a logistic regression, they find that there is a positive (negative) relation 
between real earnings management (accrual-based earnings management) and credit rating 
upgrades. These findings suggest that managers are more likely to use real earnings management 
than accrual-based earnings management to influence upcoming changes in credit ratings. Their 
study implies that changes in credit ratings convey information on a firm’s financial conditions to 
market participants (Millon and Thakor, 1985; Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Kisgen, 2006). When a 
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firm’s credit ratings are anticipated to downgrade (upgrade) relative to the previous year, investors 
reconsider whether to continue to invest in the firms (vice versa). In addition, creditors demand a 
higher return on their investments. 
Two recent studies explore the potential relation between credit ratings and earnings 
smoothing. Jung et al. (2013) examine whether firms with plus or minus notch ratings (AA+ or 
AA−) have an incentive to smooth their earnings through earnings management using three 
subsamples: total, investment-grade, and speculative-grade.  Jung et al. point out that firms have a 
desire to improve or keep their credit ratings because ratings can affect their debt financing and 
stock and bond valuations. They find that firms with plus notch ratings engage in more earnings 
smoothing.  Jung et al. further show that the likelihood of subsequent ratings upgrades increases 
with earnings smoothing. Their findings indicate that a firm’s earnings smoothing is an effective 
mechanism to improve its credit ratings. On the other hand, using cross-country bank data from 85 
countries, Shen and Huang (2013) examine the impact of earnings management on the cost of debt 
via credit ratings changes. To do this, they use the following two types of earnings management: 
earnings smoothing and discretionary accruals (discretionary loan loss provisions). They find that 
banks with higher discretionary accruals are more likely to receive lower credit ratings. Furthermore, 
they find evidence that banks engaging in earnings smoothing tend to have lower credit ratings. 
These findings suggest that a firm’s earnings management can adversely influence its credit ratings, 
which likely increases the firm’s borrowing costs. 
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2.2 Stringent Trends in Rating Standards (“Ratings Conservatism”) 
Prior literature documents the decline in credit ratings over time and provides evidence that 
ratings agencies have become more conservative in assigning a firm’s credit ratings (Blume et al., 
1998; Alp, 2013; Baghai et al., 2014; Afik et al., 2016).
13
 Blume et al. (1998) are the first to identify 
the decline in credit ratings of U.S. corporations between 1978 and 1995. They argue that the 
decline in credit ratings is primarily attributed to more stringent rating standards assigned by ratings 
agencies. In another study, Jorion et al. (2009) reexamine the tightening of credit ratings 
documented by Blume et al. (1998) between 1985 and 2002. They show that the downward trend 
in credit ratings does not correspond to firms with speculative-grade ratings. Jorion et al. argue that, 
for those firms with investment-grade ratings, changes in accounting information quality over time 
can explain the tightening of rating standards. Jorion et al. conclude that the downward trend in 
corporate credit ratings is due to the decline in accounting quality over time, not tightening rating 
standards applied by ratings agencies. Their results do not conform to those reported in Blume et al. 
(1998).  
However, subsequent studies, such as Alp (2013), Baghai et al. (2014), and Afik et al. 
(2016), confirm the conclusion of Blume et al. (1998) that the downward trend in corporate credit 
ratings over time is attributed to the tightening of credit standards by ratings agencies. Specifically, 
Alp (2013) demonstrates that there are structural shifts in credit rating standards between 1985 and 
2007. She provides evidence that credit rating agencies apply stricter rating standards for 
                                                 
13
 Furthermore, Dimitrov et al. (2015) find that, following the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (2010), credit ratings agencies tend to be more stringent in the assignment of 
corporate bond ratings. Their finding suggests that credit ratings agencies are more likely to pay strong 
attention to their reputation. 
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investment-grade ratings and more relaxed standards for speculative-grade ratings from 1985 to 
2002. Turning to the period between 2002 and 2007, she finds that credit rating agencies have 
tightened their rating standards for both investment- and speculative-grade ratings. Taken together, 
these three prior studies focus on whether credit ratings agencies have tightened their rating 
standards over time, but they do not further examine the consequences of the tightening of rating 
standards on a firm’s capital structure decisions.  
In more recent research, Baghai et al. (2014) also provide evidence that credit ratings 
agencies have become more conservative than ever before. Interestingly, when they estimate a 
rating model without firm fixed effects, their results are similar to those reported in Alp (2013). 
However, after including firm fixed effects in a ratings model, the stringent trend in rating standards 
is evident for firms with both investment- and speculative-grade ratings. As Baghai et al. notes, it is 
important to control for firm fixed effects when estimating a ratings model because a firm’s credit 
ratings can be affected by omitted firm-specific variables. Furthermore, credit ratings agencies 
consider qualitative criteria as well as quantitative criteria in their assignment of credit ratings. In 
addition to evidence on ratings conservatism, Baghai et al. further provide implications of ratings 
conservatism for a firm’s decisions on capital structure. To do this, they develop a measure for 
ratings conservatism using the coefficients estimated from the ratings model, and define the 
conservatism as the difference between a firm’s actual and predicted ratings. Baghai et al. show that 
firms facing increased ratings conservatism tend to have less debt, lower leverage, and higher cash 
holdings, compared to their counterparts. Furthermore, they find that such firms are more likely to 
receive lower credit ratings and suffer lower growth rates. These results suggest that ratings 
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conservatism by ratings agencies has several important implications for a firm’s capital structure 
decisions and for various market participants, e.g., investors and creditors, in capital markets.
14
  
In the most recent study, Afik et al. (2016) confirm prior studies providing evidence that 
credit ratings have become more stringent over time (e.g., Blume et al., 1998; Alp, 2013; Baghai et 
al., 2014). They argue that the tightening of rating standards is partially attributed to the increase in 
rating accuracy. Afik et al. further show that corporate credit ratings are more associated with 
market variables than before and are less associated with accounting variables. Their results do not 
conform to those of Jorion et al. (2009).  
2.3 Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Management 
Credit ratings are closely related to the capital structure decisions of firms (Kisgen, 2006; 
Hovakimian et al., 2009). Corporate decision makers, especially managers, are more subject to 
prioritizing their credit ratings in their capital structure choice. For example, survey evidence by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) indicates that chief financial officers (CFOs) consider their firms’ credit 
ratings as a priority in their capital structure decisions. These prior studies and evidence provide a 
meaningful implication that ratings conservatism by ratings agencies can also affect a firm’s 
decisions on capital structure. Baghai et al. (2014) argue that ratings disadvantages due to ratings 
conservatism influence a firm’s debt level by providing evidence that firms affected by the 
tightening of rating standards tend to have lower leverage (or less debt). Firms with high credit 
ratings can more easily access debt markets than those with low credit ratings. 
                                                 
14
 In addition, Kisgen (2006) investigates whether credit ratings affect a firm’s capital structure 
decisions. He proposes the “credit rating-capital structural hypothesis,” and finds that credit ratings play a 
key role in the determination of corporate capital structure. 
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As credit rating agencies become more conservative in the assignment of ratings over time, 
firms that are subject to more ratings conservatism likely experience difficulty in their debt 
financing. Thus, those firms have a lower debt level than before.15 Ratings conservatism, therefore, 
distorts a firm’s debt financing decisions. As a result, firms deviate from their target or optimal debt 
ratios (leverage ratios). That is, such firms have lower leverage ratios than their targets. According 
to the trade-off theory of capital structure, firms set a target capital structure to meet.16 In a survey by 
Graham and Harvey (2001), about 80% of chief financial officers (CFOs) responded that their firms 
have optimal or target debt ratios. Therefore, in this situation, managers would attempt to move 
back to their initial target leverage ratios to compensate for the deviations from their target or 
optimum. Ratings conservatism implies that firms receive relatively lower credit ratings than 
expected regardless of their financial conditions (e.g., balance sheet perspectives) and operating 
performance (e.g., income statement perspectives). Accordingly, firms affected by increased ratings 
stringency respond to ratings conservatism because they have relatively higher credit risk (or default 
risk) in capital markets and therefore have higher costs associated with their debt financing than 
before. To adjust their deviated leverage ratios, such firms have a desire to improve their credit 
ratings because improved ratings signal a lower likelihood of credit risk (or default risk) to market 
participants, including investors and creditors, which likely results in lower debt financing costs.  
Given the above situation, firms more affected by ratings conservatism seek either real or 
accrual-based earnings management or both to benefit from improved credit ratings and to move 
                                                 
15
 If the capital market “fully” incorporates the effect of ratings conservatism into firm’s debt pricing, 
then firms do not need to consider the effect in their debt financing decisions (see Baghai et al. (2014)). 
16
 The trade-off theory argue that firms determine the optimal level of leverage by balancing the 
benefits of debt (e.g., interest tax shields and reductions in the agency costs of equity) against its costs (e.g., 
the costs of bankruptcy and the agency costs of debt). 
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back to their initial target leverage ratios. That is, a manager’s decision whether to use earnings 
management is affected by increased ratings conservatism. At this point, I tentatively posit that 
ratings conservatism is associated with a firm’s earnings management. Prior research suggests that 
firms undertake real and accrual-based earnings management as alternative means to manage their 
reported earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 
2012; Chan et al., 2015). Given the tightening standards on credit ratings by rating agencies, these 
two types of earnings management, however, have different implications for a manager’s incentive 
to manage their reported earnings. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) explain why managers prefer real 
earnings management to accrual-based earnings management.17 Zang (2012) shows the trade-off 
between accrual-based and real earnings management.  In addition, from the perspective of a real 
business environment, managers are less reluctant to manage their reported earnings through real 
earnings management rather than through accrual-based earnings management. For example, in 
their survey, Graham et al. (2005) reveal that 78% of participants (i.e., CFOs) are willing to sacrifice 
their long-term value to meet short-term earnings targets.18 Therefore, the relation between ratings 
conservatism and each type of earnings management has different outcomes in response to the 
tightening of rating standards.  
                                                 
17
 Cohen and Zarowin (2010, p. 4) describe the managers’ preference of real-earnings management 
over accrual-based earnings management as “First, accrual-based earnings management is more likely to 
draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny than real decisions, such as those related to product pricing, production, 
and expenditures on R&D or advertising. Second, relying on accrual manipulation alone is risky.” 
18
 Graham et al. (2005, p. 32-35) state as follows: “We find strong evidence that managers take real 
economic actions to maintain accounting appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants report that 
they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings 
target. More than half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, 
even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value.” 
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Building on the statement above, I posit that managers in firms affected more by the 
tightening of rating standards engage in more real earnings management. Unlike accrual-based 
earnings management, real earnings management is not easily identified because it is directly 
related to a firm’s operating activities, production costs, and discretionary expenses (e.g., research 
and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses). 
Thus, real earnings management is less subject to auditor or regulatory scrutiny than accrual-based 
earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Lo, 2008; Gunny, 2010; Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). While credit ratings agencies recognize accounting quality as an 
important item, they are unable to capture and reflect a firm’s real earnings management in their 
assignment of credit ratings.  
Given the above, I argue that managers in firms affected by increased ratings conservatism 
would manage their reported earnings through real earnings management to compensate for ratings 
disadvantages. Firms affected by ratings conservatism will adjust their current leverage ratios 
toward their target levels. Ratings conservatism results in a lower level of debt. In this situation, 
firms seek to boost their sales and earnings (and thus increasing cash flow) through real earnings 
management because such numbers could appear to be indicative of good operating performance 
and rapid sales growth and thus likely have a positive impact on their credit ratings. Managers take 
advantage of their improved credit ratings to adjust their current leverage ratios toward their target 
ratios through lower debt financing costs. The rationale behind the possibility that real earnings 
management positively influences a firm’s credit ratings is as follows. For example, credit ratings 
are influenced by a firm’s earnings performance or profitability (Ge and Kim, 2014). Credit ratings 
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agencies perceive a firm’s earnings and cash flows as crucial financial components for evaluating its 
creditworthiness (Standard & Poor’s, 2008).19 Credit ratings agencies consider not only a firm’s 
earnings but also its sales in the assignment of ratings. Unlike accrual-based earnings management, 
real earnings management could enhance a firm’s sales and production in the process of managing 
their earnings. Real earnings management can also positively affect firm performance that is 
incorporated into its future credit ratings.20 For example, Gunny (2010) argues that managers 
engage in real earnings management to signal superior future earnings in an attempt to (just) meet 
earnings targets. Gunny (2010) finds that real earnings management positively influences firm 
performance. This finding is consistent with prior studies showing that managers undertake real 
earnings management to meet earnings targets for the purpose of gaining credibility and reputation 
from stakeholders (Bartov et al., 2002), which consequently results in better future firm 
                                                 
19
 According to the news article “S&P Raises Harley-Davidson’s Credit Rating,” increased sales and 
earnings positively influence credit ratings: “Harley-Davidson Inc.’s (HOG) credit rating was upped to ‘A-
’from ‘BBB+’ by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Ratings Services. Thus, the rating agency has assigned a stable 
outlook for the company. The revision in Harley-Davidson’s rating is based on the company’s solid second 
quarter performance together with the company’s recovery from the impact of recession. In addition, 
Harley-Davidson emphasizes on boosting manufacturing efficiency and selling its higher priced 
motorcycles. Rating affirmations or upgrades from credit rating agencies play an important part in retaining 
investor confidence in the stock as well as maintaining credit worthiness in the market. Harley-Davidson 
posted a 13.1% rise in earnings to $1.21 per share in the second quarter of 2013 from $1.07 in the same 
quarter of prior year. Earnings surpassed the Zacks Consensus Estimate by 4 cents. Net income increased 
9.9% to $271.7 million from $247.3 million a year ago” (September 23, 2013). Source: 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/sp-raises-harleydavidsons-credit-rating-analyst-blog-
cm279547\#/ixzz3oPAVbt1Y. 
20
 In contrast to Gunny’s (2010) findings, it is argued that real earnings management is negatively 
related to subsequent operating performance (Eldenburg et al., 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), and 
thereby be detrimental to firm value in the long-run (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Gunny, 2005). In spite 
of potential costs of real earnings management, survey evidence presented by Graham et al. (2005) shows 
that the chief financial officers (CFOs) prefer real earnings management over accrual-based earnings 
management. Graham et al. conclude that “The most surprising finding in our study is that most earnings 
management is achieved via real actions as opposed to accounting manipulations. Managers candidly admit 
that they would take real economic actions such as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure, and 
would even give up positive NPV projects, to meet short-term earnings benchmarks” (p. 66).   
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performance and thus possibly better credit ratings. Gunny (2010) concludes that real earnings 
management “is not opportunistic, but consistent with the firm attaining current-period 
benefits that allow the firm to perform better in the future.” Furthermore, in their survey 
study, Graham et al. (2005) find that chief financial officers (CFOs) try to meet earnings 
benchmarks in an attempt to achieve their desired credit ratings.21 Based on this logic, I 
infer that managers in firms more affected by ratings conservatism engage in more real 
earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks in an effort to gain better or desired 
credit ratings. Therefore, I predict that managers in firms affected more by the tightening of rating 
standards have incentives to manage their reported earnings through real earnings management.  
On the other hand, given desirable or achievable sales and earnings as well as meeting 
earnings benchmarks, to obtain better credit ratings than before, firms also enhance accounting 
quality (or earnings quality). A firm’s accounting quality is generally considered an important factor 
in the process of credit rating assignments. In their assignment of credit ratings, credit ratings 
agencies make an effort to accurately analyze and assess not only financial statements and audited 
annual reports of the issuer (‘quantitative information’), but also accounting quality (‘qualitative 
information’). This view is consistent with prior evidence that credit rating agencies take into 
account a firm’s accounting quality in their rating assignments (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; 
Jorion et al., 2009; Caton et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2013; Shen and Huang, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 
2015).22 To understand the intuition behind this, consider the following simple equation: Net 
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 See Graham et al. (2005, p. 25) for more details. 
22
 For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) show that credit ratings are positively related to accrual 
quality, measured as abnormal working capital accruals. This finding implies that credit ratings are 
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income = cash flows from operations + total accruals = cash flows from operations + non-
discretionary accruals + discretionary accruals. In other words, net income is calculated as the sum 
of total accruals and cash flows from operations, where total accruals can be decomposed into non-
discretionary and discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999). Part of 
discretionary accruals is related to a firm’s earnings management. Higher earnings management, 
represented as discretionary accruals, indicate lower accounting quality (or earnings quality). Based 
on the above equation, assume that, ceteris paribus, two firms, A and B, achieve comparable 
earnings or net income. Suppose also that firm A has greater discretionary accruals, while firm B 
has lower discretionary accruals.  In this situation, although the two firms achieve equivalent net 
income, firm A exhibits lower accounting quality (or earnings quality) than firm B. Thus, if credit 
ratings agencies regard accounting quality as a crucial evaluation item in their ratings assignment, 
firm A is likely to receive lower credit ratings than firm B. This example illustrates the potential 
trade-off between the benefits and costs associated with a firm’s earnings management. Ratings 
conservatism influences such potential trade-offs.  Ratings conservatism also implies that ratings 
agencies have strengthened their rating standards and possibly considered accounting quality (or 
earnings quality) as an important component in the assignment of credit ratings. Firms more 
affected by ratings conservatism engage in less accrual-based earnings management because higher 
                                                                                                                                                 
negatively related to a firm’s earnings management. The implication is consistent with Shen and Huang 
(2013), who indicate that credit ratings agencies are likely to downgrade ratings when they are aware of a 
firm’s earnings management. In another study, Jorion et al. (2009) highlight the role of accounting 
information quality in the process of credit rating assignment. Furthermore, Standard & Poor’s (2015) 
demonstrate that they reflect aspects of a debt issuer’s accounting principles and practices in evaluating 
accounting quality. 
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accounting accruals tend to draw regulatory scrutiny (e.g., the SEC), auditors, or credit ratings 
agencies (Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2010; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015). It is likely that 
higher accounting accruals give firm mangers discretion to engage in more accrual-based earnings 
management. Such accrual-based earnings management, however, negatively affect a firm’s 
accounting quality, which potentially leads to the decline in its credit ratings. Consequently, in 
response to ratings conservatism, firm mangers have incentives to improve their accounting quality 
(or earnings quality) by engaging in less accrual-based earnings management. This implies that 
ratings conservatism decreases a firm’s incentive to manipulate earnings through accrual-based 
earnings management.23 
To summarize, based on the above discussion, I expect a trade-off between real and 
accrual-based earnings management in response to the tightening standards on credit ratings by 
rating agencies. Thus, I propose and test the following first hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H1: Ceteris paribus, as ratings conservatism increases, real earnings management 
increases while accrual-based earnings management decreases. 
Second, I further examine whether a positive (negative) relation between ratings 
conservatism and real earnings management (accrual-based earnings management) varies across 
firms with high and low credit quality. I predict that, in the situation of stringent rating standards 
over time, the positive relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings management is 
stronger for firms with low credit quality than for those with high credit quality. In contrast, with 
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 Alternatively, as Zang (2012, p. 676) points out, real earnings management must happen for a fiscal 
year and “is realized by the fiscal year-end.” Managers adjust their accrual-based earnings management 
according to the degree of real earnings management.  
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respect to accrual-based earnings management, I predict that ratings conservatism and earnings 
management are greatly influenced by credit quality, which strengthens the negative relation 
between ratings conservatism and earnings management. The trend in stringent rating standards 
enables firms to improve their accounting quality to compensate for ratings disadvantages. 
Furthermore, firms with high and low credit quality respond differently to ratings conservatism. 
Firms with high credit quality are less likely to be sensitive to ratings conservatism than those with 
low credit quality. For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) argue that firms with high credit 
quality are perceived as having a higher level of earnings quality than those with low credit quality, 
which is associated with better credit ratings. Their argument is based on accrual-based earnings 
management that captures a firm’s accounting quality and thus earnings quality. It is, however, 
argued that one cannot either fully or partially captures a firm’s earnings quality, represented as real 
earnings management. One of these reasons is that managerial actions are harder to detect than 
those through accrual-based earnings management (see, for example, Cohen et al. (2008) and Zang 
(2012)).  
With respect to accrual-based earnings management, in response to ratings conservatism, 
firms with high credit quality are less likely to reduce earnings management compared to their 
counterparts. Thus, the reduction in accrual-based earnings management is expected to be smaller 
than those with low earnings quality. For firms with low credit quality, the positive effects (i.e., 
credit ratings upgrades through the improvement in earnings quality) associated with less accrual-
based earnings management are expected to outweigh the negative effects (i.e., a decrease in 
reported earnings) related to earnings. For example, firms increase their reported earnings in the 
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current period through accrual-based earnings management in order to influence their credit ratings. 
However, this pattern in earnings is not persistent. Thus, given that rating standards have become 
more stringent over time, such earnings management can negatively influence their credit ratings. 
Instead, those firms will attempt to improve their earnings quality by engaging in less accrual-based 
earnings management. With respect to firms with low credit quality, the negative relation between 
ratings conservatism and accrual-based earnings management is stronger than those with high credit 
quality. Likewise, similar logic can explain the positive relation between ratings conservatism and 
real earnings management.  
Therefore, I predict that if firms are more affected by stringent rating standards, then the 
positive (negative) relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings management (accrual-
based earnings management) is stronger in firms with low credit quality than in those with high 
credit quality.24 This prediction and discussion results in the following second hypothesis (stated in 
alternative form): 
H2: The positive (negative) relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings 
management (accrual-based earnings management) is more pronounced for firms 
with low credit quality than for those with high credit quality.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 My prediction is based on prior literature providing evidence that credit ratings agencies consider 
accounting quality as an important evaluation item in their assignment of ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Jorion et al., 2009; Caton et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2013; Shen and Huang, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 
2015). These prior studies are based on the assumption that credit ratings agencies perceive and adjust for 
the quality of accounting information when they assign ratings to debt issuers. In addition, credit ratings 
agencies evaluate not only quantitative information (e.g., earnings and profits), but also qualitative 
information (e.g., accounting quality) in the ratings process. 
 28 
 CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To examine whether ratings conservatism affects a firm’s earnings management, I employ 
the following proxies for credit ratings conservatism and earnings management. In the analysis, I 
use two measures of ratings conservatism proposed by Baghai et al. (2014). On the other hand, I 
depend on prior literature to measure a firm’s real and accrual-based earnings management. In 
addition to these earnings management measures, I further estimate a firm’s earnings smoothing 
and asymmetric timely loss recognition based on prior literature.  
3.1 Measuring Credit Ratings Conservatism 
Based on previous literature and industry practice, I employ the rating conservatism 
measures developed by Baghai et al. (2014). The main variable of interest is credit ratings 
conservatism. The sample period in this study is from 1985 to 2014. The estimation procedures for 
predicted ratings are discussed below.  
As a first step, using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, I estimate a ratings model for 
the period of 1985 to 1996. I also use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The ratings 
model is as follows:25 
                      𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                                                                (1) 
                                                 
25
 I use the sample period 1985 to 1996 to calculate the rating model (1) and the sample period 1997 to 
2014 to compute ratings conservatism. In addition to these periods, I further employ alternative cut-off 
years from 1994 to 2003. See subsection 8.2 that discusses different cut-off years employed when measuring ratings 
conservatism.  
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where Credit_Ratingsit denotes Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term issuer credit ratings of 
firm i in year t. I transform the letter ratings into numerical equivalents using an ordinal 
scale ranging from 1 for the highest rated firms (AAA) to 21 for the lowest rated firms 
(C). The 𝛼𝑗 is the intercept. The 𝛽
′ is the vector of slope coefficients. The Xit includes 
columns with explanatory variables, such as leverage (Book_Lev), convertible debt ratio 
(Conb), rental payments (Rentp), cash holdings (Cash), debt-to-EBITDA (Debt_Ebitda), 
a dummy variable for negative debt-to-EBITDA (Net_Debt_Ebitda), EBITDA-to-interest 
(Ebitda_Int), profitability (Profit), volatility of profitability (Vol_Profit), firm size 
(Firm_Size), asset tangibility (Tangibility), capital expenditures (Capex), the firm’s beta 
(Beta), and the firm’s idiosyncratic risk (Idiosyncratic_Risk). 
Specifically, Book_Lev is book leverage, measured as the sum of long- and short-
term debt divided by total assets. Conb is calculated as the ratio of convertible debt to 
total assets. Rentp is computed as the ratio of rental payments to total assets. Cash is the 
sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. Debt_Ebitda is measured as 
the ratio of total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA). Net_Debt_Ebitda is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of total debt to 
EBITDA is negative, and zero otherwise. Ebitda_Int is calculated as the EBITDA divided 
by interest payments. Profit is measured as the ratio of EBITDA to sales. Vol_Profit is 
the volatility of Profit. Firm_Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is 
calculated as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (NPPE) divided by total 
assets. Capex is measured as capital expenditures divided by total assets. Beta is the 
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stock’s Dimson beta, estimated from a market-model regression using the daily CRSP 
value-weighted index returns.  Idiosyncratic_Risk is the root mean squared error from the 
market regression.26 
In the second step, I predict debt ratings using the coefficients estimated from the 
above equation (1) for each year from 1997 to 2014. I estimate the predicted ratings 
based on both firm and industry fixed effects. As in Baghai et al. (2014), I assign 
predicted ratings to 1 if they are smaller than 1 (AAA) and to 21 if they are larger than 
21. Furthermore, I treat predicted ratings within the range from 1 to 21 as a continuous 
variable. I then calculate each measure of ratings conservatism for the period of 1997 to 
2014 as follows:27 
 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡,1985−1996   (2) 
where Ratings_Conservatismit represents two measures of ratings conservatism, 
Rat_Diff_Firm and Rat_Diff_Ind, for firm i in year t. Actual_Ratingsit  represents actual 
credit ratings of firm i in year t for the period of 1997 to 2014. The higher values of 
ratings conservatism mean that firms are affected more by the tightening of rating 
                                                 
26
 See Baghai et al. (2014, p. 1966-1967) for more details. 
27
 There is a concern about the validity of ratings conservatism measure developed by Baghai et al. 
(2014). For example, Baghai et al. (2014) assume that firm characteristics are time-constant over the period 
between 1997 and 2014 when estimating predicted ratings based on the period between 1985 and 1996. 
This assumption is somewhat strong. To relax the constant firm characteristics over the period, I estimate 
predicted ratings for the period between 1997 and 2014 using recursive regressions. Specifically, to predict 
ratings for 1997, I use a recursive regression for the period between 1985 and 1996. Then, I repeat the 
regression to predicted ratings for 1998 using the period between 1985 and 1997. In the same way, I 
estimate predicted ratings for year t using the period between 1985 and t-1. See subsection 7.2 that 
addresses the procedure applied to estimate predicted ratings following Baghai et al. (2014) for more 
details. 
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standards (“ratings conservatism”). These two measures of ratings conservatism, 
Rat_Diff_Firm and Rat_Diff_Ind, are used as a main explanatory variable in my entire 
analysis. 
3.2 Measures of Earnings Management 
With respect to earnings management, I follow prior literature and employ a variety of 
measures of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. These measures 
are discussed in more detail below. 
3.2.1 Accrual-Based Earnings Management (AEM) 
Following prior literature (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; McNichols 2000; Kothari et 
al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010), I estimate 
discretionary accruals. Total accruals (TA) are the sum of non-discretionary accruals (NDA) and 
discretionary accruals (DA). To compute discretionary accruals, I use the modified Jones (1991) 
model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) as follows:  
      
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                                        (3) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the earnings before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows from 
the statement of cash flows for firm i and fiscal year t. 𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 is the total assets for firm i 
and fiscal year t-1. ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the change in net sales for firm i from year t-1 to t. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is 
the gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i and fiscal year t. I estimate a cross-
sectional regression for each two-digit SIC industry and year group using equation (3). 
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Next, using the estimated coefficients obtained from equation (3), I calculate non-
discretionary accruals (NDA) as follows: 
         𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                       (4) 
where ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to t.  
Finally, discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between total 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals, which is 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
− 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡. As a primary 
proxy for accrual-based earnings management, I use the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (ABS_DA). I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals because my 
hypotheses do not predict any specific direction of accrual-based earnings management, 
e.g., either income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals (Warfield et al., 1995; 
Klein, 2002; Cohen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012). Furthermore, as Cohen et al. (2008) 
point out, the absolute value of discretionary accruals also capture subsequent accrual 
reversals of earnings management. 
3.2.2 Real Earnings Management (REM) 
A firm’s real earnings management has attracted growing interest from academics and 
practitioners in recent years (Graham, 2005; Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Firms engage in real earnings management by 
lowering the cost of goods sold through the overproduction of inventory, increasing sales through 
price discounts and lenient credit terms, and reducing discretionary expenses. Such expenses 
 33 
 
include advertising, research and development (R&D), and selling, general, and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
I follow Roychowdhury (2006) and estimate the abnormal levels of operating cash flows, 
production costs and discretionary expenses to capture a firm’s real earnings management. 
Subsequent studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012) provide evidence 
that these proxies better reflect real earnings management.  
First, I use the following equation to estimate the normal level of operating cash flows: 
       
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                                         (5) 
where CFOit is the cash flow from operations for firm i and fiscal year t. Salesit is the net sales for 
firm i and fiscal year t. ∆Salesit is the change in net sales for firm i from year t-1 to t. I estimate a 
cross-sectional regression for each two-digit SIC industry and year group using equation (5). The 
abnormal level of cash flow from operations is estimated as the difference between actual and 
normal levels of cash flow from operations, i.e., the estimated residual from equation (5). I multiply 
the estimated residual by negative one (denoted as REM_CFO) so that the greater amounts of 
abnormal operating cash flow indicates upward real earnings managements. 
Second, to estimate the normal level of production costs, I use the following equation: 
  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,             (6) 
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where PRODit is the sum of the cost of goods sold for firm i and fiscal year t and the change in 
inventory for firm i from year t-1 to t. I estimate a cross-sectional regression for each two-digit SIC 
industry and year group using equation (6). The abnormal level of production costs (REM_PROD) 
is estimated as the difference between actual and normal levels of production costs, i.e., the 
estimated residual from equation (6). The higher residual indicates larger amount of overproducing 
inventory such that firms reduce the cost of goods sold to manage their reported earnings upwards.  
Third, using the following equation, I estimate the normal level of discretionary expenses: 
               
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                                                       (7) 
where DISXit represents the discretionary expenses for firm i and fiscal year t. I estimate a cross-
sectional regression for each two-digit SIC industry and year group using equation (7). The 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses is estimated as the difference between actual and normal 
levels of discretionary expenses, i.e., the estimated residual from equation (7). I multiply the 
estimated residual by negative one (denoted as REM_DISX) so that the greater amounts of 
discretionary expenditures cut indicates that firms engage in real earnings management.  
Finally, following prior literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang; 
2012), I also use two alternative measures, REM1 and REM2, to capture total real earnings 
management. Specifically, REM1 is calculated as the sum of the abnormal level of discretionary 
expenses multiplied by negative one and the abnormal level of production costs, i.e., REM_DISX + 
REM_PROD. REM2 is computed as the sum of the abnormal level of discretionary expenses and 
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the abnormal level of operating cash flows, both multiplied by negative one, i.e., REM_DISX + 
REM_CFO.28 
3.2.3 Total Earnings Management (TEM) 
To examine the effect of ratings conservatism on overall earnings management, I follow 
Chan et al. (2015) and construct two measures, TEM1 and TEM2. Regarding an overall earnings 
management proxy, TEM1 is the sum of the signed discretionary accruals (DA) and the 
aggregate real earnings management (REM1). TEM2 is the sum of the signed discretionary 
accruals (DA) and the aggregate real earnings management (REM2). The reason I consider 
these aggregate measures of earnings management is to mitigate potential measurement errors.  
3.3 Baseline Regression Model 
As noted earlier, this study examines how ratings conservatism affects a firm’s earnings 
management. Specifically, this study tests a hypothesis that firms affected more by ratings 
conservatism engage in more real earnings management and less accrual-based earnings 
management. I use the following model to test the first and second hypotheses (H1 and H2).29 
 
                                                 
28
 In addition to these proxies capturing real earnings management, following Cohen et al. (2008) and 
Kim et al. (2012), I generate a combined proxy by summing three individual proxies, i.e., REM_PROD + 
REM_DISX + REM_CFO. Using the combined proxy, I repeat my analysis. The combined proxies for real 
earnings management attenuate measurement errors due to individual proxies. Untabulated results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 11. For one thing, as Roychowdhury (206) points 
out, price discount and overproduction lead to a decrease in cash flows, while cutting discretionary 
expenditures result in an increase in cash flows. That is, real earnings management has an influence on cash 
flows from operations in different directions. In particular, Zang (2012) does not consider the abnormal 
level of operating cash flows in her analysis (Zang, 2012). In a subsequent study, Chan et al. (2015) use 
two measures of real earnings management employed in my study.  
29
 This regression model is similar to those in Zang (2012), Kim et al. (2012), and Chan et al. (2015).  
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    REMit (or AEMit) = β0 + β1Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β2Sizeit + β3Leverageit  
                                 + β4MTBit + β5ROAit + β6Firm_Ageit + β7Big4it + β8SOXit  
                                 + β9Z_Scoreit + β10Lossit + β11NOAit + β12M&Ait + β13Restructit 
                                                  + β14AEMit (or REMit) + Σ βjIndustryj + Σ βkYeark + ɛit,                  (8) 
where REMit denotes the measures of real earnings management of firm i in year t. REM is one of 
the five measures, REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1, and REM2, as defined 
in Appendix B. AEMit denotes the measures of accrual-based earnings management of firm i in 
year t. AEM is one of three measures, ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA.30 I further 
generate two aggregate earnings management measures, TEM1 and TEM2, to capture the 
total effects of real and accrual-based earnings management. All relevant measures are 
defined in Appendix B.  
The main variable of interest, Ratings_Conservatismit-1, is the lagged difference between 
the actual and predicted ratings. I use two measures of ratings conservatism based on firm and 
industry fixed effects, i.e., Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. Two ratings 
conservatism proxies, lagged by one year, can alleviate endogeneity concerns.31 In the regression 
equation (8), with respect to real earnings management, I expect the coefficient on each lagged 
ratings conservatism measure, Ratings_Conservatismit-1, to be positive, indicating that firms more 
                                                 
30
 As a robust check, I also use alternative measures of accrual-based earnings management. See 
subsection 8.1 for more details.  
31
 In the models in which I study earnings management, all explanatory variables are measured 
contemporaneously, except for the difference between the actual and the predicted ratings, which is lagged 
by one year to mitigate endogeneity concerns. In my context, endogeneity may arise from the fact that the 
firm’s rating is affected by the company's earnings management, while the rating is also employed to 
compute ratings conservatism. If I measure both ratings conservatism and earnings management 
contemporaneously, the direction of causality is not clear. Lagging addresses this concern as long as there 
is no feedback effect between the firm's current earnings management and future ratings conservatism. 
 37 
 
affected by ratings conservatism engage in more real earnings management than their counterparts. 
In contrast, regarding accrual-based earnings management, I expect a negative coefficient on 
Ratings_Conservatismit-1, suggesting that firms more affected by ratings conservatism engage in 
less accrual-based earnings management. Collectively, in equation (8), I expect that ratings 
conservatism leads to a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management.  
So far, a number of studies investigate a firm’s earnings management from various aspects. 
32 Based on these prior studies, I control for firm size (Size), leverage (Leverage), market-to-book 
ratios (MTB), return on assets (ROA), dummies for firm age (Firm_Age), dummies for Big 4 
auditors (Big4), SOX dummies (SOX), the modified version of Altman’s (1968, 2000) Z-score 
(Z_Score), dummies for firm’s loss (Loss), dummies for net operating assets (NOA), dummies for 
merger and acquisition (M&A), and dummies for restructuring charges (Restruct) in equation (8). 
The subscript it represents a firm i for fiscal year t. I include firm size (Size) to control for size 
effects in the industry. Prior research (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Zang, 2012; Massa et al., 2015) documents that firms size is one 
of the determinants of a firm’s earnings management. However, the results regarding the relation 
between earnings management and firm size is mixed. For example, Klein (2002) predicts that firm 
size has a negative relation with earnings management, measured as the absolute value of adjusted 
abnormal accruals. However, she finds an insignificant relation between firm size and accrual-based 
earnings management. The logic behind the negative relation is that while smaller firms are less 
                                                 
32
 For example, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 
1999; McNichols, 2000; Barton and Simko, 2002; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Klein, 2002; Matsumoto, 
2002; Xie et al., 2003; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Kothari et al., 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Hribar 
and Nichols, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Liu and Espahbodi, 2014; 
Massa et al., 2015. 
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likely to face more frequent monitoring from stakeholders, such as regulators and auditors, larger 
firms are more likely to have effective internal control systems. Consequently, smaller firms have 
more incentive to manage their reported earnings than larger firms. Xie et al. (2003) further show an 
insignificant relation between firm size and discretionary accruals. In a similar way, Zang (2012) 
provides evidence that firm size is negatively related to accrual-based earnings management, but is 
positively related to real earnings management. In contrast, Massa et al. (2015) find that larger firms 
tend to engage in more accrual-based earnings management.  
Next, I control for a firm’s financial leverage (Leverage) that affects its earnings 
management. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) argue that debt covenant violation is related 
to earnings management, i.e., the choice of discretionary accruals. Managers in highly 
leveraged firms have incentives to manage their reported earnings upward, i.e., income-
increasing earnings management, to avoid debt covenant violation (Becker et al., 1998). 
Klein (2002) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) show a negative relation between firm 
leverage and accrual-based earnings management. Prior studies on earnings management 
include market-to-book ratios (MTB) to control for a firm’s growth opportunities 
(Warfield et al., 1995; Klein, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006; Zang, 2012). In general, firms with more growth opportunities tend to have higher 
market-to-book ratios. Warfield et al. (1995) find that firms with high growth opportunities have 
more abnormal accruals. Barth et al. (1999) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that 
managers in firms with higher growth opportunities have more incentives to manage their 
earnings upward. Next, to reduce bias associated with firm performance, following prior studies 
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(McNichols, 2000; Kothari et al., 2005; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015; 
Järvinen and Myllymäki, 2016), I control for a firm’s return on assets (ROA). In particular, Zang 
(2012) find that return on assets is negatively related to real earnings management and positively 
related to accrual-based earnings management. I follow Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and 
Jiang et al. (2010) and include a firm age dummy variable (Firm_Age) equal to one if a firm listed 
on Compustat is more than 20 years old and zero otherwise. They find a negative relation between a 
firm age dummy and earnings management, proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
This finding indicates that older firms tend to engage in less earnings management than younger 
firms. 
Furthermore, I control for Big 4 auditors (Big4) that affect a firm’s earning management. 
As in Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999), I expect a negative relation between the 
dummies for Big 4 auditors and the absolute of value of discretionary accruals. On the other hand, 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that firms audited by large audit firms (the Big 8) are more likely to 
engage in real earnings management. In a subsequent study, Zang (2012) find consistent results 
with Cohen and Zarowin (2010). Thus, I expect a positive relation between the dummies for Big 4 
auditors and proxies for real earnings management. Following Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), I include a SOX dummy variable (SOX) equal to one for all years after 2001, and 
zero otherwise. Cohen et al. (2008) find that while firms decrease accrual-based earning 
management after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, they increase real-
earnings management after the passage. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that real earnings 
management increases significantly after the passage of SOX. Following Zang (2012), I control for 
 40 
 
Altman’s Z-score (Z_Score) as a proxy for a firm’s financial health. Zang (2012) use the Altman’s 
Z-score to capture the cost of real earnings management. She finds that firms with a higher Z-score 
engage in less accrual-based earnings management, while those firms engage in more real earnings 
management. I also include a loss indicator variable (Loss) to control for a firm’s financial 
performance. This financial performance proxy can affect a firm’s earnings management. As in 
Zang (2012) and Chan et al. (2015), I control for an indicator for a firm’s net operating assets 
(NOA). Zang (2012) find that NOA is positively related to real earnings management and negatively 
related to accrual-based earnings management. Following Chan et al. (2015), I control for two 
indicator variables, M&A and Restruct. In equation (8), following Cohen et al. (2008), Zang (2012), 
and Chan et al. (2015), I include AEM (or REM) to consider a substitution between real and accrual-
based earnings management.  Finally, I include year and industry fixed effects to control for 
differences in firm characteristics that affect a firm’s earnings management across industries and 
time. All variables used in equation (8) are defined in Appendix B. 
In my empirical analysis, I perform pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.33 All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels to reduce the impact of extreme outliers. In addition to the main tests using equation 
(8), I further conduct a variety of additional analyses and robustness tests.  
                                                 
33
 As a robustness check, I also use robust standard errors clustered at both the firm and year levels to 
control for within-firm correlation of the residuals across time, as suggested by Petersen (2009). My main 
results still hold when I employ two-way clustered standard errors.  
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 CHAPTER 4
SAMPLE SELECTION AND ESTIMATION OF RATINGS MODELS 
4.1 Data Selection 
My sample selection procedures are threefold. First, I collect data on monthly debt ratings 
issued by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) from 1985 to 2014. My sample includes publicly traded and 
rated U.S. firms. The data is extracted from the Compustat Ratings File. Following Baghai et al. 
(2014), I use the S&P long-term issuer credit ratings. The S&P categorizes bond credit ratings into 
AAA, AA+, AA, AA−, A+, A, A−, BBB+, BBB, BBB−, BB+, BB, BB−, B+, B, B−, CCC+, 
CCC, CCC−, CC, and C. Using an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for the highest rated firms (AAA) 
to 21 for the lowest rated firms (C), I convert the letter ratings into numerical equivalents. I use the 
first rating that is available three months after the fiscal year-end to assign debt ratings per year. 
Second, I collect annual financial data from the Compustat Annual Database and stock return data 
from the CRSP Database for the period between 1985 and 2014. In the sample, I exclude both 
financial firms (SIC codes between 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC codes between 4900-4999). 
Finally, I combine ratings data with annual financial data from Compustat and stock returns from 
CRSP, and drop missing values due to the combination. In addition, I remove firm-year 
observations with missing values. I also winsorize all the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels to mitigate the impact of extreme observations. 
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4.2 Ratings Models 
This subsection presents descriptive statistics for relevant variables used in the estimation of 
ratings models. I follow the Baghai et al.’s (2014) procedures to estimate ratings model. In this 
analysis, I use a sample of 35,160 firm-year observations over the period between 1985 and 2014. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
4.2.1 Data Description 
Table 1 shows the distribution of credit ratings over the period between 1985 and 2014. For 
convenience, I combine the minus (−), middle, and plus (+) specifications for each broad credit 
rating. For example, the AA category includes credit ratings of AA+, AA, and AA−. As shown in 
the table, the quality of credit ratings for U.S corporate debt has deteriorated over time. The 
distribution of credit ratings in the sample is similar to that in Baghai et al. (2014). 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for relevant variables used in equation (1). This table 
shows that the average ratings variable (Rating) has increased from 8.871 in 1985 to 11.195 in 
2014. This increasing trend in the ratings variable indicates that credit ratings have become worse 
during the period. The trend in the ratings variable is consistent with that in Baghai et al. (2014). 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
4.2.2 Estimating Ratings Models 
Using equation (1), I estimate ratings models. I use OLS and ordered logit regressions with 
industry (or firm) and year dummies. In the regressions, I employ explanatory variables used in 
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Baghai et al. (2014), such as Book_Lev, Conb, Rentp, Cash, Debt_Ebitda, Net_Debt_Ebitda, 
Ebitda_Int, Profit, Vol_Profit, Firm_Size, Tangibility, Capex, Beta, and Idiosyncratic_Risk. In 
regression models (1)-(6), I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Table 3 shows the results of the ratings models on the relation between each explanatory 
variable and credit ratings. In columns (1), (3), (5), and (6), I run pooled OLS regressions. I also run 
ordered logit regressions in columns (2) and (4). In the first four columns, I consider industry and 
year fixed effects. Furthermore, I consider firm and year fixed effects in the last two columns. The 
results reported in all columns (1)-(6) are consistent with those in Baghai et al. (2014). In contrast to 
Baghai et al. (2014) who use three-digit SIC industry, I use industry dummies with the two-digit 
SIC industry. The results are similar to those in Baghai et al. (2014). I further use the three-digit SIC 
industry for generating industry dummies, and I obtain similar results with those found in Baghai et 
al. (2014). As in Baghai et al. (2014), the variables of main interest are year dummies. The results 
reported in all columns show that there is an increase in the ratings variable, indicating that credit 
ratings have worsened during the sample period. The decline in ratings with respect to year 
dummies implies that credit ratings agencies have tightened their rating standards during the period 
between1985 and 2014.  
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
Figure 1 represents the plot of coefficients on year dummies in columns (1)-(6). This figure 
graphically shows the increasing trend in the coefficients on year dummies, which implies the 
tightening of rating standards over my sample period. 
 [Please insert Figure 1 here] 
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 CHAPTER 5
RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for relevant variables used in the analysis. The average 
and median discretionary accruals (DA) are about 0.0017 and 0.0060, respectively. The average DA 
is not zero due to its winsorization. The average and median values of the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) are about 0.0482 and 0.0315, respectively. The average for 
ABS_DA indicates that it accounts for 4.82 percent of total assets. Regarding three individual 
measures for real earnings management, the average and median abnormal level of production costs 
(REM_PROD) are 0.0023 and 0.0044, respectively. The average and median abnormal level of 
discretionary expenses (REM_DISX) are 0.0079 and 0.0174, respectively. The average and median 
abnormal level of cash flow from operation (REM_CFO) are -0.0015 and -0.0006, respectively. 
The average and median of the aggregate measures of real earnings management, REM1 and 
REM2 are 0.0111 (0.0208) and 0.0069 (0.0169), respectively. The average and median of the total 
earnings management, TEM1 and TEM2, are 0.0595 (0.0663) and 0.0553 (0.0584), respectively. 
Furthermore, the average and median of earnings smoothing measures, EM_SMOOTH1, 
EM_SMOOTH2, and EM_SMOOTH3, are 0.5113 (0.5169), 0.5021 (05250), and 0.5141 (0.5227), 
respectively. 
With respect to two measures for ratings conservatism, Rat_Diff_Firm and Rat_Diff_Ind, 
the average (median) values are 0.4749 (2.1064) and 0.6193 (2.2817), respectively. The average 
and median values of Size are 8.4460 and 8.3188, respectively. Sample firms have, on average, a 
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leverage ratio (Leverage) of 0.2329, a market-book ratio (MTB) of 2.8671, and return on assets 
(ROA) of 9.56 percent. At least, 47.94 percent in sample firms have been listed on the Compustat 
for over 20 years. About 90.80 percent of sample firms are audited by the Big 4 auditors. The 
averages for SOX and Z_Score are 0.7230 and 8.3083, respectively. Finally, the average LOSS, 
NOA, M&A, and Restruct are 0.2399, 0.5306, 0.1621, and 0.3803, respectively.  
 [Please insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 shows Pearson correlations among variables. I find a positive and significant 
correlation between Rat_Diff_Firm and ABS_DA. On the other hand, the correlation between 
Rat_Diff_Ind and ABS_DA is positive but insignificant. I also find a negative and significant 
correlation between Rat_Diff_Firm and DA. The correlation between Rat_Diff_Ind and DA is 
negative but insignificant. While ABS_DA is positively and significantly correlated with 
REM_PROD and REM_CFO, it is negatively and significantly correlated with REM_DISX.  Next, 
while Size, ROA, Firm_Age, Big4, SOX, Z_Score, NOA, M&A, and Restruct are negatively and 
significantly correlated with ABS_DA, Leverage and Loss are positively and significantly correlated 
with ABS_DA. REM_PROD is negatively and significantly correlated with Size, MTB, ROA, 
Firm_Age, and Z_Score while it is positively and significantly correlated with Leverage, Loss, and 
NOA. REM_DISX is negatively and significantly correlated with Size, MTB, and ROA while it is 
positively and significantly correlated with Leverage. Finally, REM_CFO is negatively and 
significantly correlated with Z_Score, but positively and significantly correlated with NOA and 
Restruct.   
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
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5.2 Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management: Testing H1 
In this subsection, I investigate the relation between ratings conservatism and accrual-based 
earnings management. To do this, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) as a 
proxy for earnings management. Furthermore, I divide discretionary accruals (DA) into two 
subgroups, positive discretionary accruals (Positive_DA) and negative discretionary accruals 
(Negative_DA). The reason I split discretionary accruals into two subgroups is that my first 
hypothesis predicts any specific direction for a firm’s earnings management. I also use two 
measures, Rat_Diff_Firm and Rat_Diff_Ind, as proxies for credit ratings conservatism.  
Table 6 reports the results of pooled OLS regressions with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and 
Negative_DA as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest is the lagged Rat_Diff_Firm 
(Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm). In column (1) using the absolute value of discretionary accruals for a 
dependent variable, I find a negative and significant (p-value=0.045) coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. This finding suggests that firms affected more by ratings conservatism 
tend to engage in less accrual-based earnings management, which is consistent with my first 
hypothesis. The coefficient on Size is negative and significant, indicating that larger firms have less 
incentive to manage their report earnings, which is consistent with the prediction by Klein (2002). 
The coefficient on Leverage is negative and significant. I also find a positive but insignificant 
coefficient on MTB. Warfield et al. (1995) find that firms with more growth opportunities engage in 
more accrual-based earnings management. The coefficient on ROA is negative and significant, 
suggesting that firms with high return on assets have less incentive to use accrual-based earnings 
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management. I find a negative and significant coefficient on Firm_Age. This suggests that young 
firms engage in more accrual-based earnings management than old firms, which is consistent with 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Jiang et al. (2010). I find a negative and significant 
coefficient on SOX, indicating that firms decrease accrual-based earnings management after the 
passage of SOX. This finding is consistent with Cohen et al. (2008). The coefficient on Z_Score is 
negative and significant, suggesting that firms with better financial health engage in less accrual-
based earnings management. The coefficient on Loss is positive and significant, indicating that 
firms with negative net income tend to use more accrual-based earnings management. Finally, I 
find a negative and significant coefficient on NOA. The finding suggests that firms with higher net 
operating assets engage in less accrual-based earnings management, which is consistent with Barton 
and Simko (2002). 
Turing to column (2) using Positive_DA for a dependent variable, I find a negative but 
insignificant coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. The coefficient on Size is negative and 
significant, indicating that smaller firms have less incentive to manage their reported earnings 
upward. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), I find that firms have less incentive to manage their 
reported earnings upward after the passage of SOX. The coefficient on Z_Score is negative and 
significant, indicating that firms with good financial condition engage in less income-increasing 
earnings management. The coefficient on Loss is negative and significant, suggesting that firms 
with negative net income engage in less income-increasing earnings management. I find a negative 
and significant coefficient on NOA, indicating that firms with higher net operating assets engage in 
less income-increasing earnings management. Finally, the coefficients on M&A and Restruct are 
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negative and significant, suggesting that firms engaging in merger and acquisition or undergoing 
restructuring activities engage in less income-increasing earnings management.  
In column (3) with Negative_DA for a dependent variable, the coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive and significant (p-value=0.036), indicating that firms affected 
more by ratings conservatism have less incentive to manage earnings downward. The coefficient on 
Size is positive and significant, suggesting that larger firms engage in less income-decreasing 
earnings management. I find positive and significant coefficients on Leverage and ROA. These 
findings indicate that highly leveraged firms and firms with high return on assets engage in less 
income-decreasing earnings management. The coefficient on Firm_Age is positive and significant, 
suggesting that older firms have less incentive to manage earnings downward. I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on SOX. This finding indicates that firms engage in less income-decreasing 
earnings management after the passage of SOX. The coefficient on Z_Score is positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms with better financial health engage in less income-decreasing 
earnings management. The coefficient on Loss is negative and significant, suggesting that firms 
with negative net income engage in less income-decreasing earnings management. Finally, while 
the coefficient on NOA is positive and significant, the coefficient on M&A is negative and 
significant.  
In columns (4) through (9), following prior literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 2015), I control for aggregate measures of real earnings 
management, REM1 and REM2, to consider a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings 
management. In both columns (4) and (7), the coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm are negative 
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and significant, which is consistent with my prediction that firms affected more by ratings 
conservatism engage in less accrual-based earnings management. The coefficients on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm in columns (5) and (8) are negative but insignificant, while the coefficient 
on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm in column (6) is positive and significant. Furthermore, in column (9), the 
coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive but insignificant. As expected, I find negative and 
significant coefficients on REM1 and REM2, respectively, which provides evidence of the 
substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management. That is, managers use real and 
accrual-based earnings as substitutes to manage their reported earnings.  
 [Please insert Table 6 here] 
Table 7 reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and 
Negative_DA as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest is the lagged Rat_Diff_Ind. 
In column (1), I find a negative and significant (p-value=0.010) coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind, suggesting that rating conservatism decreases accrual-based earnings 
management. While the coefficients on Size, Leverage, ROA, Firm_Age, SOX, Z_Score, and NOA 
are negative and significant, the coefficient on Loss is positive and significant. These results are 
consistent with those reported in column (1) of Table 6. Turning to column (2), I find a negative and 
significant (p-value=0.058) coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind, indicating that firms affected 
more by rating conservatism have less incentive to engage in income-increasing earnings 
management. Consistent with results in column (2) of Table 6, the coefficients on Size, SOX, 
Z_Score, Loss, NOA, M&A, and Restruct are negative and significant. In column (3), the coefficient 
on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive and significant (p-value=0.059), which is consistent with my 
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prediction that ratings conservatism leads to less income-decreasing earnings management. 
Furthermore, I find consistent results with those reported in column (1) of Table 6.  
In columns (4) to (9), I control for two aggregate measures of real earnings management, 
REM1 and REM2, respectively. Consistent with those in Table (6), I find negative coefficients on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind in columns (4), (5), (7), and (8) and positive coefficients in columns (6) and 
(8). These findings indicate that, as ratings conservatism increases, managers engage in less accrual-
based earnings management, including income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management. Like Table (6), the coefficients on REM1 and REM2 are negative and significant. 
These findings are indicative of a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management.  
 [Please insert Table 7 here] 
Overall, the results from Tables (6) and (7) show that firms affected more by ratings 
conservatism engage in less accrual-based earnings management. These findings suggest that 
ratings conservatism reduces a firm’s incentive to engage in accrual-based earnings management, 
measured through the absolute value of discretionary accruals as well as positive and negative 
discretionary accruals, which supports my first hypothesis (H1). 
5.3 Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Real Earnings Management: 
Testing H1 
In this subsection, I examine the relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings 
management. To do so, I consider the abnormal levels of production costs (REM_PROD), 
discretionary expenses (REM_DISX), and cash flow from operations (REM_CFO) as well as 
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aggregate measures of real earnings management, REM1 and REM2. Furthermore, I use two 
measures, Rat_Diff_Firm and Rat_Diff_Ind, as proxies for ratings conservatism.  
Table 8 reports the results of pooled OLS regressions with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, 
REM_CFO, REM1, and REM2 as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest is lagged 
Rat_Diff_Firm (Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm). In column (1), where REM_PROD is the dependent 
variable, I find a positive and significant (p-value<0.001) coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. 
The result suggests that ratings conservatism engages in more abnormal production. While the 
coefficients on Size, Leverage, Z_Score, and M&A are positive and significant, the coefficients on 
MTB, ROA, LOSS, NOA, and Restruct are negative and significant. In column (2), where the 
dependent variable is REM_DISX, the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive and 
significant (p-value=0.042), indicating that ratings conservatism reduces discretionary expenses. In 
column (3), I find a positive and significant (p-value=0.003) coefficient on REM_CFO, suggesting 
that ratings conservatism is related to abnormally high operating cash flow. The results in columns 
(4) and (5) confirm that firms more affected by ratings conservatism engage in more real earnings 
management, as the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive and significant in both 
columns. In columns (6) to (10), I control for the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) 
to consider a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management.  Consistent with 
previous results, I find positive and significant coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm in all 
columns, suggesting that ratings conservatism increases a firm’s incentives to engage in more real 
earnings management. In columns (9) and (10), including REM1 and REM2, respectively, I find 
negative and significant coefficients on ABS_DA. Finally, in all columns, relevant control variables 
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take the predicted signs.  
[Please insert Table 8 here] 
Table 9 reports the results of pooled OLS regressions with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, 
REM_CFO, REM1, and REM2 as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest is 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. In column (1), the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive and 
significant (p-value=0.003), suggesting that ratings conservatism leads to more abnormal 
production costs. In column (2), the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive but 
insignificant. Column (3) shows a positive and significant coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind, 
indicating that ratings conservatism leads to high abnormal cash flow. The results from columns (4) 
and (5) suggest that firms more affected by ratings conservatism engage in more real earnings 
management. Turning to columns (6) to (10), including ABS_DA as an additional control variable, I 
find that the coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind are positive and significant, indicating that 
ratings conservatism results in more real earnings management.  
 [Please insert Table 9 here] 
Collectively, the results from Tables (8) and (9) show that firms affected more by ratings 
conservatism engage in more real earnings management. These findings suggest that ratings 
conservatism increases a firm’s incentive to engage in more real earnings management, measured 
as the abnormal levels of production costs (REM_PROD), discretionary expenses (REM_DISX), 
and cash flow from operations (REM_CFO) as well as aggregate measures of real earnings 
management, REM1 and REM2, which supports my first hypothesis (H1). Furthermore, I find that 
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the coefficients on ABS_DA are negative and significant, indicating a substitution between accrual-
based and real earnings management for columns (9) and (10).  
5.4 Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Total Earnings Management 
In this subsection, I further examine the relation between ratings conservatism and total 
earnings management. To do so, I sum the signed discretionary accruals (DA) and each 
aggregate measure of real earnings management (using either REM1 or REM2) to capture total 
earnings management. I generate two measures of total earnings management, TEM1 and TEM2, as 
defined in Appendix B.  
Table 10 reports the results of pooled OLS regressions with TEM1 as a dependent variable. 
In columns (1) to (4), I find that the coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm are positive and 
significant, indicating that ratings conservatism increases total earnings management, represented 
by TEM1. The finding suggests that the increase in real earnings management is greater than the 
decrease in accrual-based earnings management. Similarly, in columns (5) to (8), the coefficients on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind are positive and significant.  
[Please insert Table 10 here] 
Table 11 shows the results of pooled OLS regressions with TEM2 as a dependent variable. 
As in Table 10, I find that the coefficient on either Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm or Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 
is positive and significant, suggesting that ratings conservatism leads to the increase in total earnings 
management.  
[Please insert Table 11 here] 
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Overall, the results from Tables 6 to 9 indicate that ratings conservatism leads to less 
accrual-based earnings management (AEM), but more real earnings management (REM). On the 
other hand, Tables 10 and 11 suggest that, given the two opposite effects, ratings conservatism 
increases total earnings management (TEM).  
5.5 Investment- and Speculative-Grade Firms (Accrual-Based Earnings 
Management): Testing H2 
I investigate how the negative relation between ratings conservatism and accrual-based 
earnings management varies across investment- and speculative-grade issuers. To do this, I split 
sample firms into two subsamples: one includes investment-grade (IG) firms and the other includes 
speculative-grade (SG) firms. The investment-grade firms have debt ratings of BBB- or above and 
the speculative-grade firms have debt ratings below BBB-. Regarding accrual-based earnings 
management, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) as a dependent variable 
to test the second hypothesis (H2).  
Table 12 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with regard to 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. In column (1) for the investment-grade group, the coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is negative but insignificant. The coefficient on ROA is positive and 
significant, suggesting that investment-grade firms with high return on assets engage in more 
accrual-based earnings management. The coefficient on Firm_Age is negative and significant. This 
finding indicates that older investment-grade firms engage in less accrual-based earnings 
management. The coefficient on SOX is positive and significant, indicating that accrual-based 
earnings management in investment-grade firms increases after the passage of SOX. The 
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coefficient on Loss is positive and significant, suggesting that investment-grade firms with high net 
income engage in more accrual-based earnings management. Finally, the coefficient on NOA is 
negative and significant, indicating that investment-grade firms with high net operating assets 
engage in less accrual-based earnings management.  
In column (2) for the speculative-grade group, I find a negative and significant (p-
value=0.012) coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. Regarding the speculative-grade firms, this 
finding indicates that those affected more by ratings conservatism engage in less accrual-based 
earnings management. The coefficient on Size is negative and significant, suggesting that large 
speculative-grade firms engage in less accrual-based earnings management. The coefficient on 
Leverage is negative and significant, indicating that highly leveraged speculative-grade firms 
engage in less accrual-based earnings management. The coefficient on ROA is negative and 
significant, suggesting that speculative-grade firms with high return on assets engage in less accrual-
based earnings management. Next, I find a positive and significant coefficient on Big4. The finding 
indicates that speculative-grade firms audited by Big 4 accounting firms engage in more accrual-
based earnings management.  The coefficient on SOX is negative and significant, indicating that 
accrual-based earnings management in speculative-grade firms decreases after the passage of SOX. 
Furthermore, while the coefficients on Z_Score and NOA are negative and significant, the 
coefficient on Loss is positive and significant.  
In columns (3) to (6), I control for aggregate real earnings management, measured as either 
REM1 or REM2, to consider a substitution between accrual-based and real earnings management. 
With respect to investment-grade firms, I find that the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is 
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negative but insignificant. In contrast, regarding speculative-grade firms, I find that the coefficient 
on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is negative and significant. These findings suggest that speculative-
grade firms more affected by ratings conservatism engage in less accrual-based earnings 
management. In addition, with respect to speculative-grade firms, the coefficient on either REM1 or 
REM2 is negative and significant, indicating a substitution between accrual-based and real earnings 
management.  
Finally, I test the equality of regression coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm between 
investment- and speculative-grade groups. The bottom of Table 12 shows that the chi-square 
statistics are 4.45 (p-value=0.035), 3.88 (p-value=0.049), and 3.79 (p-value=0.052), respectively. 
These results indicate that both coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm between two groups are 
different from each other. 
[Please insert Table 12 here] 
Table 13 reports the results of the pooled OLS regression with regard to 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. Similar to those reported in Table 12, column (1) shows that the coefficient 
on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is negative but significant. The coefficients on ROA and Loss are positive 
and significant, while the coefficients on Firm_Age, SOX, and NOA are negative and significant. In 
contrast, column (2) shows that the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is negative and significant 
(p-value=0.001). This negative relation indicates that speculative-grade firms that are affected more 
by ratings conservatism have less incentive to engage in accrual-based earnings management. I 
further find that the coefficients on Size, Leverage, ROA, SOX, Z_Score, and NOA are negative and 
significant, while the coefficients on Big4 and Loss are positive and significant.  
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In columns (3) to (6), I include two proxies for aggregate real earnings management, 
respectively, measured as either REM1 or REM2, to consider a substitution between accrual-based 
and real earnings management. Regarding investment-grade groups, I find that the coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is negative but insignificant. This finding is consistent with those reported in 
Table 12. For speculative-grade groups, I find a positive and significant coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. These findings suggest that speculative-grade firms more affected by ratings 
conservatism engage in less accrual-based earnings management. Furthermore, with respect to 
speculative-grade firms, the coefficient on either REM1 or REM2 is negative and significant, 
suggesting that there is a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management. 
Finally, I perform the equality of coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind between 
investment- and speculative-grade subsamples. At the bottom of Table 13, I report that the chi-
square statistics are 8.37 (p-value=0.004), 7.69 (p-value=0.006), and 7.61 (p-value=0.006), 
respectively. These results suggest that both coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind between two 
groups are different from each other. 
[Please insert Table 13 here] 
Overall, the results from Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate that the negative relation between 
ratings conservatism and accrual-based earnings management does not apply to investment-grade 
firms. In other words, I find no evidence of the negative relation between them for the investment-
grade group. Regarding accrual-based earnings management, these findings indicate that the 
negative relation is more pronounced for speculative-grade firms than for investment-grade firms, 
supporting my second hypothesis (H2).  
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5.6 Investment- and Speculative-Grade Firms (Real earnings management): 
Testing H2 
In this subsection, I examine whether the negative relation between ratings conservatism 
and real earnings management varies across investment- and speculative-grade issuers. To do this, I 
divide my sample firms into two subsamples: one includes investment-grade (IG) firms and the 
other includes speculative-grade (SG) firms. With respect to real earnings management, I use two 
aggregate measures, REM1 and REM2, to test the second hypothesis (H2).  
Table 14 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, REM1. 
In the first columns (1) to (4), I use the ratings conservatism measure, Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. 
Furthermore, in the latter columns (5) to (8), I use another ratings conservatism measure, 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind.  
In column (1), the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is negative but insignificant for 
the investment-grade group. The coefficient on Leverage is positive and significant (p-value=0.042), 
indicating that highly leveraged investment-grade firms engage in more real earnings management. 
The coefficient on MTB is negative and significant, suggesting that investment-grade firms with 
high growth opportunities engage in less real earnings management. The coefficient on ROA is 
negative and significant, indicating that investment-grade firms with high return on assets engage in 
less real earnings management. The coefficient on Z_Score is positive and significant, while the 
coefficients on Loss and Restruct are negative and significant. In column (2), the coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive and significant for the speculative-grade group. The result 
suggests that speculative-grade firms more affected by ratings conservatism engage in more real 
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earnings management. In column (3), I find a positive but insignificant coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. In contrast, the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive and 
significant (p-value=0.050) in column (4) for speculative-grade firms. Furthermore, in column (4), 
the coefficient on ABS_DA is negative and significant.  
On the other hand, in column (5), the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive but 
insignificant. In column (6), the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive and significant (p-
value=0.050), suggesting that ratings conservatism increases real earnings management for 
speculative-grade firms. Whereas the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive but 
insignificant in column (7), the coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind in column (8) is positive and 
significant. Furthermore, in column (8), the coefficient on ABS_DA is negative and significant.  
Finally, I perform the equality of coefficients on either Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm or 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind between investment- and speculative-grade subsamples. At the bottom of 
Table 14, I report that the chi-square statistics are 0.21 (p-value=0.647), 0.16 (p-value=0.694), 0.27 
(p-value=0.603), and 0.19 (p-value=0.662), respectively. These results suggest that both coefficients 
on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind between two groups are not different from each other. 
 [Please insert Table 14 here] 
Table 15 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, REM2. 
In the first columns (1) to (4), I use the ratings conservatism measure, Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. 
Furthermore, in the latter columns (5) to (8), I use the ratings conservatism measure, 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind.  
Similar to the results found in Table 14, in columns (1) and (3), I find a positive but 
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insignificant for investment-grade firms. Likewise, in columns (2) and (4), I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm, suggesting that ratings conservatism increases 
real earnings management for speculative-grade firms. On the other hand, in columns (4) to (8), I 
find that the coefficients on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind are positive but insignificant. In addition, the 
coefficients on ABS_DA are positive and significant in columns (3) and (7), while the coefficients 
on ABS_DA are negative and significant in columns (4) and (8).  
Finally, I perform the equality of coefficients on either Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm or 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind between investment- and speculative-grade subsamples. At the bottom of 
Table 15, I report that the chi-square statistics are 0.16 (p-value=0.691), 0.10 (p-value=0.750), 0.11 
(p-value=0.741), and 0.05 (p-value=0.819), respectively. These results suggest that both coefficients 
on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind between two groups are not different from each other. 
[Please insert Table 15 here] 
Overall, the results from Tables 14 and 15 suggest that the positive relation between ratings 
conservatism and real earnings management does not apply to both investment- and speculative-
grade firms. In other words, I find no evidence of the positive relation between them for both groups. 
Regarding real earnings management, these findings are inconsistent with the second hypothesis 
that the positive relation is more pronounced for speculative-grade firms than for investment-grade 
firms.  
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 CHAPTER 6
POTENTIAL SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
The results reported in Tables 6 through 11 indicate that ratings conservatism leads to a 
trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings management. In this section, I consider the 
possibility of sample selection bias that a firm’s decision to manage its reported earnings via 
earnings management are not exogenous (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Chan et al., 
2015). This sample selection bias lead to biased ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), I use the two-stage 
model proposed by Heckman (1979) to correct for a firm’s self-selection to manage earnings 
through earnings management. In the first stage, I estimate the following probit regression model:
34
  
            Prob [Suspect_EMit = 1] = Probit (β0 + β1Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β2Sizeit  
                                                                              + β3Leverageit + β4MTBit + β5ROAit + β6Sharesit 
                                                    + Σ βkYeark + ɛit).                                                           (9) 
The dependent variable, Suspect_EM, is an indicator variable that equals to one if either real 
earnings management proxies (either REM1 or REM2) or accrual-based earnings management 
proxies are above the industry-year median, and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables, except 
for Shares, are defined in Appendix B. Shares is the natural logarithm of the number of shares 
                                                 
34
 Due to the limited data availability, I do not estimate the probit model (9) after controlling for 
variables associated with financial analysts, including the number of times beating/meeting financial 
analysts’ forecast consensus and the number of financial analysts following the firm (see, for example, 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Instead, I control for firm characteristics, such as size, leverage, 
market-to-book ratios, and return on assets. In my future study, I further need to re-estimate the probit 
model after including these variables related to financial analysts.  
 62 
 
outstanding. In addition, I control for year fixed effects in the model. In the second stage, I obtain 
the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) estimated from equation (9).35 I then re-estimate the regression model 
(8) after including the IMR as a control variable in order to control for a firm’s decision to manage 
its reported earnings. 
Table 16 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression using each earnings management 
proxy as a dependent variable. For brevity, I only present the coefficients on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm, Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind, REM1, REM2, and IMR. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 10. In other words, ratings conservatism 
increases real earnings management and decreases accrual-based earnings management. 
Furthermore, I find that the coefficient on the IMR is insignificant in all columns. The significance 
of the coefficient on the IMR is used in evaluating the presence or absence of sample selection bias 
(Lenox et al., 2012). In my analysis, the statistical insignificance of the coefficient on the IMR 
indicates no selection bias. However, due to the possibility or presence of multicollinearity, the 
insignificant coefficient on the IMR does not necessarily indicate that there is no selection bias 
(Lenox et al., 2012).  
 [Please insert Table 16 here] 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is given by λ(c) ≡ ϕ(c)/Ф(c) for any c. The ϕ is the probability density 
function of the standard normal distribution. The Ф is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution (Wooldridge, 2002).  
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 CHAPTER 7
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
7.1 Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Smoothing (EM_SMOOTH) 
Beidleman (1973, p. 653) defines earnings smoothing (also known as income smoothing) 
as “the intentional dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings that is currently 
considered to be normal for a firm.” Earnings smoothing is a particular form of earnings 
management. The motivation for managers to smooth their reported earnings is clear. For example, 
prior research argues that investors consider firms with less volatile earnings as less risky because 
the firms have the potential to generate future cash flows (Minton and Schrand, 1999; Rountree et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, Graham et al. (2005) conduct a survey and interview with chief financial 
officers (CFOs) to identify determinants of reported earnings and disclosure decisions. Their study 
suggests that about 96.9% of survey participants feel that they prefer to smooth earnings. 
Specifically, Graham et al. (2005) asked survey questions regarding the motivations for 
earnings smoothing. The main motivation is that 88.7% of survey participants responded 
that investors recognize a firm’s smoother earnings as less risky. The second motivation 
is that 79.7% of the participants feel that earnings smoothing enables financial analysts 
and investors to easily predict future earnings. In this section, I investigate the relation 
between ratings conservatism and earnings smoothing. To do this, I attempt to answer the 
following research question: Does ratings conservatism make managers engage in more 
or less earnings smoothing? 
In my empirical analysis, I use three well-known measures of earnings smoothing 
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to capture managers’ incentives to smooth their reported earnings. First, following Leuz 
et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2004), and Myers et al. (2007), I measure earnings 
smoothness as the ratio of standard deviation of earnings (Earnings) to standard deviation 
of cash flow from operations (CFO), calculated using Earnings and CFO from t to t+3. 
The first measure of earnings smoothing (denoted as EM_SMOOTH1) is represented as  
                              𝐸𝑀_𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻1 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 (
𝜎(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)
𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)
)                                              (10) 
where 𝜎 denotes the standard deviation. Both earnings and cash flow from operations are 
deflated by lagged total assets. The smaller ratios indicate a higher degree of earnings 
smoothing. For easy interpretation, I use earnings smoothing ranking of 
σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO). To do so, I follow Zarowin (2002) and convert the correlation, 
σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO), into reverse fractional ranking by each two-digit SIC industry and 
year group.36 Thus, firms with the lower ratio of standard deviation of earnings 
(Earnings) to standard deviation of cash flow from operations have a higher earning-
smoothing ranking.  
Second, I follow Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Leuz et al. (2003), Burgstahler et al. 
(2006), and Myers et al. (2007) to measure earnings smoothing. The second measure is 
calculated as the Spearman correlation between the change in total accruals (ACC) and 
                                                 
36
 To control for industry and time effects, Zarowin (2002) computes reverse fractional ranking by 
each two-digit SIC industry and year group. For example, EM_SMOOTH1 = (rank-1)/ ((number of firms 
within industry-year) -1). As a result, this measure ranges from 0 to 1 by industry-year.  
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the change in cash flow from operations (CFO), both scaled by lagged total assets.37 I 
calculate the correlation using ACC and CFO from t to t+3. The second measure of 
earnings smoothing (denoted as EM_SMOOTH2) is given by 
                               𝐸𝑀_𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻2 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜌(∆𝐴𝐶𝐶, ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂))                                           (11) 
where 𝜌 denotes the Spearman correlation coefficient, and ∆ACC and ∆CFO represent 
the change in total accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, respectively. A 
larger negative correlation between the change in total accruals and the change in cash 
flow from operations indicates a greater degree of earnings smoothing. As in the first 
measure, for easy interpretation,  
I use earnings smoothing ranking of ρ(∆ACC, ∆CFO). Following Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006), I convert the correlation into reverse fractional ranking by two-digit SIC industry 
and year. As a result, firms with a more negative correlation have a higher earning-
smoothing ranking. 
Finally, I follow Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and generate the third measure of 
earnings smoothing. As Zarowin (2002) points out, the second measure for earnings 
smoothing captures non-discretionary accruals. Thus, I decompose total accruals into two 
components, discretionary accruals (DA) and non-discretionary accruals (NDA). To 
estimate discretionary accruals (DA), as in Tucker and Zarowin (2006), I use the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model modified by Kothari et al. (2005). The third measure is 
                                                 
37
 In a similar way, several prior studies (Lang et al., 2006; LaFond et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2008) 
measure earnings smoothing as the correlation between the total accruals and the cash flow from operations.  
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calculated as the Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary accruals (DA) 
and the change in pre-discretionary income (PDI), both scaled by lagged total assets. As 
in previous measures, I calculate the correlation using DA and PDI from t to t+3. The 
third measure of earnings smoothing (denoted as EM_SMOOTH3) is given by 
                             𝐸𝑀_𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻3 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝜌(∆𝐷𝐴, ∆𝑃𝐷𝐼) )                                               (12) 
where 𝜌 denotes the Spearman correlation coefficient, ∆𝐷𝐴 and ∆𝑃𝐷𝐼 represent the 
change in discretionary accruals and the change in pre-discretionary income, respectively. 
A more negative correlation between the change in discretionary accruals and the change 
in pre-discretionary accruals demonstrates a greater degree of earnings smoothing. To 
control for industry and time effects, I follow Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and use reverse 
fractional ranking by two-digit SIC industry for the third earnings smoothing measure. 
Accordingly, a more negative correlation indicates a higher earning-smoothing ranking. 
To investigate the effect of ratings conservatism on a firm’s earnings smoothing, I estimate 
the following regression model: 
            EM_SMOOTHit = β0 + β1Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β2Sizeit + β3Leverageit 
                                                            + β4MTBit + β5ROAit + β6Firm_Ageit + β7Big4it + β8SOXit                                              
                                                            + β9Z_Scoreit + β10Lossit + β11NOAit + β12M&Ait +β13Restructit 
                                                            + Σ βjIndustryj + Σ βkYeark + ɛit,                                               (13) 
where EM_SMOOTHit denotes the measures of earnings smoothing of firm i in year t. 
EM_SMOOTHit denotes three measures, EM_SMOOTH1, EM_SMOOTH2, and 
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EM_SMOOTH3. As in equation (8), the main variable of interest is Ratings_Conservatism, 
specifically Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. Likewise, all other variables are the 
same as those in equation (8). All earnings smoothing measures and other variables are defined in 
Appendix B.  
Table 17 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with each dependent variable, 
EM_SMOOTH1, EM_SMOOTH2, and EM_SMOOTH3. As in previous analyses, the variables of 
interest are Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. The coefficients on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind, respectively, are insignificant in all columns.
38
  
 [Please insert Table 17 here] 
Overall, I find no evidence that firms more affected by ratings conservatism tend to engage 
in either more or less earnings smoothing.  
7.2 Ratings Conservatism and Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition39 
As an additional analysis, I examine the relation between ratings conservatism and 
asymmetric timely loss recognition. To do this, I seek to answer the following question: Do firm 
mangers adjust timely loss recognition in response to ratings conservatism? Asymmetric timely loss 
                                                 
38
 Instead of using reverse fractional ranking by each two-digit SIC industry and year group, I also use 
the original values of σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO), ρ(∆ACC, ∆CFO), and ρ(∆DA, ∆PDI) and repeat the analysis. I 
obtain qualitatively similar results. Instead of calculating σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO), ρ(∆ACC, ∆CFO), and 
ρ(∆DA, ∆PDI) using the period from t to t+3, I further employ different periods, e.g., contemporaneous 
period t, from t to t+1, and from t to t+2 and repeat the analysis. Similarly, I find no evidence of earnings 
smoothing in response to ratings conservatism.  
39
 Both asymmetric timely loss recognition and conditional accounting conservatism are 
interchangeably used in accounting research. Asymmetric timely loss recognition is one of the important 
earnings attributes that derives from conditional accounting conservatism (see, for example, Francis et al. 
(2004) for a discussion).  
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recognition, also known as conditional accounting conservatism, is an important attribute of 
financial reporting (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Francis et al., 2004; Ball et al., 2005; 
Roychowdhury Watts, 2007; Gormley et al., 2012). 
In the analysis, I use three measures of asymmetric timeliness loss recognition to 
test my research question. First, the measure of conditional accounting conservatism is 
Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure. The Basu’s (1997) specification that 
captures asymmetric timeliness is as follows: 
                    NIi = β1 + β2Di + β3RETi + β4Di * RETi +ɛi                                                 (14) 
where the subscript i indicates the firm, NI is annual earnings, RET is the buy-and-hold 
returns over the year, and D is an indicator variable equal to one if RET<0 and zero 
otherwise. β3 is the timeliness measure of positive returns (or good news). β4 is the 
measure of incremental timeliness for negative returns (or bad news). The total timeliness 
measure of negative returns is β3 + β4. The main coefficient of interest is β4 that captures 
symmetric timely loss recognition. To test the effect of ratings conservatism on asymmetric timely 
loss recognition, I follow LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and estimate the following regression 
equation: 
                NIit = β0 + β1Dit + β2Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β3Sizeit + β4Leverageit   
                                  + Β5MTBit + β6LITit + β7Dit*Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β8Dit*Sizeit   
                                  + β9Dit*Leverageit + β10Dit*MTBit + β11Dit*LITit 
                                  + β12RETit + β13RETit*Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β14RETit*Sizeit   
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                                  +β15RETit*Leverageit + β16RETit*MTBit + β17RETit*LITit 
                                  + β18Dit*RETit + β19Dit*RETit *Ratings_Conservatismit-1 
                                  + β20Dit *RETit*Sizeit + β21Dit *RETit*Leverageit + β22Dit*RETit *MTBit 
                                  + β23Dit*RETit*LITit + Σ βjIndustryj + Σ βkYeark + ɛit,                             (15)                                                         
where variables NI, D, and RET are previously defined. I control for industry and year 
fixed effects in equation (15). Following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Ahmed and 
Duellman (2013), I measure all control variables, except LIT, as decile ranks in the equation. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
Second, I follow Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to capture the differential timeliness 
of gains and loss recognition. Their method is based on the correlation between accruals 
and contemporaneous cash flows. Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) specification for 
capturing asymmetric timeliness is as follows: 
                  ACCi = β1 + β2DCFOi + β3CFOi + β4DCFOi * CFOi +ɛi                              (16) 
where the subscript i indicates the firm, ACC is total accruals, calculated as net 
income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows scaled by lagged total 
assets , DCFO is an indicator variable equal to one if CFO<0 and zero otherwise, and 
CFO is operating cash flows. β4 is the measure of asymmetric timeliness for loss 
recognition. That is, a positive coefficient on DCFO * CFO indicates greater conditional 
accounting conservatism. Based on the method developed by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), I estimate the following modified regression equation: 
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    ACCit = β0 + β1DCFOit + β2CFOit + β3DCFOit*CFOit + β4Ratings_Conservatismit-1 
                    + β5DCFOit *Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β6CFOit *Ratings_Conservatismit-1 
                    + β7DCFOit*CFOit *Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β8Sizeit + β9DCFOit *Sizeit   
              + β10CFOit*Sizeit + β11DCFOit*CFOit *Sizeit + β12Leverageit   
                    + β13DCFOit *Leverageit + β14CFOit * Leverageit + β15DCFOit *CFOit *Leverageit   
             + β16MTBit + β17DCFOit *MTBit + β18CFOit *MTBit + β19DCFOit *CFOit *MTBit   
             + β20LITit + β21DCFOit *LITit + β22CFOit *LITit + β23DCFOit*CFOit *LITit   
                   + Σ βjIndustryj + Σ βkYeark + ɛit,                                                                          (17)                                                         
where all variables are previously defined. I control for industry and year fixed effects in 
equation (17).  
Finally, I use the C_Score developed by Khan and Watts (2009) to capture 
asymmetric timeliness loss recognition.40 To test the relation between ratings 
conservatism and asymmetric timeliness loss recognition, I estimate the following pooled 
OLS regression for the sample period from 1997 to 2014. The pooled OLS regression 
model is as follows: 
                  C_Scoreit = β0 + β1Ratings_Conservatismit-1 + β2Sizeit + β3Leverageit  
                                                    + β4MTBit + β5ROAit + β6Firm_Ageit + β7Sales_Growthit 
                                  + β8Rd_Advit + β9LITit + β10Big4it + β11CFOit  
                                  + Σ βjIndustryj + Σ βkYeark + ɛit,                                                      (18) 
                                                 
40
 See Appendix C for more details. 
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where C_Score  represents the measure of asymmetric timeliness loss recognition. Larger 
values of C_Score exhibit greater timely loss recognition, indicating greater conditional 
conservatism. I also use cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. The main 
explanatory variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. 
Following prior research (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007, 2013; Roychowdhury and Watts, 
2007; LaFond ad Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008; Goh and Li 2011), I 
control for firm size (Size), leverage (Leverage), market-to-book ratio (MTB), return on 
assets (ROA), firm age (Firm_Age), (Sales_Growth), research and development (R&D) 
and advertising expenditures (Rd_Adv), litigation indicator (LIT), Big 4 auditor (Big4) 
indicator, and operating cash flows (CFO). Finally, I control for year and industry effects 
(Givoly et al., 2007). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Table 18 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with three measures of 
asymmetric timeliness loss recognition as each dependent variable. In columns (1) and (2), I use NI 
as a dependent variable. The variables of interest are D*RET*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and 
D*RET*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind, respectively. I find no evidence of ratings conservatism on 
asymmetric timely loss recognition as the coefficients on both D*RET*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and 
D*RET*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind are insignificant. In columns (3) and (4), I use ACC as a dependent 
variable. I find mixed results regarding the relation between ratings conservatism and accrual-based 
loss recognition. That is, the coefficient on DCFO*CFO*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is insignificant, 
while the coefficient on DCFO*CFO*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive and significant (p-
value=0.005). Finally, in columns (5) and (6), I use C_Score as a dependent variable. I find that the 
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coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm is positive and significant (p-value=0.096). Likewise, the 
coefficient on Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind is positive and significant (p-value=0.017). Taken together, 
these results exhibit less asymmetric timely loss recognition, indicating lower conditional 
accounting conservatism.  
[Please insert Table 18 here] 
Overall, I find inconsistent results regarding the relation between ratings conservatism and 
each measure of asymmetric timeliness loss recognition.  
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 CHAPTER 8
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
8.1 Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
In my main analysis, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from 
equations (3) and (4) as a proxy for accrual-based earnings management. In this subsection, I also 
use four alternative measures of accrual-based earnings management as robustness tests. The reason 
I use these alternative measures of discretionary accruals is to mitigate measurement errors arising 
from the modified Jones (1991) model. First, as in Cohen et al. (2008), I replace equation (3) 
with the following equation (19): 
        
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                     (19) 
I then take the same approach as in subsection 3.2.1 to calculate discretionary accruals.  
Table 19 shows the results using an alternative measure of accrual-based earnings 
management based on discretionary accruals proposed by Cohen et al. (2008). The results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 11. Firms more affected by 
ratings conservatism engage in more real earnings management and less accrual-based 
earnings management.  
[Please insert Table 19 here] 
Second, following Chen et al. (2008) and Francis and Yu (2009), I use the 
performance-adjusted Jones model. For example, Kothari et al. (2005) claim that the 
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modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) is likely to be 
misspecified by sample firms with extreme performance. To mitigate the misspecification 
concern, I follow Kothari et al. (2005) and include lagged return on assets (ROA) as 
follows: 
   
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1
1
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾2
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.     (20) 
I obtain coefficients estimated from the above regression for each two-digit SIC industry 
and year. I then use the estimated coefficients from the equation (20) to compute non-
discretionary accruals as follows: 
     𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1
1
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾2
(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1. 
The variables, TA, REV, AR, PPE, and AT, are defined in subsection 3.2.1. ROA is 
measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. Finally, I 
obtain performance-adjusted discretionary accruals by computing the difference between 
total accruals (
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
) and non-discretionary accruals (NDAit). All variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. I repeat previous analyses using the absolute value of 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals.  
Table 20 reports the results using another measure of accrual-based earnings 
management based on the discretionary accruals proposed by Chen et al. (2008) and 
Francis and Yu (2009). In general, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 6 
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through 11.  
[Please insert Table 20 here] 
Third, I use performance-matched discretionary accruals suggested by Kothari et 
al. (2005) as an alternative proxy for accrual-based earnings management. Specifically, 
Kothari et al. (2005) propose an accrual-based measure to control for the effect of firm 
performance on discretionary accruals. The procedure for obtaining discretionary 
accruals is same as in subsection 3.2.1. Next, I adjust the discretionary accruals for 
performance matching based on the two-digit SIC industry, year, and current year’s 
ROA.41 I then compute performance-matched discretionary accruals as the difference 
between the Jones model discretionary accruals in year t and the discretionary accruals of 
the matched firm in year t. In the analysis, I use the absolute value of performance-
matched discretionary accruals (ABS_PMDA) as an alternative proxy for accrual-based 
earnings management.  
Table 21 reports the results using the performance-matching discretionary 
accruals proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). In general, the results are qualitatively similar 
to those in Tables 6 through 11.  
[Please insert Table 21 here] 
                                                 
41
 Instead of using the current year’s ROA, I further match each firm-year observation with another 
using the two-digit SIC industry, year, and previous year’s ROA. I then calculate performance-matched 
discretionary accruals and repeat our main analysis using the proxy.  
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Finally, I use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) cash flow models to develop an 
accrual-based measure with respect to working capital accruals and cash flows. The 
model is as follows: 
              ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                                   (21) 
where ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the change in working capital accruals from fiscal year t-1 to t for firm i. 
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), I measure ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 as the increase in accounts 
receivable plus the increase in inventory plus the decrease in accounts payable and 
accrued liabilities plus decrease in taxes accrued plus the increase (decrease) in other 
assets and liabilities, scaled by lagged total assets.42 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+𝜏 is the cash flow from 
operations for firm i and fiscal year t+τ (τ = −1, 0, 1). All variables are standardized by 
average total assets. Using equation (21), I estimate a cross-sectional regression for each 
two-digit SIC industry and year group. Consistent with Jones et al. (2008), I measure 
abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) using the coefficients estimated from 
equation (21). Abnormal working capital accruals are calculated as the difference 
between the actual working capital and the fitted normal working capital. As in Wiedman 
and Hendricks (2013), I use the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals 
(ABS_AWCA) as an alternative proxy for accrual-based earnings management.43 The 
                                                 
42
 Specifically, the change in working capital (∆WC) is calculated as follows:  – (Compustat Item #302 
+ Compustat Item #303 + Compustat Item #304 + Compustat Item #305 + Compustat Item #307). 
43
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) use the standard deviation of abnormal working capital accruals 
(AWCA) as a proxy for working capital accruals quality. Wiedman and Hendricks (2013) claim that the 
absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals is “a useful alternative measure when a firm-year level 
measure is required.” 
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larger values of ABS_AWCA indicate more accrual-based earnings management, which 
implies lower accrual quality. 
Table 22 reports the results using the abnormal working capital accruals proposed 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002). The results are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 6 
through 11.  
[Please insert Table 22 here] 
Overall, my main results reported in Tables 6 through 11 are robust to alternative measures 
of accrual-based earnings management based on those proposed by prior studies. 
8.2 Using Alternative Industry Classifications When Calculating Ratings 
Conservatism and Earnings Management Proxies 
So far, I measure ratings conservatism and earnings management using two-digit SIC 
industry groups. Specifically, regarding proxies for ratings conservatism, I estimate the predicted 
ratings, one based on industry fixed effects (e.g., including dummies for a two-digit SIC industry) 
and one based on firm fixed effects. After subtracting predicted ratings from actual ratings, I obtain 
two ratings conservatism proxies. I further estimate cross-sectional regressions for each two-
digit SIC industry and year group to calculate discretionary accruals, the abnormal level 
of cash flow from operations, the abnormal level of production costs, and the abnormal 
level of discretionary expenses. Finally, I control for industry fixed effects using 
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dummies for two-digit SIC industry groups when conducting my main analysis.
44
  
In this subsection, instead of using the two-digit SIC industry, I also consider alternative 
industry classifications such as a three-digit SIC industry and Fama and French’s (1997) 48-
industry classifications as robustness checks. Specifically, following Baghai et al. (2014), I re-
estimate ratings model based on the three-digit SIC industry and measure a ratings conservatism 
proxy (denoted as Rat_Diff_Ind_1) that consider industry fixed effects. To maintain consistent 
industry classifications, I also re-calculate earnings management proxies based on each three-digit 
SIC industry and year. Finally, I repeat my main analyses using proxies for ratings conservatism 
and earnings management based on three-digit SIC industry groups. In the analysis, I further 
consider industry fixed effects using the three-digit SIC industry to control for industry-specific 
characteristics affecting earnings management. 
Table 23 presents the results of pooled OLS regression based on three-digit SIC industry 
groups. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main tables.  
 [Please insert Table 23 here] 
Similarly, I repeat the above procedure using the Fama and French’s (1997) 48-
industry classifications.
45
 In untabulated results, I obtain qualitatively similar results to 
those reported in main Tables 6 through 15.  
 
                                                 
44
 In other words, my analyses through this paper is consistently based on two-digit SIC industry 
groups.  
45
 For example, several prior studies, including Francis et al. (2005), Biddle et al. (2009), and 
Marquardt and Zur (2015), estimate discretionary accruals in a given year based on the Fama and French’s 
(1997) 48-industry classifications. 
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8.3 Alternative Cut-Off Years Employed When Measuring Ratings 
Conservatism46 
This subsection checks whether my main findings reported earlier are robust to alternative 
cut-off years when measuring ratings conservatism. In previous analyses, I use two ratings 
conservatism measures developed by Baghai et al. (2014) to examine how ratings conservatism 
influences a firm’s earnings management. As mentioned earlier, Baghai et al. (2014) measure 
ratings conservatism as the difference between a firm’s actual ratings and their predicted ratings. 
They estimate a firm’s predicted ratings for the period 1997 to 2009 using the ratings model 
estimated for the period 1985 to 1996. In addition to these cut-off years, I further employ alternative 
cut-off years from 1994 to 2003. For example, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 
1985 to 1997, 1985 to 1998, 1985 to 1999, and so on in order to predict ratings for the period of 
1998 to 2014, 1999 to 2014, 2000 to 2014, and so on, respectively.  
Table 24 reports the results using alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings 
conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1998 to 2014, I employ the ratings model 
estimated for the period 1985 to 1997. Table 24 shows that, in general, the results are 
                                                 
46
 To predict ratings over the period 1997 to 2009, Baghai et al. (2014) estimate ratings models using 
the period 1985 to 1996. They then use the parameters estimated from the ratings models for the period 
1985 to 1996 in order to obtain predicted ratings for the period 1997 to 2009. Finally, they measure ratings 
conservatism as the difference between a firm’s actual ratings and predicted ratings. The issue arising from 
the estimation of ratings models is due to an assumption that estimated parameters are constant over the 
period 1997 to 2009. Baghai et al. (2014) assume that estimated parameters are constant over the period 
1997 to 2009. In my empirical analysis, to relax the assumption of constant estimated parameters, it is used 
a moving window instead of using the period 1985 to 1996 when estimating a firm’s predicted ratings for 
the period 1997 to 2014. Specifically, for year t where t >1996, one can conduct recursive regressions and 
estimate parameters using the period from 1986 to t-1. Then, for each year, one predicts a firm’s ratings 
using the parameters estimated from the models that consider a moving window. In this way, one measures 
ratings conservatism and repeat previous analyses. This modified method may accurately reflect time-
variant firm characteristics in constructing ratings models. I further need to address relevant issues 
associated with a proxy for ratings conservatism. 
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qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 11. Specifically, with respect to 
accrual-based earnings management measured as ABS_DA, the coefficient on 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm (Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind) is negative and significant before (after) 
controlling for REM1 and REM2, respectively. In contrast, the coefficient on REM1 
(REM2) is positive and significant both before and after controlling for ABS_DA. Further, 
the relation between ABS_DA and REM1 (REM2) is negative and significant. These 
findings confirm my first hypothesis that ratings conservatism leads to less accrual-based 
earnings management, but greater real earnings management.  
 [Please insert Table 24 here] 
Table 25 presents the results using alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings 
conservatism. To do so, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 1985 to 1998 
in order to predict ratings for the period 1999 to 2014. The findings are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in the main tables.  
[Please insert Table 25 here] 
Overall, my main findings presented in Tables 6 through 11 are robust to alternative cut-off 
years employed when I measure ratings conservatism.
47
 
8.4 Controlling for the Effect of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 
It is a possibility that external events such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2008 
bias estimates on the relation between ratings conservatism and earnings management. To address 
                                                 
47
 In addition to these cut-off years, I also repeat analyses using alternative cut-off years from 1999 to 
2002. The results, not reported for the sake of brevity, are qualitatively similar to my main findings.  
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this possibility, I re-estimate the regression equation (8) by controlling for an indicator variable for 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The indicator variable takes the value of one if the years 
are 2007 and 2008, and zero otherwise. Table 24 reports the results of pooled OLS regression that 
control for the effect of external events, i.e., the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. The results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 11. Thus, my main findings are robust 
to the effect of external events.  
[Please insert Table 26 here] 
Furthermore, I repeat the analysis in equation (8) after excluding sample periods of 2007-
2008 to mitigate the effect of the Global Financial Crisis on the relation between ratings 
conservatism and earnings management. The unreported results, for the sake of brevity, are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 11.  
8.5 Possibility of Omitted Variable Bias 
In this subsection, I check whether my main findings reported in Tables 6 through 11 are 
robust to omitted variable bias. To mitigate the possibility of omitted variable problems, I re-
estimate the regression equation (8) after controlling for operating cycle (Cycle), cash flow 
operations (CFO), sales growth (Sales_Growth), and a litigation indicator (LIT) as well as existing 
control variables employed in equation.48 Based on prior studies on earnings management, I include 
                                                 
48
 In addition to these additional variables, I plan on conducting analyses after controlling for corporate 
governance characteristics (e.g., board size, board independence, board interlocks, CEO/Chair duality, 
audit committee, foreign institutional ownership, and managerial ownership) that affect a firm’s earnings 
management. The monitoring effectiveness of board of directors and audit committee on managerial 
actions has been well explored in the accounting and finance literature. Generally, the board of directors is 
recognized as entities that have the source and ability to effectively monitor managerial decisions (Jensen, 
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these control variables in equation (8). Specifically, following Cohen et al. (2008) and Zang (2012), 
I control for operating cycles (Cycle).49 I measure Sales_Growth as the percentage of annual growth 
in total sales. A litigation indicator (LIT) is defined in Appendix B.  
Table 25 reports the results when I include additional control variables in equation (8). In 
general, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 11.  
 [Please insert Table 27 here] 
8.6 Re-estimation of the Regression Equation (8) 
In this subsection, similar to Baghai et al. (2014), I re-estimate the regression equation (8) 
using lagged explanatory variables, except for each ratings conservatism proxy lagged by two years, 
as a robustness check. The lagged variables with two years can mitigate endogeneity problems. The 
regression model is as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
1993; John and Senbet, 1998; Coles et al., 2013). For example, the key functions of board of directors are 
to monitor and advise (top) management (Coles et al., 2013). Jensen (1993) and John and Senbet (1998) 
emphasize the role of board of directors in monitoring management and their actions. They argue that the 
effectiveness of monitoring is determined by composition of board of directors, board independence, and 
board size. Given the above, in addition to audit committee, the board of directors is an effective monitor of 
managers on behalf of shareholders because they are more likely to demand higher standards of corporate 
governance (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Furthermore, following Zang (2012), I plan on conducting analyses 
by controlling for the percentage of institutional ownership, firms’ marginal tax rates, and market shares. 
For example, prior literature (Bushee, 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012) shows that institutional 
ownership is effective in constraining real earnings management.  
49
 As in Cohen et al. (2008), the operating cycle is calculated as 
(𝐴𝑅t+𝐴𝑅t−1)/2
(
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆
360
)
+
(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇t+𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑇t−1)/2
(
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
360
)
. AR is 
account receivable; SALES represents sales; INVT represents inventories; and COGS represents cost of 
goods sold.  
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   REMit (or AEMit) = β0 + β1Ratings_Conservatismit-2 + β2Sizeit-1 + β3Leverageit-1 
                                 + β4MTBit-1 + β5ROAit-1 + β6Firm_Ageit-1 + β7Big4it-1 + β8SOXit-1   
                                 + β9Z_Scoreit-1 + β10Lossit-1 + β11NOAit-1 + β12M&Ait-1 + β13Restructit-1 
                                                  + β14AEMit-1 (or REMit-1) + Σ βjIndustryj + Σ βkYeark + ɛit,            (22) 
where all variables are defined previously. I further include year and industry dummies (based on a 
two-digit SIC industry) to control for time and industry specific effects. In addition, I use robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Untabulated results show that ratings conservatism 
increases real earnings management, while decrease accrual-based earnings management, which 
supports my first hypothesis (H1). 
8.7 Validity of the Ratings Model50 
For the robustness of the ratings model described in equation (1), I consider additional 
specifications provided by Baghai et al. (2014). First, as in Baghai et al. (2014), I re-estimate the 
ratings model by using only variables employed in Blume et al. (1998). Specifically, Blume et al. 
(1998) employ the following variables in estimating the ratings model: (i) the operating margin, 
calculated as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales; (ii) the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets; (iii) the ratio of total debt to total assets; (iv) the market value of equity; (v) a 
firm’s beta from a market-model regression; (vi) the standard error from the market-model 
regression; and (vii) a firm’s pretax interest coverage, computed as the ratio of sum of operating 
                                                 
50
 I estimate several additional specifications of the ratings model and then repeat analyses using two 
ratings conservatism proxies based on these specifications of the ratings model.  
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income after depreciation and interest expenses to interest expenses.51 Second, I re-estimate the 
ratings model after including the square and cube terms of all explanatory variables to consider the 
possibility of nonlinearities of the ratings model. Third, I repeat the ratings model by considering 
firm size and leverage in terms of market values, not book values. Specifically, I employ book 
leverage (calculated as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets) and firm size (computed as the 
logarithm of book value of assets) in equation (1). Instead, I replace these variables expressed in 
book values with them expressed in market values. Finally, I estimate the ratings model by 
considering serval macroeconomic variables. These macroeconomic variables includes the 
following: (i) the inflation rates; (ii) the rates of GDP growth; (iii) the slope of term structure52; (iv) 
the TED spread53; (v) the ratio of price to earnings; and (vi) the market volatility index. Untabulated 
results indicate that our main findings are robust these different specifications for ratings model.  
8.8 Role of Accounting Quality in the Assignment of Credit Ratings 
In this subsection, I consider the role of accounting quality in the assignment of credit 
ratings. As mentioned previously, credit rating agencies consider accounting quality in assigning 
credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Jorion et al., 2009; Caton et al., 2011; Bae et al., 2013; 
Shen and Huang, 2013; Standard & Poor’s, 2015). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006) provide evidence 
that credit ratings are positively related to accounting quality, indicating that accounting quality is 
                                                 
51
 See Blume et al. (1998, p. 1394-1395) for more details on these variables.  
52
 The slope of term structure is computed as the difference between the constant-maturity 10-year 
Treasury bond yield and the constant-maturity three-month T-bill yield.  
53
 The TED spread is calculated as the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) minus the 
three-month T-bill rate.  
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considered as one of the important components in rating assignment by ratings agencies.54 In a 
subsequent study, Jorion et al. (2009) emphasize the importance of accounting quality in the 
downward trend in credit ratings over time. They argue that a decline in accounting quality can 
primarily explain the downward trend in credit ratings. In a more recent study, Bae et al. (2013) 
argue that after the assignment of initial credit ratings by S&P, firms tend to engage in less accrual-
based earnings management.  
Thus, I re-estimate the rating model (1) after including accounting quality proxies (e.g., 
discretionary accruals) and predict ratings. I then calculate ratings conservatism as the difference 
between a firm’s actual ratings and predicted ratings. Finally, I repeat the analysis using the ratings 
conservatism proxies to check the robustness of the main results reported in Tables 6 through 15.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 In contrast, the following studies argue that credit ratings agencies cannot fully understand the 
process of a firm’s accounting accruals and thus managers manage earnings to favorably influence their 
debt ratings. For example, Gu and Zhao (2006) find evidence of a positive relation between accrual-based 
earnings management and bond ratings. This finding suggests that firms are likely to receive better debt 
ratings when they engage in more earnings management. They further show that the downward trend in 
bond ratings may not be due to accrual-based earnings management. Similarly, Demirtas and Cornaggia 
(2013) find that there are high current accruals at the time of initial credit ratings. This finding indicates 
that firms manage earnings around initial credit ratings in an attempt to obtain better initial ratings.  
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 CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study is to examine whether ratings conservatism by credit ratings 
agencies can affect a firm’s earnings management. I predict that managers take different earnings 
management strategies in response to the tightening of credit standards by rating agencies. 
Specifically, I investigate whether ratings conservatism leads to a substitution between an increase 
in real earnings management and a decrease in accrual-based earnings management. To this end, I 
test the following hypotheses and predictions. First, I hypothesize that tighter rating standards by 
credit rating agencies lead to a substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management. 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, I find that ratings conservatism is associated with lower 
accrual-based earnings management, measured through the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
and positive and negative discretionary accruals. In contrast, I find that these firms engage in more 
real earnings management, measured as the abnormal levels of production costs, discretionary 
expenses, and cash flow from operations as well as aggregate measures of real earnings 
management. Further, I find that total earnings management, calculated as the signed discretionary 
accruals and each aggregate measure of real earnings management, increases in response to ratings 
conservatism. This finding indicates that the increase in real earnings management is greater than 
the decrease in accrual-based earnings management. Second, I hypothesize that a positive 
(negative) relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings management (accrual-based 
earnings management) is more pronounced for firms with low credit quality than for those with 
high credit quality. I find that the negative relation between ratings conservatism and 
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accrual-based earnings management, measured as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, is stronger for speculative-grade firms than for investment-grade firms. 
However, I find that the positive relation between ratings conservatism and real earnings 
management does not apply to both investment- and speculative-grade firms. Finally, I test whether 
ratings conservatism is associated with other types of earnings management, such as income 
smoothing and asymmetric timeliness loss recognition. With respect to the additional analyses, I 
find no evidence that firms affected more by ratings conservatism tend to engage in more or even 
less earnings smoothing. I also find inconsistent results regarding the relation between ratings 
conservatism and each measure of asymmetric timeliness loss recognition. Overall, this study 
shows that ratings conservatism affects a firm’s incentive to manage its reported 
earnings. More importantly, this study suggests that ratings conservatism can influence a 
firm’s choice between accrual-based and real earnings management.  
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 CHAPTER 10
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although my study provides useful information to the literature, there are some limitations 
and future directions that will be addressed. First, it is unclear whether Standard & Poor’s (S&P) is 
generally becoming more conservative over time for all firms or S&P is more conservative for 
certain types of firms. This distinction is needed for the story of how the empirics work. If it is the 
former instead of the later, then estimating discretionary accruals by each year does not seem 
correct. It would be helpful to show that there is cross-sectional variation in ratings conservatism 
each year if discretionary accruals are estimated by year. Second, regarding accrual-based earnings 
management, it would be interesting to test the following research questions: Do firms that respond 
with less accrual-based earnings management have a lower level of debt? Are the firms with less 
accrual-based earnings management more likely to borrow? Does this type of earnings 
management strategy work? If so, do firms experience improvement in credit ratings after they 
engage in less accrual-based earnings management? Third, for an additional cross-sectional test that 
could be interesting, future research may need to split the sample by firms that want to borrow. This 
would be consistent with the story if the effect is stronger for firms that borrow in the subsequent 
year. Further, there is a possibility of reverse causality. For example, firms are more likely to borrow 
when their credit rating improves, but it still could add to the paper. Fourth, it would help if future 
research discusses some more details or provides certain anecdotal evidence on how credit rating 
agencies analyze firms’ earnings quality. Finally, it would be more interesting if future research 
includes additional cross-sectional tests. For instance, would the effect of ratings conservatism vary 
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among firms with different institutional ownership or analyst coverage? Prior literature shows that 
institutional ownership and financial analysts act as firms’ external monitors. Thus, I would expect 
the relation between ratings conservatism and accrual-based earnings management to be more 
pronounced in firms with less institutional ownership or analyst coverage. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: RATINGS MODEL55 
Variable Name Description 
Book_Lev The sum of long- and short-term debt divided by total assets; 
Conb The ratio of convertible debt to total assets; 
Rentp The ratio of rental payments to total assets; 
Cash The sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets; 
Debt_Ebitda The ratio of total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA);  
Net_Debt_Ebitda A dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of total debt to EBITDA 
is negative, and zero otherwise; 
Ebitda_Int The EBITDA divided by interest payments; 
Profit The ratio of EBITDA to sales; 
Vol_Profit The volatility of Profit; 
Firm_Size The logarithm of book value of assets; 
Tangibility The ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (NPPE) divided by 
total assets; 
Capex Capital expenditures divided by total assets; 
Beta The stock’s Dimson beta, estimated from a market-model 
regression using the daily CRSP value-weighted index returns; 
Idiosyncratic_Risk The root-mean-squared error (RMSE) from a market-model 
regression. 
 
 
                                                 
55
 I estimate the ratings model using variables employed in Baghai et al. (2014). 
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: BASELINE REGRESSION MODEL 
Variables Description 
Panel A: Accrual-Based Earnings Management (AEM) 
TA The difference between income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat Data Item  #123) and operating cash flows (Compustat 
Data Item #308); 
AT Total assets (Compustat Data Item #6); 
ΔREV The change in net sales (Compustat Data Item #12) from the previous 
year; 
ΔAR The change in accounts receivable (Compustat Data Item #2) from 
the previous year; 
PPE The gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat Data Item #7); 
DA The discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones 
Model; 
ABS_DA The absolute value of the discretionary accruals calculated using the 
Modified Jones model; 
Positive_DA The positive value of discretionary accruals calculating using the 
Modified Jones model; 
Negative_DA The negative value of discretionary accruals calculating using the 
Modified Jones model. 
Panel B: Real Earnings Management (REM) 
CFO The cash flow from operations (Compustat Data Item #308 minus 
Compustat Data Item #124); 
ΔSALE The change in net sales (Compustat Data Item #12) from the previous 
year; 
COGS The cost of goods sold (Compustat Data Item #41); 
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ΔINVT The change in inventories (Compustat Data Item #3); 
PROD The production costs, calculated as the sum of COGS and ΔINVT; 
DISX The discretionary expenditures, calculated as the sum of R&D 
expenses (Compustat Data Item #46), SG&A (Compustat Data Item 
#189), and advertising expenses (Compustat Data Item #45), where 
as long as SG&A is available, R&D and advertising expenses are set 
to zero if they are missing; 
REM_CFO The abnormal cash flow from operations (measured as the difference 
between the actual CFO and the fitted normal levels of CFO), 
multiplied by negative one; 
REM_PROD The abnormal levels of production costs (PROD), measured as the 
difference between the actual PROD and the fitted normal levels of 
PROD; 
REM_DISX The abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (measured as the 
difference between the actual DISX and the fitted normal levels of 
DISX), multiplied by negative one; 
REM1 The aggregate measure of real earnings management, computed as 
REM_DISX + REM_PROD; 
REM2 The aggregate measure of real earnings management, calculated as 
REM_DISX + REM_CFO. 
Panel C: Total Earnings Management (TEM) 
TEM1 The sum of the signed discretionary accruals (DA) and the aggregate 
real earnings management (REM1); 
TEM2 The sum of the signed discretionary accruals (ABS_DA) and the 
aggregate real earnings management (REM2). 
Panel D: Earnings Smoothing  
σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO) The ratio of standard deviation of earnings to standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations (CFO), both scaled by lagged total assets; 
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ρ(∆ACC, ∆CFO) The Spearman correlation between the change in total accruals (ACC) 
and the change in cash flow from operations, both scaled by lagged 
total assets; 
ρ(∆DA, ∆PDI) The Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary 
accruals and the change in pre-discretionary income, where DA refers 
to discretionary accruals and PDI is the pre-discretionary income 
(‘un-managed income’), calculated as net income before 
extraordinary income minus discretionary accruals, i.e., PDI = NI – 
DAP;  
EM_SMOOTH1 Earnings smoothing ranking of σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO). Following 
Zarowin (2002), I convert σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO) into reverse fractional 
ranking by each two-digit SIC industry and year. A higher rank 
indicates more earnings smoothing;  
EM_SMOOTH2 Earnings smoothing ranking of ρ(∆ACC, ∆CFO). Following Tucker 
and Zarowin (2006), I convert the correlation into reverse fractional 
ranking by each two-digit SIC industry and year. A higher rank 
indicates more earnings smoothing; 
EM_SMOOTH3 Earnings smoothing ranking of ρ(∆DA, ∆PDI). I follow Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) and convert the correlation into reverse fractional 
ranking by each two-digit SIC industry and year. A higher rank 
indicates more earnings smoothing. 
Panel D: Explanatory Variables (Equations 8 and 13) 
Rat_Diff_Firm The difference between a firm’s actual and predicted ratings, where 
the predicted ratings are estimated based on firm fixed effects (from 
model (6) of Table 3); 
Rat_Diff_Ind The difference between a firm’s actual and predicted ratings, where 
the predicted ratings are estimated based on industry fixed effects 
(from model (3) of Table 3); 
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Size56 The natural logarithm of the market value of total assets, where the 
market value of total assets is calculated as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of total 
equity; 
Leverage57 The ratio of long-term debt to the market value of total assets; 
MTB The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; 
ROA The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization  
(EBITDA) divided by lagged total assets; 
Firm_Age An indicator variable equal to one if a firm listed on Compustat has 
more than 20 years, and zero otherwise; 
Big4 An indicator variable equal to one if  a firm’s auditor is one of the 
Big 4 audit firms, and zero otherwise; 
SOX An indicator variable equal to one if the year is 2002 or later, and 
zero otherwise; 
Z_Score The modified version of Altman’s Z-score, calculated as Z = 0.3(net 
income/total assets) + 1.0(sales/total assets) + 1.4(retained 
earnings/total assets) + 0.6(market value of equity/total liabilities); 
Loss An indicator variable equal to one if net income is less than zero, and 
zero otherwise; 
NOA An indicator variable equal to one if the net operating assets at the 
beginning of the year divided by lagged sales above the median of the 
corresponding industry-year, and zero otherwise; 
M&A An indicator variable equal to one if the auditee is engaged in a 
merger or acquisition, and zero otherwise; 
Restruct An indicator variable equal to one if the firm took restricting charges, 
and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
56
 Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 15 if I define Size as the 
natural logarithm of total assets.  
57
 Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 through 15 if I define Leverage as 
long- and short-term debt divided by book value of total assets.  
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Panel E: Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition 
Basu’s Specification Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure; 
Ball and 
Shivakumar’ 
Specification 
Accrual-based loss recognition measure developed by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005); 
C_Score A firm-year measure of conditional conservatism developed by Khan 
and Watts (2009). 
Panel F: Explanatory Variables (Equations 15, 17, and 18) 
Size Same definition as in Panel D; 
Leverage Same definition as in Panel D; 
MTB Same definition as in Panel D; 
ROA Same definition as in Panel D; 
Firm_Age Same definition as in Panel D; 
Sales_Growth The percentage of annual growth in total sales;  
Rd_Adv Research and development costs (Compustat Data Item XRD) plus 
advertising expense divided by sales; 
LIT Following Francis et al. (1994), I set an indicator variable equal to 
one if a firm falls in a high litigation risk industry as identified by 
SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 
7370; 
Big4 Same definition as in Panel D; 
CFO Cash flow operations divided by lagged total assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
 
APPENDIX C 
MEASURE OF ASYMMETRIC TIMELY LOSS RECOGNITION: Khan and 
Watts’ C_Score (2009, p. 136) 
Based on the Basu’s (1997) measure of asymmetric timeliness, Khan and Watts 
(2009) develop a firm-specific measure of the asymmetric timeliness. Khan and Watts 
(2009) estimate the timelines of good news (G_Score) and bad news (C_Score) as 
follows: 
                   NIi = β1 + β2Di + β3RETi + β4 Di * RETi +ɛi                                                   (a) 
                   G_Score = β3 = μ1 + μ2SIZEi + μ3MTBi + μ4LEVi +ɛi                                    (b) 
                   C_Score = β4 = λ1 + λ2SIZEi + λ3MTBi + λ4LEVi +ɛi,                                     (c) 
where the subscript i indicates the firm, NI is annual earnings, RET is returns, D is an 
indicator variable equal to one when RET<0 and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of 
the market value of equity. MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. LEV is the total debt divided by market value of equity. Replacing β3 and β4 
estimated from equations (b) and (c) into regression equation (a) and including additional 
terms in the last parenthesis yields the following equation: 
     Xi = β1 + β2Di + RETi * (μ1 + μ2SIZEi + μ3MTBi + μ4LEVi)  
         + Di * RETi *(λ1 + λ2SIZEi + λ3MTBi + λ4LEVi) 
         + (δ1SIZEi + δ2MTBi + δ3LEVi + δ4Di * SIZEi + δ5Di * MTBi + δ6Di * LEVi) + ɛi    (d) 
I estimate the above equation (d) using annual cross-sectional regressions. Then, I 
obtain G_Score and C_Score using the coefficients estimated from equation (d). In the 
analysis, I use C_Score for capturing a firm’s asymmetric timely loss recognition (also 
for measuring a firm’s conditional accounting conservatism). All variables used are 
defined in Appendix B.  
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Table 1     Number of Firms by S&P Credit Ratings Categories and Year, 1985-2014 
(CHAPTER 4) 
This table shows the distribution of credit ratings over the period 1985 to 2014. My sample contains 35,160 
firm-year observations of ratings. For the convenience, I combine minus (−), middle, and plus (+) 
specifications for each broad credit rating. For example, the AA category includes credit ratings of AA+, 
AA, and AA−. 
 Rating  
Year AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C Total 
1985 28 103 197 118 131 160 6 1 0 744 
1986 28 108 194 144 173 246 48 0 0 941 
1987 31 108 185 133 170 255 33 2 0 917 
1988 34 87 201 139 156 263 29 0 0 909 
1989 35 87 189 151 153 234 31 0 1 881 
1990 33 86 193 151 150 188 36 0 3 840 
1991 32 87 196 165 159 159 34 9 0 841 
1992 30 85 198 188 189 156 23 6 0 875 
1993 28 84 198 208 229 178 12 1 0 938 
1994 26 79 202 221 237 194 14 1 0 974 
1995 27 77 216 243 263 224 17 0 0 1,067 
1996 25 82 228 285 288 259 17 2 0 1,186 
1997 24 81 235 319 340 319 11 2 0 1,331 
1998 21 80 230 349 368 344 23 6 0 1,421 
1999 17 68 218 370 372 349 30 10 0 1,434 
2000 14 49 232 381 361 384 43 7 0 1,471 
2001 13 47 217 388 365 363 55 13 0 1,461 
2002 11 41 209 379 385 328 71 14 0 1,438 
2003 11 38 202 373 418 374 61 5 0 1,482 
2004 9 37 197 376 423 365 44 4 0 1,455 
2005 9 34 194 351 397 359 46 2 0 1,392 
2006 9 34 167 335 391 378 33 2 0 1,349 
2007 7 33 156 328 357 352 22 4 0 1,259 
2008 6 32 149 313 316 327 53 12 0 1,208 
2009 5 32 146 323 297 345 39 2 0 1,189 
2010 6 30 145 337 313 351 23 5 0 1,210 
2011 6 27 144 341 323 336 24 1 0 1,202 
2012 6 28 143 348 324 354 22 1 0 1,226 
2013 6 33 142 355 350 336 27 0 0 1,249 
2014 5 35 138 353 368 347 24 0 0 1,270 
Total 542 1832 5661 8465 8766 8827 951 112 4 35,160 
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Table 2     Summary Statistics for Relevant Variables used in Ratings Models (CHAPTER 4) 
This table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the ratings model (1). This table shows that the average ratings variable (Rating) has 
increased from 8.876 in 1985 to 11.150 in 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Year Rating Book_Lev Conb Rentp Cash Debt_Ebitda Net_Debt_Ebitda Ebitda_Int Profit Vol_Profit Firm_Size Tangibility Capex 
1985 8.876 0.326 0.042 0.024 0.079 2.962 0.034 7.868 0.159 0.036 6.840 0.451 0.088 
1986 9.944 0.363 0.051 0.025 0.090 3.511 0.052 7.344 0.143 0.058 6.651 0.416 0.076 
1987 9.913 0.377 0.055 0.025 0.088 3.352 0.046 6.996 0.161 0.051 6.801 0.408 0.073 
1988 9.878 0.392 0.046 0.025 0.077 3.457 0.035 7.334 0.166 0.049 6.967 0.406 0.074 
1989 9.796 0.405 0.038 0.024 0.069 3.508 0.035 6.248 0.164 0.120 7.106 0.416 0.075 
1990 9.638 0.403 0.033 0.024 0.065 3.400 0.032 6.741 0.161 0.106 7.226 0.424 0.074 
1991 9.529 0.393 0.033 0.026 0.065 3.765 0.027 6.614 0.158 0.039 7.281 0.433 0.068 
1992 9.477 0.382 0.035 0.026 0.066 3.540 0.025 8.334 0.157 0.037 7.298 0.433 0.069 
1993 9.549 0.375 0.034 0.026 0.071 3.519 0.031 7.956 0.143 0.042 7.300 0.429 0.072 
1994 9.715 0.375 0.032 0.025 0.065 3.287 0.031 8.916 0.154 0.051 7.329 0.425 0.074 
1995 9.845 0.382 0.029 0.024 0.066 3.204 0.032 8.931 0.157 0.058 7.341 0.410 0.078 
1996 10.006 0.386 0.027 0.024 0.068 3.318 0.037 8.803 0.139 0.162 7.359 0.410 0.079 
1997 10.243 0.400 0.027 0.024 0.075 3.398 0.042 10.216 0.109 0.268 7.332 0.399 0.082 
1998 10.443 0.442 0.023 0.026 0.068 3.839 0.055 9.504 0.065 0.357 7.393 0.388 0.082 
1999 10.628 0.440 0.020 0.024 0.072 3.764 0.059 7.987 0.096 0.378 7.485 0.375 0.071 
2000 10.821 0.427 0.021 0.024 0.072 3.491 0.068 8.203 0.123 0.405 7.551 0.365 0.070 
2001 10.934 0.424 0.023 0.026 0.078 3.853 0.057 8.161 0.150 0.094 7.561 0.364 0.064 
2002 11.043 0.415 0.024 0.026 0.084 3.679 0.040 10.323 0.142 0.085 7.602 0.361 0.052 
2003 11.142 0.398 0.025 0.025 0.093 3.815 0.026 11.782 0.096 0.285 7.689 0.351 0.049 
2004 11.073 0.375 0.024 0.023 0.097 3.188 0.014 16.014 0.154 0.297 7.791 0.339 0.052 
2005 11.114 0.358 0.021 0.022 0.097 3.086 0.014 18.579 0.174 0.313 7.863 0.325 0.057 
2006 11.211 0.356 0.021 0.021 0.090 3.025 0.015 18.016 0.170 0.188 7.953 0.325 0.063 
2007 11.155 0.364 0.019 0.020 0.085 3.155 0.022 15.384 0.164 0.194 8.082 0.325 0.064 
2008 11.380 0.386 0.019 0.022 0.087 3.281 0.050 14.338 0.154 0.212 8.109 0.337 0.065 
2009 11.297 0.366 0.017 0.022 0.109 3.494 0.044 13.524 0.163 0.147 8.123 0.337 0.048 
2010 11.203 0.351 0.016 0.020 0.108 3.127 0.016 17.561 0.202 0.148 8.184 0.332 0.051 
2011 11.113 0.359 0.012 0.019 0.099 3.040 0.017 16.198 0.206 0.157 8.232 0.329 0.058 
2012 11.140 0.366 0.010 0.018 0.098 3.420 0.016 17.685 0.167 0.165 8.289 0.330 0.064 
2013 11.151 0.369 0.008 0.018 0.102 3.435 0.024 16.134 0.202 0.067 8.300 0.336 0.061 
2014 11.150 0.382 0.008 0.018 0.099 3.594 0.020 16.260 0.195 0.064 8.321 0.332 0.062 
Mean 10.593 0.386 0.025 0.023 0.084 3.426 0.034 11.670 0.151 0.170 7.617 0.371 0.066 
N 35,160 34,993 34,601 30,548 35,055 34,642 35,160 34,641 35,009 35,160 33,354 34,877 34,552 
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Table 3     Ratings Models (CHAPTER 4) 
This table shows the results of the ratings model on the relation between each explanatory variable and credit ratings. In columns (1), (3), (5), and (6), I 
run pooled OLS regressions. I also run ordered logit regressions in columns (2) and (4). In the first four columns, I consider industry and year fixed 
effects. Furthermore, I consider firm and year fixed effects in the last two models. The results reported in all columns (1) through (6) are consistent with 
Baghai et al. (2014). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rating Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Book_Lev 2.986 0.000 2.665 0.000 2.609 0.000 2.576 0.000 2.616 0.000 2.575 0.000 
Conb 2.575 0.000 1.599 0.000 2.402 0.000 2.049 0.000 0.659 0.099 0.526 0.169 
Rentp 4.021 0.001 4.654 0.000 4.104 0.002 5.064 0.000 2.190 0.239 3.985 0.060 
Cash 0.589 0.071 0.678 0.011 0.105 0.735 0.343 0.223 -0.437 0.151 -0.208 0.518 
Debt_Ebitda 0.262 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.088 0.000 
Net_Debt_Ebitda 3.329 0.000 3.491 0.000 1.960 0.000 2.545 0.000 1.590 0.000 1.173 0.000 
Ebitda_Int -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
Profit -0.091 0.001 -0.091 0.002 -0.064 0.005 -0.075 0.004 -0.009 0.673 -0.011 0.435 
Vol_Profit 0.012 0.034 0.019 0.014 0.002 0.741 0.009 0.324 0.006 0.442 0.003 0.705 
Firm_Size -1.275 0.000 -1.061 0.000 -1.103 0.000 -0.995 0.000 -1.073 0.000 -1.037 0.000 
Tangibility -1.130 0.000 -0.616 0.008 0.292 0.263 0.389 0.096 -1.043 0.006 -1.350 0.002 
Capex -1.517 0.020 -1.673 0.002 -2.440 0.000 -2.535 0.000 -4.953 0.000 -4.290 0.000 
Beta - - - - 0.251 0.000 0.187 0.000 - - 0.079 0.000 
Idiosyncratic_Risk - - - - 2.032 0.000 2.417 0.000 - - 1.188 0.000 
1986 0.372 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.309 0.002 0.244 0.005 0.310 0.000 0.354 0.000 
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1987 0.535 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.347 0.002 0.314 0.002 0.487 0.000 0.491 0.000 
1988 0.664 0.000 0.553 0.000 0.406 0.001 0.394 0.000 0.652 0.000 0.576 0.000 
1989 0.792 0.000 0.622 0.000 0.490 0.000 0.470 0.000 0.753 0.000 0.670 0.000 
1990 0.887 0.000 0.668 0.000 0.573 0.000 0.509 0.000 0.916 0.000 0.887 0.000 
1991 0.837 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.899 0.000 0.876 0.000 
1992 0.893 0.000 0.631 0.000 0.732 0.000 0.681 0.000 0.911 0.000 0.975 0.000 
1993 0.928 0.000 0.677 0.000 0.806 0.000 0.709 0.000 0.894 0.000 1.005 0.000 
1994 1.176 0.000 0.928 0.000 1.056 0.000 0.974 0.000 1.071 0.000 1.175 0.000 
1995 1.313 0.000 1.052 0.000 1.176 0.000 1.078 0.000 1.191 0.000 1.311 0.000 
1996 1.414 0.000 1.105 0.000 1.236 0.000 1.113 0.000 1.285 0.000 1.384 0.000 
1997 1.531 0.000 1.177 0.000 1.274 0.000 1.092 0.000 1.339 0.000 1.387 0.000 
1998 1.515 0.000 1.113 0.000 1.354 0.000 1.113 0.000 1.352 0.000 1.418 0.000 
1999 1.815 0.000 1.368 0.000 1.637 0.000 1.378 0.000 1.555 0.000 1.645 0.000 
2000 2.225 0.000 1.703 0.000 1.998 0.000 1.685 0.000 1.867 0.000 1.918 0.000 
2001 2.341 0.000 1.767 0.000 2.195 0.000 1.877 0.000 2.118 0.000 2.210 0.000 
2002 2.627 0.000 2.002 0.000 2.287 0.000 1.972 0.000 2.397 0.000 2.396 0.000 
2003 2.860 0.000 2.217 0.000 2.515 0.000 2.189 0.000 2.558 0.000 2.561 0.000 
2004 3.225 0.000 2.559 0.000 2.833 0.000 2.480 0.000 2.793 0.000 2.803 0.000 
2005 3.487 0.000 2.798 0.000 3.037 0.000 2.655 0.000 3.039 0.000 2.982 0.000 
2006 3.723 0.000 3.006 0.000 3.186 0.000 2.796 0.000 3.241 0.000 3.131 0.000 
2007 3.856 0.000 3.106 0.000 3.243 0.000 2.851 0.000 3.368 0.000 3.230 0.000 
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2008 3.921 0.000 3.156 0.000 3.304 0.000 2.956 0.000 3.545 0.000 3.405 0.000 
2009 3.849 0.000 3.122 0.000 3.240 0.000 2.917 0.000 3.453 0.000 3.315 0.000 
2010 4.108 0.000 3.320 0.000 3.474 0.000 3.109 0.000 3.526 0.000 3.386 0.000 
2011 4.068 0.000 3.274 0.000 3.439 0.000 3.050 0.000 3.523 0.000 3.365 0.000 
2012 4.054 0.000 3.228 0.000 3.470 0.000 3.060 0.000 3.543 0.000 3.393 0.000 
2013 4.009 0.000 3.201 0.000 3.487 0.000 3.073 0.000 3.514 0.000 3.352 0.000 
2014 3.979 0.000 3.156 0.000 3.419 0.000 3.008 0.000 3.418 0.000 3.280 0.000 
Industry dummies Y - Y - Y - Y - N - N - 
Firm dummies N - N - N - N - Y - Y - 
Observations 27,631 - 27,631 - 21,528 - 21,528 - 27,631 - 21,528 - 
Adjusted R
2
  0.642 - - - 0.689 - - - 0.888 - 0.893 - 
Pseudo R
2
 - - 0.206 - - - 0.243 - - - - - 
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Table 4     Descriptive Statistics (CHAPTER 5) 
This table shows descriptive statistics for relevant variables used in the analysis. My sample period is 
between 1997 and 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
DA 11,499 0.0017 0.0712 -0.0255 0.0060 0.0365 
ABS_DA 11,499 0.0482 0.0550 0.0141 0.0315 0.0612 
REM_PROD 11,499 0.0023 0.1422 -0.0719 0.0044 0.0833 
REM_DISX 11,499 0.0079 0.1570 -0.0577 0.0174 0.0924 
REM_CFO 11,499 -0.0015 0.0693 -0.0407 -0.0006 0.0371 
REM1 11,499 0.0111 0.2652 -0.1187 0.0208 0.1691 
REM2 11,499 0.0069 0.1702 -0.0754 0.0169 0.1071 
TEM1 11,499 0.0595 0.2704 -0.0767 0.0663 0.2177 
TEM2 11,499 0.0553 0.1788 -0.0378 0.0584 0.1585 
EM_SMOOTH1 9,981 0.5113 0.2925 0.2632 0.5169 0.7636 
EM_SMOOTH2 9,962 0.5021 0.2885 0.2553 0.5250 0.7732 
EM_SMOOTH3 9,874 0.5141 0.2857 0.2727 0.5227 0.7619 
Rat_Diff_Firm 11,499 0.4749 5.5444 -0.3494 2.1064 3.7663 
Rat_Diff_Ind 11,499 0.6193 5.5226 0.1721 2.2817 3.8094 
Size 11,499 8.4460 1.5098 7.3927 8.3188 9.4424 
Leverage 11,499 0.2329 0.1706 0.1017 0.1956 0.3295 
MTB 11,499 2.8671 5.3716 1.2540 2.1387 3.5486 
ROA 11,499 0.0956 0.0989 0.0508 0.0943 0.1449 
Firm_Age 11,499 0.4794 0.4996 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Big4 11,499 0.9080 0.2890 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
SOX 11,499 0.7230 0.4475 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Z_Score 11,499 8.3083 39.6864 1.9198 3.3597 5.7348 
Loss 11,499 0.2399 0.4271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NOA 11,499 0.5306 0.4991 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
M&A 11,499 0.1621 0.3686 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Restruct 11,499 0.3803 0.4855 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 5     Pearson Correlation Coefficients (CHAPTER 5) 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. My sample period is between 1997 and 2014. Correlations in bold denote the 
statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) DA 1.00                   
(2) ABS_DA -0.21 1.00                  
(3) REM_PROD 0.02 0.05 1.00                 
(4) REM_DISX 0.11 -0.06 0.68 1.00                
(5) REM_CFO 0.22 0.13 0.47 0.08 1.00               
(6) Rat_Diff_Firm -0.04 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.17 1.00              
(7) Rat_Diff_Ind -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.95 1.00             
(8) Size 0.05 -0.15 -0.12 -0.08 -0.22 -0.47 -0.32 1.00            
(9) Leverage -0.08 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.26 0.25 0.09 -0.47 1.00           
(10) MTB -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 0.19 -0.21 1.00          
(11) ROA 0.22 -0.21 -0.36 -0.09 -0.47 -0.17 -0.09 0.24 -0.33 0.18 1.00         
(12) Firm_Age 0.09 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.25 -0.16 0.35 -0.27 0.05 0.13 1.00        
(13) Big4 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.16 -0.14 0.02 0.06 0.07 1.00       
(14) SOX -0.02 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.16 -0.10 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.30 1.00      
(15) Z_Score 0.13 -0.17 -0.09 -0.04 -0.19 -0.18 -0.06 0.26 -0.61 0.15 0.37 0.23 0.09 0.06 1.00     
(16) Loss -0.32 0.24 0.14 -0.01 0.30 0.19 0.07 -0.27 0.39 -0.12 -0.55 -0.18 -0.09 -0.08 -0.45 1.00    
(17)  NOA -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.19 -0.07 -0.15 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.07 1.00   
(18)  M&A -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.14 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.23 0.02 -0.05 0.03 1.00  
(19)  Restruct -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.15 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.20 1.00 
 
 
 104 
 
 
Table 6     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Accrual-Based Earnings Management                               
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest 
is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. I use a sample of 9,837, 5,548, and 4,289 firm-year observations for ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA, respectively, between 
1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Intercept 0.1039 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1027 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0944 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1032 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1031 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0929 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1034 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1028 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0894 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.045) 
** -0.0001 
(0.653) 
0.0004 
(0.036) 
** -0.0002 
(0.065) 
* -0.0001 
(0.588) 
 0.0004 
(0.068) 
* -0.0002 
(0.061) 
* -0.0001 
(0.342) 
 0.0003 
(0.117) 
 
Size -0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0031 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.081) 
* -0.0025 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0032 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.081) 
* -0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0033 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0018 
(0.045) 
** 
Leverage -0.0207 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0043 
(0.459) 
0.0374 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0186 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0057 
(0.343) 
 0.0331 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0184 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0125 
(0.038) 
** 0.0249 
(0.013) 
** 
MTB 0.0002 
(0.149) 
-0.0000 
(0.827) 
-0.0003 
(0.127) 
0.0002 
(0.195) 
 -0.0000 
(0.875) 
 -0.0002 
(0.220) 
 0.0002 
(0.198) 
 0.0000 
(0.869) 
 -0.0001 
(0.449) 
 
ROA -0.0449 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0077 
(0.557) 
0.0562 
(0.003) 
*** -0.0502 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0033 
(0.812) 
 0.0657 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0496 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0155 
(0.274) 
 0.0770 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age -0.0043 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0012 
(0.372) 
0.0072 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0042 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0012 
(0.383) 
 0.0069 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0042 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0012 
(0.385) 
 0.0063 
(0.001) 
*** 
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Big4 0.0029 
(0.230) 
0.0022 
(0.410) 
-0.0021 
(0.575) 
0.0029 
(0.233) 
 0.0022 
(0.409) 
 -0.0020 
(0.581) 
 0.0029 
(0.233) 
 0.0023 
(0.384) 
 -0.0020 
(0.591) 
 
SOX -0.0184 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0148 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0150 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0185 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0147 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0143 
(0.006) 
*** -0.0184 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0143 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0133 
(0.010) 
*** 
Z_Score -0.0102 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0047 
(0.045) 
** 0.0156 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0098 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0050 
(0.035) 
** 0.0151 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0099 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0059 
(0.012) 
** 0.0147 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Loss 0.0153 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0117 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0368 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0149 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0115 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0361 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0150 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0109 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0362 
(<0.001) 
*** 
NOA -0.0054 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0072 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0044 
(0.010) 
*** -0.0054 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0072 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0043 
(0.014) 
** -0.0054 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0070 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0038 
(0.030) 
** 
M&A 0.0010 
(0.494) 
-0.0029 
(0.083) 
* -0.0058 
(0.009) 
*** 0.0010 
(0.478) 
 -0.0029 
(0.084) 
* -0.0060 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0010 
(0.496) 
 -0.0028 
(0.095) 
* -0.0062 
(0.004) 
*** 
Restruct -0.0008 
(0.499) 
-0.0022 
(0.079) 
* 0.0004 
(0.822) 
-0.0010 
(0.389) 
 -0.0021 
(0.105) 
 0.0008 
(0.687) 
 -0.0010 
(0.420) 
 -0.0015 
(0.232) 
 0.0009 
(0.629) 
 
REM1    -0.0061 
(0.040) 
** 0.0040 
(0.171) 
 0.0137 
(0.003) 
***       
REM2          -0.0089 
(0.074) 
* 0.0338 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0514 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1137 0.0913 0.2166 0.1144 0.0916 0.2199 0.1143 0.1048 0.2350 
 
 
 106 
 
Table 7     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Accrual-Based Earnings Management                               
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest 
is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use a sample of 9,837, 5,548, and 4,289 firm-year observations for ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA, respectively, between 
1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Intercept 0.1037 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1044 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0924 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1031 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1048 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0913 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1033 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1044 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0881 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0003 
(0.010) 
*** -0.0002 
(0.058) 
* 0.0003 
(0.059) 
* -0.0003 
(0.015) 
** -0.0002 
(0.046) 
** 0.0003 
(0.095) 
* -0.0003 
(0.014) 
** -0.0003 
(0.015) 
** 0.0003 
(0.141) 
 
Size -0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0033 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.124) 
-0.0025 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0034 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.114) 
 -0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0035 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.060) 
** 
Leverage -0.0214 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0048 
(0.404) 
0.0380 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0193 
(0.003) 
*** -0.0063 
(0.292) 
 0.0336 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0191 
(0.003) 
*** -0.0133 
(0.028) 
** 0.0254 
(0.012) 
** 
MTB 0.0002 
(0.149) 
-0.0000 
(0.832) 
-0.0003 
(0.127) 
0.0002 
(0.193) 
 -0.0000 
(0.882) 
 -0.0002 
(0.220) 
 0.0002 
(0.196) 
 0.0000 
(0.864) 
 -0.0001 
(0.448) 
 
ROA -0.0451 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0082 
(0.530) 
0.0564 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0504 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0036 
(0.795) 
 0.0660 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0498 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0152 
(0.281) 
 0.0772 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age -0.0042 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0013 
(0.347) 
0.0071 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0042 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0013 
(0.359) 
 0.0068 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0041 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0012 
(0.367) 
 0.0062 
(0.001) 
*** 
Big4 0.0029 
(0.227) 
0.0022 
(0.398) 
-0.0021 
(0.575) 
0.0029 
(0.229) 
 0.0022 
(0.398) 
 -0.0020 
(0.581) 
 0.0029 
(0.230) 
 0.0024 
(0.372) 
 -0.0020 
(0.591) 
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SOX -0.0183 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0144 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0151 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0183 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0144 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0144 
(0.006) 
*** -0.0183 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0139 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0134 
(0.010) 
*** 
Z_Score -0.0101 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0047 
(0.043) 
** 0.0155 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0098 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0050 
(0.034) 
** 0.0150 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0099 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0059 
(0.012) 
** 0.0146 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Loss 0.0152 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0117 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0367 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0148 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0115 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0360 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0149 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0109 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0361 
(<0.001) 
*** 
NOA -0.0054 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0073 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0044 
(0.011) 
*** -0.0054 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0072 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0042 
(0.015) 
** -0.0054 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0071 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0037 
(0.032) 
** 
M&A 0.0010 
(0.487) 
-0.0029 
(0.079) 
* -0.0058 
(0.008) 
*** 0.0010 
(0.472) 
 -0.0029 
(0.080) 
* -0.0061 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0010 
(0.490) 
 -0.0028 
(0.091) 
* -0.0062 
(0.004) 
*** 
Restruct -0.0008 
(0.505) 
-0.0022 
(0.087) 
* 0.0005 
(0.808) 
-0.0010 
(0.396) 
 -0.0020 
(0.117) 
 0.0008 
(0.674) 
 -0.0010 
(0.427) 
 -0.0014 
(0.254) 
 0.0009 
(0.620) 
 
REM1    -0.0060 
(0.042) 
** 0.0042 
(0.148) 
 0.0139 
(0.002) 
***       
REM2          -0.0088 
(0.076) 
* 0.0342 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0516 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1140 0.0920 0.2164 0.1147 0.0924 0.2198 0.1146 0.1058 0.2349 
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Table 8     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Real Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. The main 
variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. I use a sample of 9,837 firm-year observations for measuring real earnings management proxies, respectively, 
between 1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Intercept -0.0570 
(0.030) 
** -0.0623 
(0.063) 
* 0.0082 
(0.511) 
-0.1200 
(0.033) 
** -0.0586 
(0.091) 
* -0.0569 
(0.033) 
** -0.0450 
(0.184) 
 0.0024 
(0.844) 
 -0.1036 
(0.069) 
* -0.0493 
(0.160) 
 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.042) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.049) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.004) 
*** 
Size 0.0071 
(0.011) 
** 0.0022 
(0.536) 
-0.0015 
(0.172) 
0.0094 
(0.110) 
 0.0012 
(0.740) 
 0.0071 
(0.011) 
** 0.0017 
(0.620) 
 -0.0013 
(0.219) 
 0.0090 
(0.126) 
 0.0010 
(0.790) 
 
Leverage 0.1543 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1880 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0716 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3401 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2572 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1543 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1846 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0727 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3368 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2553 
(<0.001) 
*** 
MTB -0.0015 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0005 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0036 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0027 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0015 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0005 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0036 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** 
ROA -0.6853 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.2160 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3480 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.8815 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5354 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.6853 
(0.001) 
*** -0.2234 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3455 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.8886 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5394 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age 0.0020 
(0.789) 
0.0086 
(0.361) 
0.0046 
(0.035) 
** 0.0095 
(0.530) 
 0.0122 
(0.190) 
 0.0020 
(0.789) 
 0.0079 
(0.402) 
 0.0049 
(0.027) 
** 0.0088 
(0.559) 
 0.0118 
(0.203) 
 
 109 
 
Big4 0.0006 
(0.939) 
-0.0017 
(0.866) 
0.0011 
(0.743) 
-0.0017 
(0.917) 
 -0.0014 
(0.887) 
 0.0006 
(0.938) 
 -0.0012 
(0.905) 
 0.0009 
(0.781) 
 -0.0012 
(0.940) 
 -0.0012 
(0.908) 
 
SOX -0.0007 
(0.920) 
-0.0006 
(0.937) 
0.0055 
(0.115) 
-0.0017 
(0.897) 
 0.0044 
(0.599) 
 -0.0007 
(0.919) 
 -0.0037 
(0.627) 
 0.0065 
(0.060) 
* -0.0046 
(0.725) 
 0.0027 
(0.744) 
 
Z_Score 0.0292 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0267 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0030 
(0.311) 
0.0555 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0290 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0292 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0250 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.229) 
 0.0539 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0281 
(0.001) 
*** 
Loss -0.0352 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0395 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0003 
(0.896) 
-0.0733 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0366 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0352 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0369 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0006 
(0.808) 
 -0.0708 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0352 
(<0.001) 
*** 
NOA -0.0178 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0168 
(0.018) 
** -0.0150 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0021 
(0.862) 
 0.0012 
(0.866) 
 -0.0178 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0159 
(0.025) 
** -0.0147 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0030 
(0.807) 
 0.0007 
(0.919) 
 
M&A 0.0139 
(0.013) 
** -0.0070 
(0.297) 
0.0064 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0059 
(0.603) 
 -0.0006 
(0.929) 
 0.0139 
(0.013) 
** -0.0068 
(0.307) 
 0.0063 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0060 
(0.593) 
 -0.0005 
(0.940) 
 
Restruct -0.0169 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0206 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.168) 
-0.0369 
(0.001) 
 -0.0179 
(0.008) 
*** -0.0169 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0207 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.159) 
 -0.0371 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0180 
(0.008) 
*** 
ABS_DA        -0.0005 
(0.988) 
 -0.1663 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0553 
(0.008) 
*** -0.1577 
(0.035) 
** -0.0899 
(0.068) 
* 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1918 0.0812 0.3017 0.1299 0.1649 0.1917 0.0839 0.3032 0.1306 0.1655 
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Table 9     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Real Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. The main 
variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use a sample of 9,837 firm-year observations for real earnings management measures, respectively, between 1997 
and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Intercept -0.0482 
(0.062) 
* -0.0540 
(0.096) 
* 0.0091 
(0.456) 
-0.1031 
(0.060) 
* -0.0493 
(0.145) 
 -0.0482 
(0.065) 
* -0.0368 
(0.264) 
 0.0033 
(0.786) 
 -0.0868 
(0.118) 
 -0.0401 
(0.241) 
 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.141) 
0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.010) 
** 0.0020 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0008 
(0.163) 
 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.011) 
** 
Size 0.0060 
(0.027) 
** 0.0012 
(0.733) 
-0.0016 
(0.126) 
0.0074 
(0.201) 
 0.0001 
(0.982) 
 0.0060 
(0.028) 
** 0.0007 
(0.829) 
 -0.0014 
(0.166) 
 0.0070 
(0.227) 
 -0.0002 
(0.966) 
 
Leverage 0.1584 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1896 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0733 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3458 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2606 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1584 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1860 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0745 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3424 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2587 
(<0.001) 
*** 
MTB -0.0015 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0005 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0036 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0027 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0015 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0005 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0036 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** 
ROA -0.6854 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.2170 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3474 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.8825 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5358 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.6854 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.2245 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3449 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.8896 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5399 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age 0.0012 
(0.868) 
0.0080 
(0.395) 
0.0045 
(0.040) 
** 0.0081 
(0.590) 
 0.0114 
(0.217) 
 0.0012 
(0.867) 
 0.0072 
(0.438) 
 0.0048 
(0.031) 
** 0.0075 
(0.620) 
 0.0110 
(0.232) 
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Big4 0.0005 
(0.945) 
-0.0016 
(0.869) 
0.0010 
(0.755) 
-0.0017 
(0.915) 
 -0.0015 
(0.885) 
 0.0005 
(0.945) 
 -0.0012 
(0.907) 
 0.0009 
(0.794) 
 -0.0012 
(0.938) 
 -0.0012 
(0.906) 
 
SOX 0.0001 
(0.986) 
0.0006 
(0.931) 
0.0053 
(0.128) 
0.0003 
(0.981) 
 0.0054 
(0.512) 
 0.0001 
(0.985) 
 -0.0024 
(0.747) 
 0.0063 
(0.068) 
* -0.0026 
(0.844) 
 0.0038 
(0.647) 
 
Z_Score 0.0285 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0262 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.343) 
0.0544 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0283 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0285 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0245 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0034 
(0.254) 
 0.0528 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0274 
(0.001) 
*** 
Loss -0.0345 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0391 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0005 
(0.828) 
-0.0722 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0360 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0345 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0365 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0004 
(0.870) 
 -0.0698 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0346 
(<0.001) 
*** 
NOA -0.0181 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0166 
(0.020) 
** -0.0150 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0026 
(0.833) 
 0.0010 
(0.892) 
 -0.0181 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0157 
(0.027) 
** -0.0147 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0034 
(0.779) 
 0.0005 
(0.945) 
 
M&A 0.0137 
(0.015) 
** -0.0072 
(0.283) 
0.0063 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0054 
(0.632) 
 -0.0009 
(0.900) 
 0.0137 
(0.015) 
** -0.0070 
(0.293) 
 0.0062 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0056 
(0.621) 
 -0.0008 
(0.910) 
 
Restruct -0.0168 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0205 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.170) 
-0.0367 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0178 
(0.009) 
*** -0.0168 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0206 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.161) 
 -0.0369 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0179 
(0.008) 
*** 
ABS_DA        0.0006 
(0.988) 
 -0.1665 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0561 
(0.007) 
*** -0.1568 
(0.037) 
** -0.0892 
(0.071) 
* 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1914 0.0805 0.3027 0.1291 0.1644 0.1913 0.0832 0.3043 0.1298 0.1649 
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Table 10     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Total Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using TEM1) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 as a dependent variable. To examine the effect of ratings conservatism on overall earnings 
management, I follow Chan et al. (2015) and construct two measures, TEM1 and TEM2. The TEM1 is the sum of the signed discretionary accruals (DA) and the 
aggregate real earnings management (REM1). The main variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept 0.0621 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0699 
 (0.189) 
0.0642 
(0.236) 
 -0.0161 
(0.774) 
 0.0588 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0798 
(0.126) 
 0.0743 
(0.160) 
 0.0007 
(0.990) 
 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0057 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0027  
(0.011) 
** 0.0027 
(0.013) 
** 0.0033 
(0.003) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0042 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.020) 
** 0.0023 
(0.025) 
** 0.0026 
(0.013) 
** 
Size  0.0019  
(0.724) 
0.0021 
(0.703) 
 0.0068 
(0.245) 
   0.0006 
(0.911) 
 0.0008 
(0.890) 
 0.0048 
(0.404) 
 
Leverage  0.2065 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2098 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3194 
(<0.001) 
***   0.2116 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2147 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3244 
(<0.001) 
*** 
MTB  -0.0033 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0033 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0034 
(<0.001) 
***   -0.0033 
(<0.001) 
 -0.0033 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0034 
(<0.001) 
*** 
ROA  -0.8782 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.8880 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.9264 
(<0.001) 
***   -0.8795 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.8892 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.9276 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age  0.0015  
(0.923) 
0.0017 
(0.909) 
 0.0052 
(0.731) 
   0.0004 
(0.981) 
 0.0006 
(0.967) 
 0.0039 
(0.797) 
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Big4  0.0035  
(0.834) 
0.0032 
(0.849) 
 0.0012 
(0.938) 
   0.0032 
(0.847) 
 0.0030 
(0.858) 
 0.0012 
(0.939) 
 
SOX  -0.0080 
 (0.370) 
-0.0194 
(0.146) 
 -0.0202 
(0.133) 
   -0.0070 
(0.428) 
 -0.0178 
(0.179) 
 -0.0180 
(0.175) 
 
Z_Score  0.0500 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0501 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0454 
(0.002) 
***   0.0489 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0490 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0443 
(0.002) 
*** 
Loss  -0.0497 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0494 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0579 
(<0.001) 
***   -0.0490 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0487 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0569 
(<0.001) 
*** 
NOA  0.0017  
(0.887) 
0.0010 
(0.936) 
 -0.0075 
(0.539) 
   0.0013 
(0.911) 
 0.0006 
(0.961) 
 -0.0080 
(0.515) 
 
M&A  0.0109  
(0.279) 
0.0163 
(0.141) 
 0.0069 
(0.544) 
   0.0106 
(0.293) 
 0.0158 
(0.155) 
 0.0064 
(0.571) 
 
Restruct  -0.0198 
 (0.067) 
* -0.0191 
(0.088) 
* -0.0377 
(0.001) 
***   -0.0201 
(0.063) 
* -0.0194 
(0.084) 
* -0.0375 
(0.001) 
*** 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0135 0.1087 0.1091 0.1419 0.0072 0.1084 0.1087 0.1410 
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Table 11     Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Total Earnings Management                                                
(Testing H1 using TEM2) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM2 as dependent variables. As in Table 10, I generate an overall earnings management proxy, 
TEM2. The TEM2 is the sum of the signed discretionary accruals (DA) and the aggregate real earnings management (REM2).The main variable of interest is 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept 0.0568 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1095 
 (0.001) 
*** 0.1016 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0453 
(0.192) 
 0.0542 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1145 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1066 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0544 
(0.109) 
 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0045 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015  
(0.025) 
** 0.0014 
(0.033) 
** 0.0018 
(0.011) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0031 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.035) 
** 0.0012 
(0.049) 
** 0.0014 
(0.034) 
** 
Size  -0.0046  
(0.178) 
-0.0046 
(0.186) 
 -0.0014 
(0.693) 
   -0.0053 
(0.116) 
 -0.0053 
(0.122) 
 -0.0025 
(0.476) 
 
Leverage  0.1477 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1492 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2365 
(<0.001) 
***   0.1506 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1519 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2392 
(<0.001) 
*** 
MTB  -0.0024 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0023 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0025 
(<0.001) 
***   -0.0024 
(<0.001) 
 -0.0023 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0025 
(<0.001) 
*** 
ROA  -0.5466 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5547 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5803 
(<0.001) 
***   -0.5472 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5552 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.5810 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age  0.0050  
(0.592) 
0.0050 
(0.591) 
 0.0079 
(0.399) 
   0.0044 
(0.634) 
 0.0045 
(0.632) 
 0.0072 
(0.442) 
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Big4  0.0030  
(0.792) 
0.0031 
(0.784) 
 0.0015 
(0.888) 
   0.0028 
(0.803) 
 0.0030 
(0.792) 
 0.0015 
(0.889) 
 
SOX  -0.0108  
(0.060) 
* -0.0133 
(0.127) 
 -0.0141 
(0.108) 
   -0.0104 
(0.069) 
* -0.0126 
(0.146) 
 -0.0129 
(0.137) 
 
Z_Score  0.0218  
(0.014) 
** 0.0218 
(0.014) 
** 0.0188 
(0.033) 
**   0.0212 
(0.017) 
** 0.0212 
(0.017) 
** 0.0182 
(0.039) 
** 
Loss  -0.0154  
(0.029) 
** -0.0148 
(0.036) 
** -0.0213 
(0.002) 
***   -0.0150 
(0.033) 
** -0.0144 
(0.041) 
** -0.0208 
(0.002) 
*** 
NOA  0.0032 
 (0.662) 
0.0027 
(0.716) 
 -0.0042 
(0.573) 
   0.0030 
(0.680) 
 0.0025 
(0.735) 
 -0.0044 
(0.551) 
 
M&A  0.0043  
(0.489) 
0.0079 
(0.248) 
 0.0004 
(0.956) 
   0.0041 
(0.508) 
 0.0076 
(0.265) 
 0.0001 
(0.984) 
 
Restruct  -0.0068  
(0.315) 
-0.0056 
(0.422) 
 -0.0187 
(0.006) 
***   -0.0070 
(0.302) 
 -0.0058 
(0.410) 
 -0.0186 
(0.007) 
*** 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0195 0.1383 0.1399 0.1845 0.0094 0.1381 0.1397 0.1839 
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Table 12     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table shows the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA as a dependent variable. The main variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. I 
investigate the negative relation between ratings conservatism and earnings management varies across investment- and speculative-grade issuers. To do this, I 
split sample firms into two subsamples: one includes investment-grade firms and the other includes speculative-grade firms. The investment-grade firms have 
debt ratings of BBB- or above and the speculative-grade firms have debt ratings of below BBB-. I use a sample of 4,436 firm-year observations for columns (1), 
(3), and (5) between 1997 and 2014. I use a sample of 5,401 firm-year observations for columns (2), (4), and (6) for the same period. I use robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variable: ADS_DA 
Explanatory variables 
IG  
(1) 
SG  
(2) 
IG  
(3) 
SG  
(4) 
IG  
(5) 
SG  
(6) 
Intercept 0.0581 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1096  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0582 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1081 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0577 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1082 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0000 
(0.767) 
-0.0007 
(0.012) 
** -0.0001 
(0.716) 
 -0.0007 
(0.017) 
** -0.0001 
(0.675) 
 -0.0007 
(0.017) 
** 
Size -0.0003 
(0.691) 
-0.0027 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0004 
(0.631) 
 -0.0026 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.648) 
 -0.0027 
(0.002) 
*** 
Leverage 0.0035  
(0.694) 
-0.0248 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0012 
(0.896) 
 -0.0225 
(0.005) 
*** -0.0015 
(0.870) 
 -0.0211 
(0.009) 
*** 
MTB -0.0000 
(0.760) 
0.0002 
(0.242) 
-0.0000 
(0.878) 
 0.0002 
(0.251) 
 -0.0000 
(0.999) 
 0.0002 
(0.271) 
 
ROA 0.0343  
(0.015) 
** -0.0816 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0414 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0854 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0480 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0854 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age -0.0043 
(0.007) 
*** -0.0029 
(0.119) 
-0.0042 
(0.007) 
*** -0.0026 
(0.158) 
 -0.0043 
(0.007) 
*** -0.0025 
(0.182) 
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Big4 -0.0017 
(0.666) 
0.0056 
(0.056) 
* -0.0015 
(0.686) 
 0.0056 
(0.058) 
* -0.0015 
(0.692) 
 0.0055 
(0.063) 
* 
SOX 0.0091  
(0.024) 
** -0.0196 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0092 
(0.023) 
** -0.0194 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0093 
(0.022) 
** -0.0195 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Z_Score -0.0003 
(0.947) 
-0.0099 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0007 
(0.874) 
 -0.0098 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0010 
(0.823) 
 -0.0099 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Loss 0.0239 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0095 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0242 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0092 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0245 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0094 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
NOA -0.0045 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0059 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0044 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0056 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0044 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0056 
(0.001) 
*** 
M&A -0.0000 
(0.977) 
0.0005 
(0.829) 
-0.0001 
(0.965) 
 
 
0.0005 
(0.839) 
 
 
-0.0001 
(0.973) 
 
 
0.0003 
(0.880) 
 
 
Restruct -0.0010 
(0.430) 
-0.0002 
(0.933) 
-0.0008 
(0.535) 
 -0.0004 
(0.825) 
 -0.0006 
(0.618) 
 -0.0004 
(0.850) 
 
REM1   0.0042 
(0.205) 
 -0.0117 
(0.009) 
***     
REM2       0.0129 
(0.023) 
** 
 
-0.0216 
(0.004) 
*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4,436 5,401 4,436 5,401 4,436 5,401 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1043 0.0983 0.1048 0.1002 0.1067 0.1009 
Test of equal coefficients for 
Rat_Diff_Firm between investment- 
and speculative-grade subsamples 
2 = 4.45 (p-value = 0.035) 2 = 3.88 (p-value = 0.049) 2 = 3.79 (p-value = 0.052) 
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Table 13     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table shows the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA as a dependent variable. The main variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I 
investigate the negative relation between ratings conservatism and earnings management varies across investment- and speculative-grade issuers. To do this, I 
split sample firms into two subsamples: one includes investment-grade firms and the other includes speculative-grade firms. The investment-grade firms have 
debt ratings of BBB- or above and the speculative-grade firms have debt ratings of below BBB-. I use a sample of 4,436 firm-year observations for columns (1), 
(3), and (5) between 1997 and 2014. I use a sample of 5,401 firm-year observations for columns (2), (4), and (6) for the same period. I use robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variable: ADS_DA 
Explanatory variables 
IG  
(1) 
SG  
(2) 
IG  
(3) 
SG  
(4) 
IG  
(5) 
SG  
(6) 
Intercept 0.0580 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1069 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0580 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1057 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0575 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1057 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0000 
(0.791) 
-0.0009 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0000 
(0.744) 
 -0.0009 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0000 
(0.698) 
 -0.0009 
(0.002) 
*** 
Size -0.0003 
(0.703) 
-0.0023 
(0.008) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.645) 
 -0.0023 
(0.009) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.664) 
 -0.0023 
(0.007) 
*** 
Leverage 0.0035  
(0.700) 
-0.0264 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0011 
(0.902) 
 -0.0240 
(0.003) 
*** -0.0016 
(0.863) 
 -0.0226 
(0.005) 
*** 
MTB -0.0000 
(0.758) 
0.0002 
(0.243) 
-0.0000 
(0.876) 
 0.0002 
(0.251) 
 -0.0000 
(0.999) 
 0.0002 
(0.271) 
 
ROA 0.0344  
(0.015) 
** -0.0827 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0414 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0864 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0481 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0864 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Firm_Age -0.0043 
(0.007) 
*** -0.0028 
(0.133) 
-0.0042 
(0.008) 
*** -0.0025 
(0.173) 
 -0.0043 
(0.007) 
*** -0.0024 
(0.199) 
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Big4 -0.0017 
(0.666) 
0.0056 
(0.055) 
* -0.0015 
(0.686) 
 0.0056 
(0.058) 
* -0.0015 
(0.692) 
 0.0055 
(0.062) 
* 
SOX -0.0144 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0193 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0143 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0190 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0142 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0192 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Z_Score -0.0003 
(0.948) 
-0.0097 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0007 
(0.875) 
 -0.0096 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0009 
(0.824) 
 -0.0097 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Loss 0.0239 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0093 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0242 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0090 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0244 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0092 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
NOA -0.0045 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0059 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0044 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0056 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0044 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0056 
(0.001) 
*** 
M&A -0.0000 
(0.977) 
0.0006 
(0.777) 
-0.0001 
(0.965) 
 
 
0.0006 
(0.789) 
 
 
-0.0001 
(0.973) 
 
 
0.0005 
(0.830) 
 
 
Restruct -0.0010 
(0.430) 
-0.0002 
(0.902) 
-0.0008 
(0.534) 
 -0.0005 
(0.796) 
 -0.0006 
(0.617) 
 -0.0004 
(0.820) 
 
REM1   0.0042 
(0.206) 
 -0.0116 
(0.010) 
***     
REM2       0.0129 
(0.023) 
** 
 
-0.0215 
(0.004) 
*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4,436 5,401 4,436 5,401 4,436 5,401 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1043 0.0994 0.1048 0.1013 0.1067 0.1020 
Test of equal coefficients for 
Rat_Diff_Firm between investment- 
and speculative-grade subsamples 
2 = 8.37 (p-value = 0.004) 2 = 7.69 (p-value = 0.006) 2 = 7.61 (p-value = 0.006) 
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Table 14     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using REM1) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table shows the results of pooled OLS regression with REM1 as a dependent variable. The main variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I investigate the negative relation between ratings conservatism and earnings management varies across investment- and speculative-
grade issuers. To do this, I split sample firms into two subsamples: one includes investment-grade firms and the other includes speculative-grade firms. The 
investment-grade firms have debt ratings of BBB- or above and the speculative-grade firms have debt ratings of below BBB-. I use a sample of 4,436 firm-year 
observations for columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) between 1997 and 2014. I use a sample of 5,401 firm-year observations for columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) for the 
same period. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variable: REM1 
Explanatory variables 
IG 
 (1) 
SG 
 (2) 
IG  
(3) 
SG 
 (4) 
IG  
(5) 
SG  
(6) 
IG 
 (7) 
SG 
 (8) 
Intercept -0.0186 
(0.871) 
-0.1218 
(0.043) 
*** -0.0298 
(0.798) 
 -0.1004 
(0.095) 
* -0.0102 
(0.928) 
 -0.1108 
(0.063) 
* -0.0213 
(0.853) 
 -0.0900 
(0.131) 
 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0022 
(0.151) 
0.0032 
(0.042) 
** 0.0022 
(0.149) 
 0.0031 
(0.050) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0018 
(0.185) 
 0.0028 
(0.081) 
* 0.0018 
(0.183) 
 0.0027 
(0.098) 
* 
Size 0.0154 
(0.127) 
0.0045 
(0.471) 
0.0154 
(0.126) 
 0.0040 
(0.523) 
 0.0143 
(0.149) 
 0.0033 
(0.597) 
 0.0143 
(0.148) 
 0.0029 
(0.647) 
 
Leverage 0.5511 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2000 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.5504 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1951 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.5544 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.2038 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.5537 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1987 
(<0.001) 
*** 
MTB -0.0059 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0004 
(0.640) 
-0.0059 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.675) 
 -0.0059 
(<0.001) 
 -0.0004 
(0.648) 
 -0.0059 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.683) 
 
ROA -1.6922 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3242 
(<0.001) 
*** -1.6988 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3401 
(<0.001) 
*** -1.6942 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3208 
(<0.001) 
*** -1.7008 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.3368 
(<0.001) 
*** 
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Firm_Age -0.0101 
(0.681) 
0.0234 
(0.153) 
-0.0093 
(0.705) 
 0.0228 
(0.163) 
 -0.0109 
(0.659) 
 0.0228 
(0.162) 
 -0.0101 
(0.682) 
 0.0223 
(0.173) 
 
Big4 -0.0247 
(0.435) 
-0.0013 
(0.937) 
-0.0244 
(0.442) 
 -0.0002 
(0.989) 
 -0.0246 
(0.437) 
 -0.0015 
(0.931) 
 -0.0243 
(0.443) 
 -0.0004 
(0.982) 
 
SOX -0.0227 
(0.290) 
0.0200 
(0.173) 
-0.0245 
(0.260) 
 0.0162 
(0.274) 
 -0.0304 
(0.212) 
 
 
0.0208 
(0.156) 
 -0.0276 
(0.249) 
 0.0170 
(0.248) 
 
Z_Score 0.0947 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0093 
(0.498) 
0.0947 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0073 
(0.591) 
 0.0945 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
0.0083 
(0.544) 
 0.0945 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0064 
(0.638) 
 
Loss -0.0778 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0244 
(0.020) 
** -0.0824 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0226 
(0.030) 
** -0.0776 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
-0.0235 
(0.025) 
** -0.0822 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0217 
(0.037) 
** 
NOA -0.0287 
(0.110) 
0.0208 
(0.121) 
-0.0279 
(0.121) 
 0.0197 
(0.142) 
 -0.0288 
(0.108) 
 
 
0.0204 
(0.129) 
 -0.0280 
(0.119) 
 0.0192 
(0.150) 
 
M&A 0.0060 
(0.724) 
-0.0024 
(0.847) 
0.0060 
(0.724) 
 -0.0023 
(0.853) 
 0.0060 
(0.723) 
 
 
-0.0033 
(0.790) 
 0.0060 
(0.723) 
 -0.0031 
(0.798) 
 
Restruct -0.0528 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0221 
(0.109) 
-0.0526 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0221 
(0.108) 
 -0.0528 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
-0.0218 
(0.114) 
 -0.0526 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0219 
(0.113) 
 
ABS_DA   0.1920 
(0.219) 
 -0.1957 
(0.008) 
***     0.1917 
(0.220) 
 -0.1945 
(0.008) 
*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Number of observations 4,436 5,401        4,436        5,401        4,436       5,401        4,436        5,401 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2838 0.0858        0.2842        0.0877        0.2836       0.0854       0.2840        0.0873 
Test of equal coefficients for 
Rat_Diff_Firm (Rat_Diff_Ind) 
between investment- and 
speculative-grade subsamples 

2
 = 0.21 (p-value = 0.647) 
2
 = 0.16 (p-value = 0.694) 
2
 = 0.27 (p-value = 0.603) 
2
 = 0.19 (p-value = 0.662) 
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Table 15     Investment- Grade (IG) and Speculative-Grade (SG) Firms                                                                      
(Testing H2 using REM2) (CHAPTER 5) 
This table shows the results of pooled OLS regression with REM2 as dependent variables. The main variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I investigate the negative relation between ratings conservatism and earnings management varies across investment- and speculative-
grade issuers. To do this, I split sample firms into two subsamples: one includes investment-grade firms and the other includes speculative-grade firms. The 
investment-grade firms have debt ratings of BBB- or above and the speculative-grade firms have debt ratings of below BBB-. I use a sample of 4,436 firm-year 
observations for columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) between 1997 and 2014. I use a sample of 5,401 firm-year observations for columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) for the 
same period. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 Dependent variable: REM2 
Explanatory variables 
  IG 
 (1) 
SG 
 (2) 
IG  
(3) 
         SG 
         (4) 
IG  
(5) 
SG  
(6) 
IG 
 (7) 
SG 
 (8) 
Intercept 0.0328  
(0.637) 
-0.0628 
(0.093) 
* 0.0196 
(0.782) 
 -0.0471 
(0.206) 
 0.0356 
(0.605) 
 -0.0566 
(0.123) 
 0.0224 
(0.749) 
 -0.0413 
(0.259) 
 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0013  
(0.176) 
0.0018 
(0.062) 
* 0.0013 
(0.171) 
 0.0017 
(0.075) 
*         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0011 
(0.173) 
 0.0015 
(0.127) 
 0.0011 
(0.168) 
 0.0014 
(0.157) 
 
Size 0.0034  
(0.567) 
-0.0013 
(0.743) 
0.0035 
(0.558) 
 -0.0017 
(0.670) 
 0.0030 
(0.608) 
 -0.0019 
(0.615) 
 0.0030 
(0.599) 
 -0.0023 
(0.556) 
 
Leverage 0.3907 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1739 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3899 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1704 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3929 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1759 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.3922 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.1722 
(<0.001) 
*** 
MTB -0.0039 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0006 
(0.213) 
-0.0039 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0006 
(0.233) 
 -0.0039 
(<0.001) 
 -0.0006 
(0.218) 
 -0.0038 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0006 
(0.239) 
 
ROA -1.0632 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.1766 
(0.001) 
*** -1.0710 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.1883 
(<0.001) 
*** -1.0640 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.1747 
(0.001) 
*** -1.0719 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.1865 
(<0.001) 
*** 
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Firm_Age 0.0002 
 (0.992) 
0.0201 
(0.046) 
** 0.0011 
(0.940) 
 0.0197 
(0.051) 
* -0.0002 
(0.990) 
 0.0198 
(0.049) 
** 0.0008 
(0.959) 
 0.0194 
(0.054) 
* 
Big4 -0.0111 
(0.551) 
-0.0038 
(0.736) 
-0.0107 
(0.564) 
 -0.0030 
(0.790) 
 -0.0111 
(0.552) 
 -0.0039 
(0.731) 
 -0.0107 
(0.565) 
 -0.0031 
(0.785) 
 
SOX -0.0101 
(0.441) 
0.0039 
(0.686) 
-0.0122 
(0.356) 
 0.0011 
(0.912) 
 -0.0165 
(0.270) 
 
 
0.0044 
(0.642) 
 -0.0133 
(0.373) 
 0.0017 
(0.861) 
 
Z_Score 0.0523  
(0.002) 
*** 0.0003 
(0.973) 
0.0524 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0011 
(0.891) 
 0.0523 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
-0.0003 
(0.975) 
 0.0523 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0016 
(0.843) 
 
Loss -0.0446 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0036 
(0.577) 
-0.0500 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0022 
(0.728) 
 -0.0445 
(<0.001) 
*** 
 
-0.0031 
(0.632) 
 -0.0500 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0018 
(0.784) 
** 
NOA -0.0137 
(0.203) 
0.0144 
(0.071) 
* -0.0127 
(0.238) 
 0.0135 
(0.089) 
* -0.0137 
(0.202) 
 
 
0.0141 
(0.076) 
* -0.0127 
(0.237) 
 0.0133 
(0.094) 
* 
M&A 0.0007  
(0.947) 
-0.0067 
(0.376) 
0.0007 
(0.946) 
 -0.0067 
(0.380) 
 0.0007 
(0.945) 
 
 
-0.0072 
(0.339) 
 0.0007 
(0.945) 
 -0.0071 
(0.344) 
 
Restruct -0.0292 
(0.001) 
*** -0.0092 
(0.279) 
-0.0290 
(0.002) 
*** -0.0092 
(0.277) 
 -0.0292 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
-0.0091 
(0.287) 
 -0.0290 
(0.002) 
 -0.0091 
(0.284) 
 
ABS_DA   0.2272 
(0.027) 
** -0.1434 
(0.003) 
***     0.2271 
(0.027) 
** -0.1429 
(0.003) 
*** 
Year dummies Yes          Yes Yes Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes 
Industry dummies Yes          Yes Yes Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes 
Number of observations 4,436        5,401 4,436 5,401      4,436      5,401     4,436      5,401 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3089       0.1106 0.3108 0.1132     0.3089     0.1102     0.3108     0.1128 
Test of equal coefficients for 
Rat_Diff_Firm (Rat_Diff_Ind) 
between investment- and 
speculative-grade subsamples 
2 = 0.16 (p-value = 0.691) 2 = 0.10 (p-value = 0.750) 2 = 0.11 (p-value = 0.741) 2 = 0.05 (p-value = 0.819) 
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Table 16     Potential Sample Selection Bias                                                                                                                     
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Firm) (CHAPTER 6) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest 
is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm. I use a sample of 9,837, 5,548, and 4,289 firm-year observations for ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA, respectively, between 
1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Key explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
 (6) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.038) 
** -0.0000  
(0.890) 
0.0004 
(0.020) 
** -0.0002 
(0.032) 
** -0.0001 
(0.414) 
 0.0003 
(0.064) 
* 
REM1 -0.0068 
(0.020) 
** 0.0044 
(0.133) 
0.0159 
(<0.001) 
***       
REM2     -0.0119 
(0.014) 
** 0.0345 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0580 
(<0.001) 
*** 
IMR -0.0030 
(0.936) 
0.0260 
(0.497) 
0.0108 
(0.823) 
 0.0204 
(0.426) 
 -0.0051 
(0.843) 
 -0.0483 
(0.171) 
 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1240 0.0971 0.2320 0.1243 0.1106 0.2509 
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Table 16 (Continued)     Potential Sample Selection Bias                                                                                                                     
(Testing H1 using the ratings conservatism measure, Rat_Diff_Ind) (CHAPTER 6) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest 
is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use a sample of 9,837, 5,548, and 4,289 firm-year observations for ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA, respectively, between 
1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Key explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
 (6) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0002 
(0.042) 
** -0.0001 
(0.277) 
0.0003 
(0.095) 
* -0.0002 
(0.040) 
** -0.0002 
(0.076) 
* 0.0002 
(0.223) 
 
REM1 -0.0069 
(0.019) 
** 0.0045 
(0.117) 
0.0162 
(<0.001) 
***       
REM2     -0.0121 
(0.014) 
** 0.0347 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0584 
(<0.001) 
*** 
IMR 0.0040  
(0.914) 
0.0228 
(0.553) 
0.0111 
(0.820) 
 0.0194 
(0.453) 
 -0.0055 
(0.832) 
 -0.0473 
(0.184) 
 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1240 0.0973 0.2315 0.1242 0.1110 0.2505 
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Table 16 (Continued)     Potential Sample Selection Bias                                                                                                                     
(Testing H1 using two ratings conservatism proxies) (CHAPTER 6) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. The main variable of interest is 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use a sample of 9,837 firm-year observations between 1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Key explanatory variables 
          REM1 
         (1) 
REM2 
(2) 
    REM1 
    (3) 
REM2 
 (4) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0030  
(0.004) 
*** 0.0019 
(0.003) 
***     
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind   0.0022  
(0.025) 
** 0.0015 
(0.017) 
** 
ABS_DA -0.2060  
(0.006) 
*** -0.1349 
(0.006) 
*** -0.2073  
(0.006) 
*** -0.1357 
(0.006) 
*** 
IMR 0.1219  
(0.617) 
0.1771 
(0.113) 
0.1052  
(0.665) 
 0.1803 
(0.107) 
 
Control variables and Intercept       Yes               Yes  Yes              Yes 
Year dummies       Yes               Yes  Yes              Yes 
Industry dummies       Yes               Yes  Yes              Yes 
Number of observations      9,837              9,837  9,837            9,837 
Adjusted R
2
      0.1174              0.1490  0.1162           0.1481 
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Table 17     Additional Analysis                                                                                                                                         
Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Earnings Smoothing (CHAPTER 7) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with EM_SMOOTH1, EM_SMOOTH2, and EM_SMOOTH3 as each dependent variable. The main 
variable of interest is Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm and Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind. I use a sample of 8,553, 8,534, and 8,453 firm-year observations for EM_SMOOTH1, 
EM_SMOOTH2, and EM_SMOOTH3, respectively, between 1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables:  
Key explanatory variables 
  EM_SMOOTH1   EM_SMOOTH2  EM_SMOOTH3 
 (1)         (2) (3)        (4)  (5)         (6) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0003  
(0.741) 
 -0.0007 
(0.503) 
   -0.0006 
(0.540) 
   
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind  0.0007 
(0.436) 
  0.0000 
(0.968) 
   0.0004 
(0.661) 
 
Control variables and Intercept Yes        Yes Yes        Yes Yes        Yes 
Year dummies Yes        Yes Yes        Yes Yes        Yes 
Industry dummies Yes        Yes Yes        Yes Yes        Yes 
Number of observations 8,553       8,553 8,534      8,534 8,453      8,453 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0691      0.0692 0.0366     0.0365 0.0526      0.0526 
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Table 17 (Continued)     Additional Analysis                                                                                                                                         
Descriptive Statistics (CHAPTER 7) 
This table shows descriptive statistics for earnings smoothing measures in equations (10)-(12). My sample period is between 1997 and 2014. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
σ(Earnings)/σ(CFO) 9,981 1.7280 2.6982 0.8790 0.0604 18.2320 
ρ(∆ACC, ∆CFO) 9,962 -0.5343 0.6218 -0.8702 -1.0000 1.0000 
ρ(∆DA, ∆PDI) 9,874 -0.5798 0.6110 -0.9063 -1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 18     Additional Analysis                                                                                                                                         
Relation between Ratings Conservatism and Asymmetric Timely Loss Recognition (CHAPTER 7) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with NI, ACC, and C_Score as each dependent variable. I use a sample of 12,199, 11,509, and 11,147 
firm-year observations for NI, ACC, and C_Score, respectively, between 1997 and 2014. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables:  
Key explanatory variables 
 NI                            ACC                            C_Score 
 (1)         (2) (3)        (4)  (5)         (6) 
D*RET*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0785  
(0.430) 
         
D*RET*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind  0.0213 
(0.817) 
        
DCFO*CFO*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm   -0.0009 
(0.968) 
       
DCFO*CFO*Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind     0.0414 
(0.005) 
***     
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm       -0.0006 
(0.096) 
*   
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind         -0.0008 
(0.017) 
** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes        Yes Yes        Yes Yes        Yes 
Year dummies Yes        Yes Yes        Yes Yes        Yes 
Industry dummies Yes        Yes Yes        Yes Yes        Yes 
Number of observations 12,199      12,199 11,509      11,509 11,147    11,147 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0907      0.0936 0.3259      0.3275 0.4733    0.4734 
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Table 19                                                                                                                                                                               
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 1: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using a measure 
based on discretionary accruals proposed by Cohen et al. (2008). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed 
test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0003 
(0.042) 
** -0.0000 
(0.797) 
0.0004 
(0.024) 
** -0.0002 
(0.065) 
* -0.0000 
(0.724) 
 0.0004 
(0.049) 
** -0.0002 
(0.054) 
* -0.0001 
(0.456) 
 0.0003 
(0.092) 
* 
REM1    -0.0054 
(0.064) 
* 0.0044 
(0.134) 
 0.0134 
(0.003) 
***       
REM2          -0.0075 
(0.096) 
* 0.0346 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0508 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1136 0.0919 0.2186 0.1142 0.0924 0.2217 0.1140 0.1061 0.2368 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0003 
(0.009) 
*** -0.0002 
(0.114) 
0.0004 
(0.035) 
** -0.0003 
(0.013) 
** -0.0002 
(0.091) 
* 0.0003 
(0.058) 
* -0.0003 
(0.012) 
** -0.0002 
(0.035) 
** 0.0003 
(0.093) 
* 
REM1    -0.0053 
(0.067) 
* 0.0046 
(0.117) 
 0.0135 
(0.003) 
***       
REM2          -0.0075 
(0.092) 
* 0.0350 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0509 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1139 0.0924 0.2184 0.1145 0.0929 0.2217 0.1143 0.1068 0.2368 
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Table 19 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                             
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 1: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat my 
tests using a measure based on discretionary accruals proposed by Cohen et al. (2008). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.042) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.003) 
** 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.049) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.004) 
*** 
ABS_DA        0.0097 
(0.784) 
 -0.1569 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0618 
(0.003) 
*** -0.1397 
(0.059) 
* -0.0764 
(0.094) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1918 0.0812 0.3017 0.1299 0.1649 0.1917 0.0836 0.3036 0.1305 0.1653 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.141) 
0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.010) 
** 0.0020 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0008 
(0.162) 
 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.011) 
** 
ABS_DA        0.0108 
(0.762) 
 -0.1572 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0626 
(0.003) 
*** -0.1388 
(0.061) 
* -0.0758 
(0.093) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1914 0.0805 0.3027 0.1291 0.1644 0.1913 0.0829 0.3047 0.1296 0.1648 
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Table 19 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                             
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 1: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using a measure based on discretionary 
accruals proposed by Cohen et al. (2008). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-
values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0057 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0027  
(0.011) 
** 0.0027 
(0.013) 
** 0.0033 
(0.003) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0042 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.020) 
** 0.0023 
(0.026) 
** 0.0026 
(0.014) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.0135 0.1084 0.1087 0.1420 0.0072 0.1080 0.1084 0.1411 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0045 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.025) 
** 0.0014 
(0.035) 
** 0.0018 
(0.011) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0031 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.036) 
** 0.0012 
(0.051) 
* 0.0014 
(0.035) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.0194 0.1376 0.1392 0.1845 0.0093 0.1375 0.1390 0.1840 
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Table 20                                                                                                                                                                              
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 2: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using a measure based on 
discretionary accruals proposed by Chen et al. (2008) and Francis and Yu (2009). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed 
test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.081) 
* 0.0001 
(0.496) 
0.0005 
(0.010) 
*** -0.0002 
(0.090) 
* 0.0001 
(0.549) 
 0.0004 
(0.019) 
** -0.0002 
(0.087) 
* 0.0000 
(0.808) 
 0.0004 
(0.033) 
** 
REM1    -0.0054 
(0.058) 
* 0.0040 
(0.170) 
 0.0116 
(0.007) 
***       
REM2          -0.0081 
(0.090) 
* 0.0325 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0460 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1177 0.0982 0.2174 0.1183 0.0986 0.2198 0.1182 0.1106 0.2332 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0003 
(0.018) 
** -0.0001 
(0.463) 
0.0004 
(0.015) 
** -0.0002 
(0.024) 
** -0.0001 
(0.411) 
 0.0004 
(0.025) 
** -0.0002 
(0.023) 
** -0.0001 
(0.239) 
 0.0003 
(0.035) 
** 
REM1    -0.0054 
(0.061) 
* 0.0042 
(0.151) 
 0.0117 
(0.007) 
***       
REM2          -0.0080 
(0.094) 
* 0.0329 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0462 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1180 0.0983 0.2172 0.1186 0.0987 0.2197 0.1185 0.1109 0.2332 
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Table 20 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                            
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 2: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat my 
tests using a measure based on discretionary accruals proposed by Chen et al. (2008) and Francis and Yu (2009). I use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.042) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.047) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.004) 
*** 
ABS_DA        0.0107 
(0.766) 
 -0.1625 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0596 
(0.005) 
*** -0.1440 
(0.053) 
* -0.0843 
(0.085) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1918 0.0812 0.3017 0.1299 0.1649 0.1917 0.0837 0.3034 0.1305 0.1654 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.141) 
0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.010) 
*** 0.0020 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0008 
(0.159) 
 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.011) 
** 
ABS_DA        0.0119 
(0.741) 
 -0.1626 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0604 
(0.005) 
*** -0.1428 
(0.056) 
* -0.0835 
(0.089) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1914 0.0805 0.3027 0.1291 0.1644 0.1913 0.0830 0.3045 0.1296 0.1648 
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Table 20 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                            
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 2: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using a measure based on discretionary 
accruals proposed by Chen et al. (2008) and Francis and Yu (2009). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0059 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.009) 
*** 0.0027 
(0.012) 
** 0.0034 
(0.003) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0043 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0024 
(0.018) 
** 0.0023 
(0.023) 
** 0.0026 
(0.012) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0140 0.1090 0.1093 0.1432 0.0075 0.1086 0.1090 0.1423 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0046 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.019) 
** 0.0015 
(0.027) 
** 0.0018 
(0.008) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0032 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.028) 
** 0.0013 
(0.041) 
** 0.0014 
(0.027) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0204 0.1392 0.1408 0.1873 0.0099 0.1391 0.1406 0.1867 
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Table 21                                                                                                                                                                              
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 3: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_PMDA, Positive_PMDA, and Negative_PMDA as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using the 
performance-matched discretionary accruals proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_PMDA 
(1) 
Positive_PMDA 
(2) 
 Negative_PMDA 
(3) 
ABS_PMDA 
(4) 
Positive_PMDA 
(5) 
Negative_PMDA 
(6) 
ABS_PMDA 
(7) 
Positive_PMDA 
(8) 
Negative_PMDA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0001 
(0.488) 
0.0002 
(0.359) 
0.0004 
(0.030) 
** -0.0001 
(0.629) 
 0.0002 
(0.293) 
 0.0004 
(0.043) 
** -0.0001 
(0.643) 
 0.0002 
(0.384) 
 0.0004 
(0.071) 
* 
REM1    -0.0103 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0101 
(0.022) 
** 0.0089 
(0.071) 
*       
REM2          -0.0191 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0051 
(0.464) 
 0.0403 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0843 0.0819 0.1028 0.0854 0.0829 0.1036 0.0858 0.0819 0.1104 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_PMDA 
(1) 
Positive_PMDA 
(2) 
 Negative_PMDA 
(3) 
ABS_PMDA 
(4) 
Positive_PMDA 
(5) 
Negative_PMDA 
(6) 
ABS_PMDA 
(7) 
Positive_PMDA 
(8) 
Negative_PMDA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0002 
(0.082) 
* -0.0001 
(0.786) 
0.0004 
(0.019) 
** -0.0002 
(0.117) 
 -0.0000 
(0.881) 
 0.0004 
(0.025) 
** -0.0002 
(0.122) 
 -0.0001 
(0.755) 
 0.0004 
(0.039) 
** 
REM1    -0.0102 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0098 
(0.026) 
** 0.0089 
(0.069) 
*       
REM2          -0.0189 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0056 
(0.428) 
 0.0403 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0845 0.0818 0.1029 0.0856 0.0827 0.1037 0.0860 0.0817 0.1106 
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Table 21 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                              
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 3: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_PMDA, Positive_PMDA, and Negative_PMDA as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests 
using the performance-matched discretionary accruals proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.042) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.047) 
 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.005) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.008) 
*** 
ABS_PMDA        -0.0277 
(0.206) 
 -0.1048 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0005 
(0.966) 
 -0.1283 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0928 
(0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1918 0.0812 0.3017 0.1299 0.1649 0.1935 0.0876 0.2995 0.1360 0.1710 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.141) 
0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.010) 
*** 0.0017 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0005 
(0.352) 
 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.020) 
** 0.0013 
(0.025) 
** 
ABS_PMDA        -0.0264 
(0.227) 
 -0.1046 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0011 
(0.920) 
 -0.1268 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0920 
(0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1914 0.0805 0.3027 0.1291 0.1644 0.1930 0.0871 0.3003 0.1352 0.1704 
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Table 21 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                              
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 3: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using the performance-matched discretionary 
accruals proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-
values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0049 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.014) 
** 0.0023 
(0.016) 
** 0.0027 
(0.006) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0036 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0019 
(0.039) 
** 0.0019 
(0.045) 
** 0.0021 
(0.033) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0105 0.1139 0.1146 0.1472 0.0056 0.1134 0.1141 0.1463 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0039 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.020) 
** 0.0013 
(0.024) 
** 0.0016 
(0.012) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0027 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0011 
(0.053) 
* 0.0011 
(0.067) 
* 0.0011 
(0.057) 
* 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0146 0.1411 0.1433 0.1858 0.0073 0.1407 0.1428 0.1851 
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Table 22                                                                                                                                                                               
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 4: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_AWCA, Positive_AWCA, and Negative_AWCA as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using the 
abnormal working capital accruals proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_AWCA 
(1) 
Positive_AWCA 
(2) 
 Negative_AWCA 
(3) 
ABS_AWCA 
(4) 
Positive_AWCA 
(5) 
Negative_AWCA 
(6) 
ABS_AWCA 
(7) 
Positive_AWCA 
(8) 
Negative_AWCA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0001 
(0.324) 
-0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0001 
(0.399) 
 -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0001 
(0.486) 
 
REM1    -0.0016 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0014 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0032 
(0.028) 
**       
REM2          -0.0001 
(0.823) 
 0.0001 
(0.923) 
 0.0096 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0931 0.1038 0.0154 0.0952 0.1055 0.0235 0.0930 0.1037 0.0504 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_AWCA 
(1) 
Positive_AWCA 
(2) 
 Negative_AWCA 
(3) 
ABS_AWCA 
(4) 
Positive_AWCA 
(5) 
Negative_AWCA 
(6) 
ABS_AWCA 
(7) 
Positive_AWCA 
(8) 
Negative_AWCA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0001 
(0.231) 
-0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0001 
(0.270) 
 -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0001 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0001 
(0.307) 
 
REM1    -0.0016 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0014 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0032 
(0.028) 
**       
REM2          -0.0002 
(0.771) 
 0.0000 
(0.960) 
 0.0096 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 9,837 5,472 4,365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0921 0.1030 0.0171 0.0943 0.1048 0.0252 0.0920 0.1030 0.0523 
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Table 22 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                               
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 4: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_AWCA, Positive_AWCA, and Negative_AWCA as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests 
using the abnormal working capital accruals proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0022 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.042) 
** 0.0007 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.096) 
* 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.003) 
*** 
ABS_AWCA        -0.8732 
(0.206) 
 -0.7387 
(0.001) 
*** 0.6565 
(<0.001) 
*** -1.5503 
(<0.001) 
*** -0.0552 
(0.823) 
 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1918 0.0812 0.3017 0.1299 0.1649 0.1842 0.0821 0.2725 0.1324 0.1598 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.141) 
0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.010) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0007 
(0.201) 
 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0022 
(0.017) 
** 0.0015 
(0.008) 
*** 
ABS_AWCA        -0.8857 
(0.227) 
 -0.7520 
(0.001) 
*** 0.6534 
(<0.001) 
*** -1.5758 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0719 
(0.771) 
 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1914 0.0805 0.3027 0.1291 0.1644 0.1838 0.0817 0.2729 0.1319 0.1593 
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Table 22 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                               
Alternative Measures of Accrual-Based Earnings Management 4: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat my tests using the abnormal working capital accruals 
proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-
values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0044 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.011) 
** 0.0022 
(0.014) 
** 0.0026 
(0.006) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0035 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0021 
(0.017) 
** 0.0020 
(0.020) 
** 0.0022 
(0.015) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0094 0.0995 0.0996 0.1269 0.0058 0.0993 0.0994 0.1263 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0034 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.010) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.005) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0026 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.009) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.013) 
** 0.0014 
(0.011) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0134 0.1171 0.1183 0.1531 0.0079 0.1170 0.1182 0.1527 
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Table 23                                                                                                                                                                                    
Using a Three-Digit SIC Industry: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. I repeat previous analyses by replacing 
a rating proxy based on a two-digit SIC industry with a rating proxy based on a three-digit SIC industry. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.027) 
** -0.0001 
(0.471) 
0.0004 
(0.029) 
** -0.0002 
(0.040) 
** -0.0001 
(0.418) 
 0.0003 
(0.056) 
** -0.0002 
(0.038) 
** -0.0001 
(0.224) 
 0.0003 
(0.096) 
* 
REM1    -0.0061 
(0.041) 
** 0.0040 
(0.167) 
 0.0137 
(0.003) 
***       
REM2          -0.0088 
(0.076) 
* 0.0339 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0513 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1138 0.0914 0.2167 0.1145 0.0917 0.2200 0.1144 0.1050 0.2350 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind_1 -0.0003 
(0.010) 
*** -0.0002 
(0.052) 
* 0.0003 
(0.058) 
* -0.0003 
(0.014) 
** -0.0002 
(0.042) 
** 0.0003 
(0.091) 
* -0.0003 
(0.014) 
** -0.0003 
(0.015) 
** 0.0003 
(0.133) 
 
REM1    -0.0061 
(0.041) 
** 0.0042 
(0.149) 
 0.0139 
(0.002) 
***       
REM2          -0.0088 
(0.077) 
* 0.0342 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0515 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1140 0.0920 0.2164 0.1147 0.0924 0.2198 0.1146 0.1058 0.2349 
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Table 23 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Using a Three-Digit SIC Industry: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat 
previous analyses by replacing a rating proxy based on a two-digit SIC industry with a rating proxy based on a three-digit SIC industry. I use robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0020 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0012 
(0.047) 
** 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0032 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0019 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0020 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0011 
(0.055) 
* 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0031 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0019 
(0.003) 
*** 
ABS_DA        -0.0002 
(0.996) 
 -0.1661 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0560 
(0.008) 
*** -0.1571 
(0.036) 
** -0.0890 
(0.071) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1916 0.0812 0.3019 0.1298 0.1650 0.1915 0.0838 0.3035 0.1305 0.1655 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind_1 0.0018 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0007 
(0.203) 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.010) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.013) 
** 0.0018 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0007 
(0.232) 
 0.0008 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.011) 
** 0.0015 
(0.015) 
** 
ABS_DA        0.0003 
(0.993) 
 -0.1669 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0566 
(0.007) 
** -0.1574 
(0.036) 
** -0.0891 
(0.072) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1911 0.0803 0.3029 0.1287 0.1641 0.1910 0.0830 0.3045 0.1294 0.1647 
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Table 23 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Using a Three-Digit SIC Industry: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I repeat previous analyses by replacing a rating proxy based on 
a two-digit SIC industry with a rating proxy based on a three-digit SIC industry. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0051 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.010) 
*** 0.0025 
(0.012) 
** 0.0029 
(0.004) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind_1       0.0037 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0022 
(0.024) 
** 0.0021 
(0.030) 
** 0.0023 
(0.022) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0117 0.1088 0.1091 0.1417 0.0062 0.1083 0.1086 0.1407 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0040 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.017) 
** 0.0014 
(0.023) 
** 0.0016 
(0.011) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind_1       0.0028 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.033) 
** 0.0012 
(0.046) 
** 0.0013 
(0.044) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0164 0.1385 0.1401 0.1845 0.0083 0.1382 0.1398 0.1854 
 
 145 
 
Table 24                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1997): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. I use alternative cut-off years for 
measuring ratings conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1998 to 2014, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 1985 to 1997. I use robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.061) 
* -0.0000 
(0.811) 
0.0004 
(0.052) 
* -0.0002 
(0.090) 
* -0.0000 
(0.718) 
 0.0003 
(0.105) 
 -0.0002 
(0.089) 
* -0.0001 
(0.440) 
 0.0003 
(0.178) 
 
REM1    -0.0064 
(0.029) 
** 0.0052 
(0.067) 
* 0.0153 
(0.001) 
***       
REM2          -0.0104 
(0.035) 
** 0.0337 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0533 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,122 5,135 3,987 9,122 5,135 3,987 9,122 5,135 3,987 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1157 0.1012 0.2146 0.1165 0.1019 0.2187 0.1166 0.1150 0.2343 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0003 
(0.018) 
** -0.0002 
(0.176) 
0.0003 
(0.068) 
* -0.0002 
(0.028) 
** -0.0002 
(0.140) 
 0.0003 
(0.126) 
 -0.0002 
(0.028) 
** -0.0002 
(0.056) 
* 0.0002 
(0.203) 
 
REM1    -0.0064 
(0.030) 
** 0.0053 
(0.058) 
* 0.0154 
(0.001) 
***       
REM2          -0.0103 
(0.037) 
** 0.0340 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0534 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,122 5,135 3,987 9,122 5,135 3,987 9,122 5,135 3,987 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1159 0.1015 0.2144 0.1167 0.1023 0.2186 0.1168 0.1156 0.2343 
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Table 24 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1997): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. I use 
alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1998 to 2014, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 
1985 to 1997. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0023 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.022) 
** 0.0007 
(0.004) 
*** 0.0039 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0023 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0015 
(0.026) 
** 0.0007 
(0.004) 
*** 0.0038 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0022 
(0.002) 
*** 
ABS_DA        0.0056 
(0.876) 
 -0.1659 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0387 
(0.065) 
* -0.1698 
(0.025) 
** -0.1071 
(0.032) 
** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 
Adjusted R2 0.1792 0.0589 0.2966 0.1277 0.1375 0.1928 0.0616 0.2973 0.1093 0.1384 
  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0012 
(0.054) 
* 0.0008 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0033 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.004) 
*** 0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0011 
(0.063) 
* 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0032 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.004) 
*** 
ABS_DA        -0.0111 
(0.759) 
 -0.1659 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0394 
(0.061) 
* -0.1689 
(0.026) 
** -0.1064 
(0.033) 
** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 
Adjusted R2 0.1789 0.0583 0.2976 0.1078 0.1372 0.1788 0.0610 0.2984 0.1087 0.1380 
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Table 24 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1997): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I use alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings 
conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1998 to 2014, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 1985 to 1997. I use robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0059 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0031 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0030 
(0.008) 
*** 0.0036 
(0.002) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0047 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.008) 
*** 0.0027 
(0.011) 
** 0.0030 
(0.006) 
*** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0147 0.1007 0.1011 0.1237 0.0092 0.1006 0.1009 0.1230 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0047 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0018 
(0.011) 
** 0.0017 
(0.016) 
** 0.0020 
(0.006) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0035 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.012) 
** 0.0016 
(0.019) 
** 0.0017 
(0.013) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 9,122 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0215 0.1305 0.1324 0.1648 0.0120 0.1305 0.1323 0.1644 
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Table 25                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1998): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. I use alternative cut-off years for 
measuring ratings conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1999 to 2014, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 1985 to 1998. I use robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.129) 
-0.0000 
(0.940) 
0.0003 
(0.075) 
* -0.0002 
(0.169) 
 -0.0000 
(0.818) 
 0.0003 
(0.128) 
 -0.0002 
(0.172) 
 -0.0001 
(0.495) 
 0.0002 
(0.220) 
 
REM1    -0.0051 
(0.090) 
* 0.0062 
(0.035) 
** 0.0132 
(0.007) 
***       
REM2          -0.0090 
(0.077) 
* 0.0359 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0513 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,416 4,734 3,682 8,416 4,734 3,682 8,416 4,734 3,682 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1159 0.0920 0.2265 0.1164 0.0931 0.2294 0.1166 0.1078 0.2440 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0002 
(0.025) 
** -0.0001 
(0.272) 
0.0003 
(0.065) 
* -0.0002 
(0.037) 
** -0.0002 
(0.206) 
 0.0003 
(0.114) 
 -0.0002 
(0.038) 
** -0.0002 
(0.078) 
* 0.0002 
(0.203) 
 
REM1    -0.0050 
(0.098) 
* 0.0064 
(0.029) 
** 0.0132 
(0.006) 
***       
REM2          -0.0088 
(0.084) 
* 0.0363 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0513 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,416 4,734 3,682 8,416 4,734 3,682 8,416 4,734 3,682 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1163 0.0923 0.2265 0.1167 0.0934 0.2294 0.1169 0.1084 0.2440 
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Table 25 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1998): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. I use 
alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1999 to 2014, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 
1985 to 1998. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.022) 
** 0.0007 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0021 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.025) 
** 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0021 
(0.002) 
*** 
ABS_DA        0.0134 
(0.716) 
 -0.1544 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0432 
(0.048) 
** -0.1334 
(0.084) 
* -0.0902 
(0.072) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 
Adjusted R2 0.1967 0.0765 0.2991 0.1309 0.1638 0.1966 0.0788 0.3000 0.1313 0.1643 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0014 
(0.017) 
** 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0021 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0021 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.021) 
** 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0035 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0021 
(0.001) 
*** 
ABS_DA        0.0153 
(0.677) 
 -0.1531 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0439 
(0.044) 
** -0.1302 
(0.091) 
* -0.0883 
(0.078) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 
Adjusted R2 0.1971 0.0766 0.2994 0.1312 0.1641 0.1971 0.0789 0.3003 0.1317 0.1646 
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Table 25 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Alternative Cut-Off Years (1985-1998): Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I use alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings 
conservatism. To predict ratings for the period 1999 to 2014, I employ the ratings model estimated for the period 1985 to 1998. I use robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0055 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.005) 
*** 0.0028 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0033 
(0.002) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0046 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.004) 
** 0.0032 
(0.002) 
*** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0146 0.1136 0.1144 0.1437 0.0100 0.1141 0.1148 0.1439 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0043 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.009) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.013) 
** 0.0019 
(0.005) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0035 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.009) 
*** 0.0019 
(0.005) 
*** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 8,416 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0210 0.1442 0.1464 0.1853 0.0132 0.1445 0.1467 0.1854 
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Table 26                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controlling for the Effect of Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. I use alternative cut-off years for 
measuring ratings conservatism. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0002 
(0.029) 
** -0.0000 
(0.862) 
0.0004 
(0.011) 
** -0.0002 
(0.041) 
** -0.0000 
(0.793) 
 0.0004 
(0.022) 
 -0.0002 
(0.039) 
** -0.0001 
(0.509) 
 0.0003 
(0.041) 
** 
REM1    -0.0060 
(0.039) 
** 0.0041 
(0.162) 
 0.0134 
(0.002) 
***       
REM2          -0.0087 
(0.072) 
* 0.0347 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0513 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1208 0.0949 0.2298 0.1216 0.0953 0.2329 0.1214 0.1090 0.2479 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0003 
(0.011) 
** -0.0001 
(0.192) 
0.0004 
(0.024) 
** -0.0002 
(0.015) 
** -0.0001 
(0.162) 
 0.0003 
(0.039) 
** -0.0003 
(0.015) 
** -0.0002 
(0.072) 
* 0.0003 
(0.062) 
* 
REM1    -0.0060 
(0.040) 
** 0.0042 
(0.148) 
 0.0136 
(0.002) 
***       
REM2          -0.0087 
(0.073) 
* 0.0349 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0514 
(<0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 9,837 5,566 4,271 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1210 0.0952 0.2295 0.1218 0.0956 0.2327 0.1216 0.1095 0.2478 
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Table 26 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                   
Controlling for the Effect of Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. I use robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0010 
(0.088) 
* 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.003) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.005) 
*** 0.0019 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.101) 
 0.0007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0029 
(0.004) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.006) 
*** 
ABS_DA        -0.0035 
(0.924) 
 -0.1627 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0557 
(0.008) 
*** -0.1557 
(0.036) 
** -0.0880 
(0.068) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 8,416 
Adjusted R2 0.1922 0.0868 0.2894 0.1358 0.1691 0.1921 0.0893 0.2909 0.1365 0.1697 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0018 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0006 
(0.263) 
0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0024 
(0.012) 
** 0.0014 
(0.016) 
** 0.0018 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0006 
(0.297) 
 0.0008 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0024 
(0.014) 
** 0.0014 
(0.018) 
** 
ABS_DA        -0.0030 
(0.935) 
 -0.1633 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0563 
(0.007) 
*** -0.1557 
(0.036) 
** -0.0879 
(0.068) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.1917 0.0862 0.2903 0.1350 0.1685 0.1917 0.0888 0.2918 0.1357 0.1691 
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Table 26 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                   
Controlling for the Effect of Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. I use alternative cut-off years for measuring ratings 
conservatism. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level s. The p-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0057 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0023 
(0.015) 
** 0.0023 
(0.017) 
** 0.0027 
(0.007) 
***         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0042 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0020 
(0.032) 
** 0.0020 
(0.036) 
** 0.0021 
(0.026) 
** 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0135 0.1132 0.1132 0.1476 0.0072 0.1128 0.1128 0.1468 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0045 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.026) 
** 0.0013 
(0.033) 
** 0.0015 
(0.017) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0031 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0012 
(0.046) 
** 0.0011 
(0.057) 
* 0.0012 
(0.051) 
* 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0195 0.1429 0.1438 0.1886 0.0094 0.1427 0.1436 0.1880 
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Table 27                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controlling for the Controlling for Additional Variables: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with ABS_DA, Positive_DA, and Negative_DA as each dependent variable. To mitigate the possibility of omitted 
variable problems, I re-estimate the regression equation (8) after controlling for operating cycle (Cycle), cash flow operations (CFO), sales growth (Sales_Growth), and a 
litigation indicator (LIT) as well as existing control variables employed in equation. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm -0.0003 
(0.014) 
** -0.0002 
(0.188) 
0.0005 
(0.005) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.018) 
** -0.0001 
(0.191) 
 0.0004 
(0.007) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.017) 
** -0.0002 
(0.169) 
 0.0004 
(0.009) 
*** 
REM1    -0.0054 
(0.079) 
* -0.0008 
(0.775) 
 0.0079 
(0.050) 
**       
REM2          -0.0096 
(0.062) 
* 0.0065 
(0.166) 
 0.0229 
(0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1260 0.2615 0.3097 0.1265 0.2614 0.3106 0.1266 0.2618 0.3129 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
ABS_DA 
(1) 
Positive_DA 
(2) 
 Negative_DA 
(3) 
ABS_DA 
(4) 
Positive_DA 
(5) 
Negative_DA 
(6) 
ABS_DA 
(7) 
Positive_DA 
(8) 
Negative_DA 
(9) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind -0.0003 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.008) 
*** 0.0004 
(0.019) 
** -0.0003 
(0.005) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.008) 
*** 0.0003 
(0.025) 
** -0.0003 
(0.004) 
*** -0.0003 
(0.006) 
*** 0.0003 
(0.028) 
** 
REM1    -0.0054 
(0.078) 
* -0.0007 
(0.800) 
 0.0080 
(0.045) 
**       
REM2          -0.0097 
(0.061) 
* 0.0066 
(0.155) 
 0.0232 
(0.001) 
*** 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 9,837 5,548 4,289 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1262 0.2625 0.3092 0.1268 0.2624 0.3102 0.1269 0.2628 0.3124 
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Table 27 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controlling for the Controlling for Additional Variables: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with REM_PROD, REM_DISX, REM_CFO, REM1 and REM2 as each dependent variable. To mitigate the 
possibility of omitted variable problems, I re-estimate the regression equation (8) after controlling for operating cycle (Cycle), cash flow operations (CFO), sales growth 
(Sales_Growth), and a litigation indicator (LIT) as well as existing control variables employed in equation. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0014 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0008 
(0.145) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0022 
(0.018) 
*** 0.0012 
(0.030) 
** 0.0014 
(0.002) 
*** 0.0008 
(0.163) 
 0.0003 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0022 
(0.020) 
** 0.0012 
(0.033) 
*** 
ABS_DA        -0.0141 
(0.701) 
 -0.1300 
(0.005) 
*** 0.0254 
(0.005) 
*** -0.1336 
(0.074) 
* -0.0843 
(0.056) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.2515 0.1198 0.7499 0.1759 0.2870 0.2515 0.1213 0.7502 0.1764 0.2875 
 
 Dependent variables: 
Explanatory variables 
REM_PROD 
(1) 
REM_DISX 
(2) 
REM_CFO 
(3) 
REM1 
(4) 
REM2 
(5) 
REM_PROD 
(6) 
REM_DISX 
(7) 
REM_CFO 
(8) 
REM1 
(9) 
REM2 
(10) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind 0.0012 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0004 
(0.423) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.072) 
* 0.0008 
(0.124) 
 0.0012 
(0.007) 
*** 0.0004 
(0.466) 
 0.0003 
(0.001) 
*** 0.0016 
(0.079) 
* 0.0008 
(0.135) 
 
ABS_DA        -0.0141 
(0.703) 
 -0.1309 
(0.004) 
*** 0.0256 
(0.005) 
*** -0.1344 
(0.073) 
* -0.0849 
(0.055) 
* 
Control variables and Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R2 0.2510 0.1193 0.7500 0.1751 0.2864 0.2509 0.1209 0.7503 0.1756 0.2869 
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Table 27 (Continued)                                                                                                                                                                                    
Controlling for the Controlling for Additional Variables: Testing H1 (CHAPTER 8) 
This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression with TEM1 and TEM2 as each dependent variable. To mitigate the possibility of omitted variable problems, I re-
estimate the regression equation (8) after controlling for operating cycle (Cycle), cash flow operations (CFO), sales growth (Sales_Growth), and a litigation indicator 
(LIT) as well as existing control variables employed in equation. I use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. The p-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed 
test). 
 Dependent variable: TEM1 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0057 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0022 
(0.019) 
** 0.0022 
(0.022) 
** 0.0020 
(0.038) 
**         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0042 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0017 
(0.058) 
* 0.0017 
(0.067) 
* 0.0014 
(0.141) 
 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0135 0.1339 0.1335 0.1849 0.0072 0.1333 0.1329 0.1842 
 
 Dependent variable: TEM2 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Firm 0.0045 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0013 
(0.024) 
** 0.0012 
(0.032) 
** 0.0009 
(0.098) 
*         
Lagged_Rat_Diff_Ind       0.0031 
(<0.001) 
*** 0.0009 
(0.096) 
* 0.0008 
(0.129) 
 0.0005 
(0.327) 
 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 9,856 9,837 9,837 9,837 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0195 0.2187 0.2193 0.2944 0.0094 0.2181 0.2187 0.2940 
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Figure 1     Plot of Coefficient on Year Dummies in Ratings Models (CHAPTER 4) 
This figure presents the plot of coefficients on year dummies in columns (1)-(6). This figure graphically 
shows the increasing trend in the coefficients on year dummies, which implies the more tightening of rating 
standards over my sample period. 
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